#### POST CONVICTION

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179<sup>TH</sup> DISTRICT COURT

SEP 17 2018

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JUAN BALDERAS 1412826-A

**APPLICANT** 

VS.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

**RESPONDENT** 

# **VOLUME 7 OF 22**

Filed 18 March 07 P12:10 Chris Daniel - District Clerk Harris County EA001\_17877 By: L GARCIA

#### CAUSE NO. 1412826-A

EX PARTE	\$	IN THE 179 <sup>th</sup> DISTRICT
JUAN BALDERAS,	S	COURT OF
Applicant	6	HARRIS COUNTY, T E X A S

### STATE'S PROPOSED SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER DESIGNATING ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED VIA EVIDENTIARY HEARING

Based on this Court's review of the habeas record and the argument of counsel, this Court **FINDS** that the following controverted, unresolved factual issues potentially material to the legality of the applicant's confinement will be addressed by means of a narrowly tailored evidentiary hearing:

- to assist the Court in resolving the issue of whether the State either knowingly or unknowingly presented false testimony at trial through Israel Diaz, this Court will permit the applicant to attempt to present the testimony of Israel Diaz specific to whether Diaz is recanting his trial testimony, whether Diaz was pressured by the State pretrial to "change" his testimony, and whether Diaz testified falsely under oath at the applicant's trial; and
- to assist this Court in resolving the issue of whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present evidence of an alibi defense during the guilt/innocence phase of trial, this Court will permit the applicant to present the testimony of Anali Garcia and Octavio Cortes limited to what these witnesses would have stated if called to testify during the guilt-innocence phase.

Therefore, this Court **ORDERS** an evidentiary hearing to resolve these issues pursuant to **Tex. Crim. Proc. Code** art. 11.071 §§ 9, 10.

The Clerk of the Court is **ORDERED** to transmit the Court's instant supplemental order designating issues to the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Clerk of the Court is **ORDERED NOT** to transmit any additional documents in the above-styled case to the Court of Criminal Appeals until further ordered.

By the following signature, the Court adopts the State's Proposed Supplemental Order Designating Issues to be Resolved via Evidentiary Hearing in Cause Number 1412826-A.

SIGNED this \_\_\_\_\_ day of March, 2018.

The Honorable Baylor Wortham Presiding Judge by Assignment 179<sup>th</sup> District Court Harris County, Texas

3/9/2018 3:21 PM Chris Daniel - District Clerk Harris County Envelope No. 23079412 By: L Garcia

Filed: 3/9/2018 3:21 PM

### IN THE 179TH DISTRICT COURT HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS

		Trial Cause No.
EX PARTE	)	1412826-A
Juan Balderas,	)	
APPLICANT	)	
	)	
	)	

### MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO PREPARE FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING

Juan Balderas, through his attorneys the Office of Capital and Forensic Writs (OCFW), requests this Court grant an extension of time to prepare for evidentiary hearing. For the reasons set out below, good cause exists to justify the granting of an extension to May 11, 2018, in order to allow counsel for Mr. Balderas adequate opportunity to prepare for the evidentiary hearing.

On February 26, 2018, the OCFW and the Harris County District Attorney's Office were contacted by the Court's coordinator regarding scheduling of the evidentiary hearing as early as April 4, 2018. The OCFW respectfully requested an evidentiary hearing date on or after May 10, 2018, due to scheduling conflicts beyond the control of Mr. Balderas's counsel. Specifically, the conflicts include a filing deadline in mid-March for an initial application in a case involving 25

terabytes of discovery; an oral argument in late March; and an evidentiary hearing in Hunt County scheduled for late April that is expected to last at least one week.

Under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 11.071, this Court is authorized to grant an extension to an applicant seeking an evidentiary hearing. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.071 § 9(b). The Court may do so if it finds good cause exists. *Id.* In light of the OCFW's obligations in other cases, including the multiple conflicts prior to May 11, 2018 detailed above, good cause exists in this case to allow for a reasonable delay for this evidentiary hearing.

As the state agency charged with representing capital defendants in their state habeas proceedings, the OCFW, which is located in Austin, Texas, accepts appointment to cases that have resulted in a capital sentence after September 1, 2010. Writ proceedings in these cases typically take place in the trial courts in which the cases were originally tried; therefore, counsel represent clients in court proceedings in counties across the State of Texas. The OCFW staff works diligently to provide the highest caliber representation to each of its clients.

While counsel for Mr. Balderas focus on the litigation of this evidentiary hearing, they also must devote attention to other cases with equally pressing deadlines, many of which were set prior to the February 22, 2018 status hearing at which this Court granted an evidentiary hearing, and all of which require travel to other counties to appear in court on behalf of clients. Counsel for Mr. Balderas make

this extension request in good faith and because they require the additional time to prepare adequately for the evidentiary hearing.

#### PRAYER FOR RELIEF

For the foregoing reasons, Applicant prays this Court would grant the extension of the evidentiary hearing to May 11, 2018.

Respectfully submitted,

DATED: March 9, 2018

/s/ Katherine Froyen Black

ERIN M. ECKHOFF (No. 24090910) (E-Mail: Erin.Eckhoff@ocfw.texas.gov)

KATHERINE BLACK

(E-Mail: Katherine.Black@ocfw.texas.gov)

**Post-Conviction Attorneys** 

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1700 N. Congress Avenue, Suite 460

Austin, Texas 78701

(512) 463-8600

(512) 463-8590 (fax)

Attorneys for Mr. Balderas

#### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, declare and certify that I have served the foregoing Motion for Extension of Time to Prepare for Evidentiary Hearing to:

Criminal Post-Trial Harris County District Clerk 1201 Franklin Street, Suite 3180 Houston, Texas 77002 Judge Baylor Wortham Jefferson County Courthouse 1085 Pearl Street Beaumont, TX 77701

Harris County District Attorney c/o Farnaz Faiaz Hutchins 1301 Prairie, 5<sup>th</sup> Floor Houston, TX 77002

This certification is executed on March 9, 2018 at Austin, Texas.

KATHERINE FROYEN BLACK

3/9/2018 3:21:25 PM Chris Daniel - District Clerk Harris County Envelope No: 23079412 By: L GARCIA Filed: 3/9/2018 3:21:25 PM

## IN THE 179TH DISTRICT COURT HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS

EX PARTE Juan Balderas, APPLICANT	Trial Cause No. 1412826-A ) [PROPOSED] ORDER ) _ )
	ORDER
On this date, the Court consi	dered Applicant's Motion for Extension of Time
to Prepare for Evidentiary Hearing.	. After due consideration, Applicant's Motion is
GRANTED. The evidentiary heari	ing will begin on May 11, 2018.
ORDERED AND SIGNED	on this day of March, 2018.
	The Honorable Baylor Wortham Judge Sitting by Assignment,
	179th Judicial District Court

3/9/2018 4:06 PM Chris Daniel - District Clerk Harris County Envelope No. 23082508 By: L Garcia Filed: 3/9/2018 4:06 PM

### IN THE 179TH DISTRICT COURT HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS

EX PARTE		Trial Cause No. 1412826-A
EXTARIE ,	<i>)</i>	141202U-A
Juan Balderas,	)	
APPLICANT	)	
	)	
	)	

#### MOTION FOR AN ORDER DESIGNATING ADDITIONAL ISSUES FOR FURTHER FACTUAL DEVELOPMENT

Mr. Balderas, through his counsel, hereby moves this Court for an Order Designating Additional Issues for Further Factual Development.

At a status hearing that took place on February 22, 2017, and via a follow-up electronic communication to counsel for both Mr. Balderas and the State, this Court ordered both parties to submit proposed supplemental orders designating several additional issues identified by the Court as requiring further factual development to take place via live testimony at an evidentiary hearing, pursuant to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 11.071, section 9(a). *See* February 22, 2017 Writ Hearing Transcript, attached hereto as Exhibit A, at 60.

Accordingly, Mr. Balderas, through his counsel moves this Court for an order designating the following issues for further factual development via live evidentiary hearing:

A. Mr. Balderas's First and Second Grounds for Relief: That His Due Process Rights Were Violated When the State Obtained a Guilty Verdict Through the Knowing Use of False Evidence Under Giglio and Napue and/or Through The Use of False Evidence Under Chabot and Chavez

Mr. Balderas requests this Court issue an order designating further factual development, via live evidentiary hearing, of the whether a key State's witness at trial, Israel Diaz, testified falsely against Mr. Balderas.

B. Mr. Balderas's Fourth Ground for Relief: That His Trial Counsel Were Ineffective at the Guilt/Innocence Phase of His Trial For Failing to Investigate and Present Alibi Evidence

Mr. Balderas requests this Court issue an order designating further factual development, via live evidentiary hearing, of whether his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel at his trial when they failed to investigate and present evidence of Mr. Balderas's alibi, including the testimony of key alibi witnesses Anali Garcia and Octavio Cortez.

Mr. Balderas respectfully requests this Court issue an order designating the above issues for further factual development via live evidentiary hearing.

Respectfully submitted,

DATED: March 9, 2018

/s/ Katherine Froyen Black
KATHERINE FROYEN BLACK

ERIN M. ECKHOFF (No. 24090910) (Email: Erin.Eckhoff@ocfw.texas.gov) KATHERINE FROYEN BLACK (No. 24099910)

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Attorneys for Mr. Balderas

#### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, declare and certify that I have served the foregoing Motion for Extension of Time to Prepare for Evidentiary Hearing to:

Criminal Post-Trial Harris County District Clerk 1201 Franklin Street, Suite 3180 Houston, Texas 77002 Judge Baylor Wortham Jefferson County Courthouse 1085 Pearl Street Beaumont, TX 77701

Harris County District Attorney c/o Farnaz Faiaz Hutchins 1301 Prairie, 5<sup>th</sup> Floor Houston, TX 77002

This certification is executed on March 9, 2018 at Austin, Texas.

/s/ <u>Katherine Froyen Black</u> KATHERINE FROYEN BLACK

1	REPORTER'S RECORD VOLUME 1 OF 1 VOLUMES
2	TRIAL COURT CAUSE NO. 1412826-A
3	EX PARTE, JUAN BALDERAS ) IN THE DISTRICT COURT )
4 5	vs. ) HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
6	STATE OF TEXAS ) 179TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
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10	WRIT HEARING
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14	On the 22nd day of February, 2018, the following
15	proceedings came on to be held in the above-titled and
16	numbered cause before the Honorable Baylor Wortham,
17	Judge Presiding, held in Houston, Harris County, Texas.
18	Proceedings reported by computerized stenotype
19	machine.
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1	APPEARANCES
2	Ms. Faraz Hutchins SBOT NO. 24063791
3	Ms. Shawna L. Reagin SBOT NO. 16634900
4	Assistant District Attorney 1201 Franklin, Suite 600
5	Houston, TX 77002 Telephone: (713) 274-5800
6	Counsel for the State
7	
8	Ms. Erin Eckhoff
9	SBOT NO. 24090910
10	Ms. Katherine Froyen Black SBOT NO. 24099910
11	Office of Capital and Forensic Writs 1700 N. Congress Avenue, Suite 460
12	Austin, TX 78701 Telephone: (512) 463-8503
13	Counsel for the Defendant
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1 P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 2 THE COURT: So everybody ready to proceed? 3 MS. ECKHOFF: Yes, sir. MS. HUTCHINS: Yes. 4 5 THE COURT: The Court will call Cause No. 1412826-A, ex-parte, Juan Balderas. I'll note for 6 7 the record that Mr. Balderas is present in the courtroom 8 this afternoon. 9 Counsel, since we are on the record, can I have each of the attorneys identify themselves for the 10 11 court reporter and your respective clients, please. 12 MS. HUTCHINS: Farnaz Hutchins, spelled 13 F-a-r-n-a-z; last name Hutchins, H-u-t-c-h-i-n-s. For 14 the State. 15 MS. REAGIN: Shawna Reagin, S-h-a-w-n-a 16 R-e-a-g-i-n for the State of Texas. 17 MS. ECKHOFF: Erin Eckhoff with the Office of Capital and Forensic Writs on behalf of Mr. Balderas. 18 19 MS. BLACK: Katherine Froyen Black, from 20 the Office of Capital and Forensic Writs for 21 Mr. Balderas, as well. 22 THE COURT: Well, Counselor, I know, just procedurally -- I guess we can kind of address this. 23 We're here for, I guess, essentially a status conference 24 is how he would probably label it. I know because we've 25

had a substitution of judges on this case, it takes some time for -- obviously for myself to get a little bit more familiarized with the case and also to kind of come back and readdress certain issues.

So my goal here this afternoon isn't to readdress necessarily all of the issues that were covered in the prior hearing. I know that was a very lengthy hearing and I was able to review the record.

And I think most of the statements that I think you have speak for themselves.

issues in more of a cursory manner. From the onset,

I'll note in the filings that each of the parties

submitted that it's very apparent from the record that

the respective attorneys in this case have worked very,

very hard and diligently on this, both the counsel for

Mr. Balderas and the counsel for the State. It's very

evident from the filings and the work product of the

attorneys that both counsel genuinely care about this

case. It's very important to them. So I want to

commend each of the attorneys for the outstanding

representation you've shown your respective clients from

the get-go.

And I say that, having dealt with a lot of bad lawyers. It's very refreshing to actually see some

good lawyers that do good work on a case. I do want to commend each of you for the work that you have put forth into the case and are continuing to do so, thus far.

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Getting somewhat into the crux of the matter, I know, Ms. Eckhoff, you filed a request, asked for a live evidentiary hearing on a litany of issues. So, they're somewhat voluminous, but I'll consolidate those. From the get-go, we have issues relating to recanted testimony or the alleged false testimony of two witnesses, Mr. Israel Diaz and Mr. Christopher Pool. There's also an issue relating to Brady disclosure of impeachment evidence, although I think technically that would be under the category of Giglio, but I think it's still under the same parameters. Multiple issues relating to ineffective assistance of counsel, issues pertaining to jury's exposure to outside influences. And then another category, which I would, I guess, label as constitutional law issues relating to jury charge and voir dire and other aspects such as that.

So, one of the things that I noted at the get-go was the dispute about whether or not there's a, I guess, mandatory or obligatory right to have an evidentiary hearing to develop some of these matters.

Having read the State's response, I think there's merit in their response in that the Supreme Court case law

recited by counsel for Mr. Balderas was really more 2 limited in scope to issues relating to mental competency 3 or really mental ability relating to somebody being medically diagnosed with an IQ below a certain ` 4 5 threshold. Here we're looking at a little bit more broader issues. So Ms. Eckhoff, having read the filings, I don't believe that's one of the allegations that's 8 9 been raised in your habeas corpus is that your client is 10 below the requisite IQ in order to be death penalty 11 ineligible. Is that correct? 12 MS. ECKHOFF: That's correct. But, Your 13 Honor, I would point out that US Supreme Court precedent 14 in Evitts V. Lucey makes clear that due process applies 15 in situations where, like here, the State has 16 instituted a process, right, by creating Article 11.071 17 of the court of the Texas Rules of Criminal Procedure. 18 The State has undertaken a post conviction writ process. 19 And to the extent that the State has done that, then due 20 process applies. 21 So, I don't believe that a more limited reading of Panetti and Ford is actually the case. Those 22 23 particular cases pertain to those issues, but they are guidance on the issue of due process applying in post 24 25 conviction, more generally.

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THE COURT: Okay. Well, I mean, I'll take that argument certainly under consideration; but I do think that although the Court has discretion, in order to allow the development of evidence in certain categories, if warranted under the circumstances, I don't know that it necessarily equates to an absolute right on any potential issues. The Court's belief is that each individual issue will turn on its own circumstances. So...

And I'll rule on that, too. I think that the State was accurate in that the evidentiary hearing is really a matter to be developed. Evidence after the fact, as necessary, but not necessarily to be used as a fishing expedition or a means to -- where evidence could theoretically exist, to allow it to probe every possible nook and cranny.

My take on it has always been that if there is indication of where evidence is likely to exist or issues that are certainly undisputed that need to be developed, that may be the appropriate avenue. But with each of that being said, let's kind of dive into the weeds. Specifically, we have the first issue of the recanted testimony and false testimony that was alleged in the briefing.

We have Israel Diaz -- and having not

presided over the actual trial itself, I'm playing a 2 little bit of catch-up with the facts. But was Mr. Diaz presented as a cooperating witness on behalf of the 3 State's case in chief? 5 MS. HUTCHINS: By "cooperating witness," 6 Judge, you mean he was himself charged with a different 7 capital murder that was reduced to an aggravated robbery. He had pled guilty to the aggravated robbery 9 and it was open for sentencing after he testified in 10 Mr. Balderas' case and I believe two other cases. 1.1 Ultimately, he only testified in Mr. Balderas' case. 12 did not testify in the two other cases because they 13 ended up trying different cases that didn't involve him. 14 All of this information was made known to 15 the jury, it was put out. I believe he testified in his 16 original jumpsuit from the jail and made all of that 17 information aware to the jury and was cross-examined on it, as well. 18 19 THE COURT: Was there, whether it be an 20 written or oral understanding, I guess, between the 21 counsel for Mr. Diaz and the district attorney's office 22 that if he had provided testimony in the case or presumably had agreed to provide truthful testimony in 23 the proceedings, that that would have been taken into 24 25 consideration in his own case?

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1 MS. HUTCHINS: Judge, I don't want to 2 misspeak. There was a formal written notice given to 3 defense counsel who tried the case from State's counsel. 4 I believe it's -- it's been filed, it's in the district 5 clerk's office. I just don't have a copy of that with me today. So whatever the terms were or whatever it 6 was, was disclosed to trial counsel at the time. I know that the defense has asked for 8 9 other writings, communications within the DA's office 10 relating to information about Mr. Diaz' plea deal. 11 was all addressed prior to my coming on the case, I 12 believe it was in 2015. And having read the transcripts 13 and correspondence, whatever existed that wasn't 14 otherwise covered by work product privilege was already 15 turned over to the Office of Capital Writs. So there 16 shouldn't be anything that remains. As far as I know, 17 there were no promises, there was nothing. THE COURT: Okay. Well, in any event, at 18 19 some point after the conclusion of Mr. Balderas' trial I 20 understand, Ms. Eckhoff, that that witness has since 21 indicated that a portion or -- all or at least a portion 22 of his testimony was untruthful or has since been 23 recanted? MS. ECKHOFF: That is correct. 2.4 25 THE COURT: And certainly, to what extent

has that witness made that declaration?

investigator, he explained what testimony of his was false and -- on two different occasions. He did not sign an affidavit to that effect, citing concerns raised by his attorney. However, he confirmed, when presented with the affidavit, that the information in that was correct. So I understand, obviously, that we do not have a sworn document on that; but that is exactly the reason that an evidentiary hearing is necessary here, so that the witness can be subpoenaed and questioned under oath and we have an opportunity to ask him about that.

THE COURT: Well -- and this is a question

I have and maybe it's just more of a practical

consideration. Obviously, counsel who represented

Mr. Diaz was instructing him not to give a sworn

affidavit because if he had given sworn testimony during

the course of the trial that he is now admitting is

false, then he would be admitting committing perjury,

which in and of itself is a crime and carries punitive

consequences.

So to the effect that even if this witness was produced and were put on the stand and placed under oath, do you have confidence that questions that you posed about whether or not he gave false testimony would

result in him revoking his Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify?

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MS. ECKHOFF: I cannot tell you how he would testify. I don't have any insight into that, but we need the opportunity to try. We need the opportunity to try and present that evidence to this Court. We need that in order to satisfy Mr. Balderas' right to due process.

THE COURT: Well, any time I think you have a communication that somebody has changed their testimony or has recanted their testimony -- that is, of all the categories, one that certainly caught my attention the most. You've talked about either presenting the investigator to testify, although obviously, the issue you run into there is some hearsay issues.

The most reliable way to present that evidence would be through that particular witness, though that witness is not willing to testify without invoking the Fifth. Rather than going through that process of bringing him over here just to have a five-minute hearing to have him invoke the Fifth and not answer any questions, I don't know if you've had any conversations with his attorney to see whether or not he is willing to come and testify at a hearing about those

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matters or if he's been advised by his attorney to 1 2 invoke the Fifth; but certainly I think that would be 3 something that would be somewhat helpful to know whether or not it would be a fruitful endeavor to even produce 4 5 him as a witness. 6 MS. ECKHOFF: Yes, we have not had 7 contact. And I can't say what his attorney has told 8 him. To the extent he's still even represented, I don't 9 know even know that. 10 THE COURT: Well, I think ethically, as a 11 judge presiding over a case, if there's a possibility 12 that somebody is going to testify and possibly 13 incriminate themselves in any capacity, I think, 14 ethically I'm bound to at least admonish that witness as 15 to their constitutional rights and if they're indigent 16 or incarcerated, to appoint an attorney to represent 17 their interests. 18 MS. ECKHOFF: Sure. THE COURT: I think that's another issue 19 20 that would need to be addressed to certainly protect 21 Mr. Diaz' rights if he's going to be possibly produced 22 at a hearing. Okay. 23 Well, let's discuss Mr. Pool. I looked 24 through the briefing and I've scanned through it several 25 I don't know how extensive his involvement is

discussed, but if you could share with me specifically the scope you believe that his was false. Has he also recanted his testimony?

MS. ECKHOFF: No, Your Honor. We -- at trial, he provided testimony. He testified in the punishment phase. He had been a corrections officer at the Harris County Jail and was called by the State to testify, I believe, about a discovery in contraband, I think. And, in the course of that it came out -- in the course of his testimony, he recognized that he had been essentially let go from the Harris County Sheriff's Office due to an incident with an inmate where the inmate actually died.

And through the -- you know, he made appeals through personnel. And it was notable because the issue was not only that this incident occurred and the inmate ended up dying, but that part of the reason that he was let go was because he was found to have been dishonest about something which is, of course, significant.

When this case came out at trial -- at the trial in cross-examination, trial counsel did not have his personnel file. And he said on the stand that he had been cleared of all of those charges. And that actually wasn't true because a review of his personnel

1 file, including what he was relying on to say he was cleared of all charges, doesn't actually clear him of 2 dishonesty and doesn't clear him of this incident where 3 4 the inmate died; but rather, it says that he could be 5 rehired. So, like, part of his punishment was that 6 7 he could not be rehired by Harris County Sheriff's 8 Office. And what he got, you know, cleared of was 9 actually the punishment was reduced. He wasn't cleared 10 of being dishonest. 11 THE COURT: Okay. 12 MS. ECKHOFF: And it's a misdemeanor. 13 proof for that is the personnel record that contradicts his testimony. 14 THE COURT: Well --15 16 MS. ECKHOFF: So I don't necessarily 17 actually believe testimony from him in a live hearing is 18 necessary. There are records on that. 19 THE COURT: That was going to be my next question, if that can be established through the records 20 developing the testimony through cross-examination 21 22 probably with some very fruitful --23 MS. ECKHOFF: Correct. 24 THE COURT: Okay. Next on the issue we 25 have the matter relating to the disclosure of the

impeachment information relating to a witness, I think, 1 2 pertaining to one of the notes. Through the attorney 3 notes or investigator notes? 4 MS. HUTCHINS: They're attorney notes, 5 Judge. THE COURT: Well, my understanding is --6 7 what the rule requires is whether -- they opposing 8 counsel has provided the notes themselves is typically irrelevant. What the courts care about is whether or not the information is conveyed, whether that be 10 11 conveyed via email, or orally, or whatever capacity, as 12 long as it was shared with the opposing counsel prior to 13 trial at a time when it could still be useful and 14 effective. 15 So I'm reading everyone's briefing 16 correctly. It seems that the information was conveyed 17 over to opposing counsel, at least, prior to trial, but 18 it was shortly before trial. I think it was three days. 19 Is that the allegation? 20 MS. HUTCHINS: So, Judge, we have looked at it in two different ways sort of based off the 21. argument that defense is making now. According to the 22 affidavit, trial counsel, Mr. Godinich, he was aware of 23 24 it pretrial. There's no timeline from him. He said in 25 his review of all of the documentation from the DA's

office, which was over a series of years that we have based off of his time sheets, he reviewed the entirety of the file. These notes were amongst the things that he's reviewed, he was aware of them.

In terms of trying to pinpoint an exact timeline, I think the defense makes light of this email that existed at least we know three days before testimony started. At minimum, we know three days before they were made aware of some meetings that occurred and that's sort of, in terms of a timeline, the best we can qualify. But Mr. Godinich says he was aware of it well before. Prior prosecutors on the case say that these notes were available in the State's file for defense to review. The defense did review the State's file and that was back in 2010, 2011.

And one thing I did want to mention to the Court that we didn't include in our briefing, I came across it again in preparing for this hearing, is that Mr. Godinich actually in presenting Walter Benitez, I believe, one of his -- his star defense witness, Mr. Benitez actually testifies to some of the contents of these notes and the meetings that were held several days before the murder talking about what was discussed at the murder and the hit being put out.

So I just wanted to bring that to the

Court's attention that they were able to make use of that evidence, even if it was three days; but we certainly believe it was years before.

MS. ECKHOFF: There's a few different points I would like to address here. First of all, I think the State misunderstands the significance of the pretrial hearing, at least the significance to us. Okay.

These notes that were withheld were impeachment because on multiple occasions years before the trial, the State's star witness against Mr. Balderas gave contradictory statements. What he says in those happened is not what he testified to. They're prior inconsistent statements. Right? That was not revealed three days before at this pretrial hearing. Right? This is not what that pretrial hearing disclosed.

I raised that because in Mr. Godinich's and Mr. Nunnery's affidavits, they make the assertion that they knew about all of these things and incorporated them. And what I'm telling you is that in viewing trial counsel's own emails amongst the defense team, it makes clear that they were unaware of these meetings until three days before.

I fully acknowledge that they have notice of that three days before, or whatever, at this pretrial

hearing. However, those meetings were discussed in the notes. Diaz had provided that information to the State.

So, for State -- or for the trial counsel to be like,

Hey, I'm surprised to find out that this is the State's theory of what happened, you know, just a few days before trial, calls into question their assertion that they viewed these notes before and incorporated them into their preparations.

And further, I will also note that

Mr. Godinich doesn't actually say that he saw the notes.

His affidavit says the notes were viewed. It doesn't
say who viewed them or when they were viewed. And they
also, both trial counsel -- and Mr. Nunnery's statements
is even more vague. It's, I was aware that the notes
existed.

Doesn't say how or anything to give you any more information than that. So I think that that vagueness is a real issue. And there's a case here of Harris County, ex parte Prevost where the CCA has remanded on one of these writs because trial counsel's affidavits were vague.

The other issue is in their affidavits they both say that they incorporated the knowledge that they gained from reviewing these notes into their cross-examination of Mr. Diaz. Again, these notes

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pertain to prior inconsistent statements that Mr. Diaz' 1 had made to the State. There are no questions on 2 cross-examination of Mr. Diaz at trial about prior 3 4 inconsistent statements or even prior meetings with the 5 State. So, that doesn't seem to match up with what trial counsel is asserting in their affidavits. 6 7 And I think what we need here is the 8 opportunity to cross-examine. You know, the Supreme 9 Court says that reliability in proceedings like this is 10 best determined through the crucible of 11 cross-examination. We need to be able to ask these 12 questions and get past the vague answers and know what 13 we're actually dealing with here. And that's really all we're asking for is an opportunity to confront witnesses 14 15 against Mr. Balderas and present evidence because we 16 haven't had that opportunity yet. 17 THE COURT: The issue that, as far as the disclosure goes, in the defense counsel's affidavit they 18 19 stated, at least from the record it was clear, that in 20 the hearing it was laid out or made known, the 21 inconsistent statements. 22 MS. ECKHOFF: No, they said -- my understanding is that the hearing was where the State 23 24 went in and said, This is what our theory of the case 2.5 is.

They didn't say, This is our theory of the case. We are going to rely on Mr. Diaz to do it. And oh, by the way, he said contradictory things to us before.

The inconsistent statements were not an issue at the previous trial hearing.

MS. HUTCHINS: Judge, if I may respond?

THE COURT: You may.

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MS. HUTCHINS: I think we have, I guess, two different frame works that we're are looking at if I'm understanding correctly. So at the pretrial hearing that happened, the State proffered what they were going to prove through various witnesses. And one of the things that they proffered was that they were going to provide testimony, that there was a meeting three days before the murder. And at that meeting there was a hit put out on the complainant, the defendant was present at that meeting; and it was just made known that that's — that the hit was out.

When Mr. Godinich returns to the office,
I'm assuming, is when he writes this email. And he
writes the email to the defense team that says, We
learned some information. We learned the State's
case -- a part of their theory of their case and it's
the first time that we've heard about meetings three

days before and three days after the meeting.

I've reviewed the transcript from the hearing. There was never any mention of the meeting three days after. I believe Mr. Godinich made an error in that regard in writing that front portion of the email. And so -- and he asked the defense team for any insight into this.

Well, when you -- and so that's the extent of sort of, at least on the transcript, what was revealed from the meetings that were held three days before. There is a portion in the transcript where Mr. Nunnery specifically asked, I believe twice, "Three days before? Three days before?" Which in reviewing it -- again, we are reviewing paper documents -- it becomes of note because looking at the Diaz notes, the Diaz notes do mention meetings. And they mention meetings nine to ten months before. And they mention meanings that appear to be different with no timeline, but there's never specifically a three-day meeting that's mentioned in the notes.

So that's the point that I was trying to make in my written motion was that this element of surprise that appears in Mr. Godinich's email is not mutually exclusive from him, his having prior reviewed the contents of the notes or somebody having told him

the notes or whatnot because that three-day number never exists in the notes. In terms of the entirety of notes, the entirety of the notes deal with three different conversations that were had with Mr. Diaz and the State's attorneys back in, I believe it was, 2007 and 2008.

And these conversations deal with a host of different extraneous offenses. They jump around, the names are sort of confusing as to who's participating in what, what's happening where. And those are the notes -- the rest of the contents of the notes are what Mr. Godinich and Mr. Nunnery say they were aware of the information in that note -- in those notes before trial.

I know defense counsel is now making a distinction, Well, if they knew it, they certainly didn't use it at trial. Well, that's trial strategy. That's how they want to conduct their cross-examination. Just because they didn't specifically cross-examine on a point that Mr. Balderas now wishes they had doesn't mean that they were ineffective and doesn't mean that they didn't know about it, and I think that's the key issue here.

MS. ECKHOFF: I think there's two points to make to that. One is you're presuming a lot. The State is presuming a lot about what Mr. Godinich's email

This is something we should ask him, he should meant. be providing those answers. We shouldn't be basing it 2 on what the State is interpreting. 3 4 Second of all, and to a similar point is 5 that the State -- trial counsel may or may not have a strategy. Those are things that they can testify to 6 themselves that they should be cross-examined on. It's 8 very easy in a post-conviction case for trial counsel to 9 come in and say any error was due to strategy. And 10 that's clearly not always the case because if that was 11 the case, we wouldn't have post-conviction relief. And they need to be tested on what that strategy was and 12 13 what the thinking was and we need to be able to prove 14 whether it was or was not strategy. 15 We don't -- we should not just take their 16 assertion, or in this case the State's assertion that it 17 must have been strategy. That's just not how these proceedings should work. We need the right to confront 18 19 these witnesses. 20 MS. HUTCHINS: Just one more thing, if I 21 may? THE COURT: Please. 22 MS. HUTCHINS: Separate from this, I just 23 want to move it along. One of the cases that Counsel 24 25 referenced was Prevost saying that that case was out of

Harris County, which it was, and that it was sent back
because the affidavits were so vague. The affidavits in
Prevost were much different than the ones that were
filed here. And in that particular case, they were
sent back for additional affidavits to clarify some of
the points that were made, which is also certainly
something this Court is able to do.

THE COURT: I understand. And that's something I've noted, as well. Ultimately, as I understand it, the attorney affidavit referenced that they had access to the notes and the notes were viewed by somebody on the defense counsel team -- it doesn't necessarily state who -- that ultimately at the time the affidavits were drafted, the defense counsel was aware of, I guess, the contentions of these inconsistent statements and had not indicated in their affidavits, at least that I saw from review of the affidavits, that there was information that they were not privy to or did not have access to, just from our review of the affidavits. That's certainly an aspect that I will take under consideration.

Next, let's address the matter of ineffective assistance of counsel. Now, I know there are at least four different caveats you've raised in your petition that address ineffective assistance of

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counsel on trial counsel and right of capacities. And so first, I'll note that as a basic 2 3 premise under Strickland the Courts have always addressed this that ineffective assistance of counsel 4 5 that would amount to representation that was so deficient that essentially the defendant did not have an 6 7 attorney assisting in the trial. 8 MS. ECKHOFF: No. Your Honor, it's 9 whether or not errors were made that would cause 10 prejudice. And the prejudice is whether or not even one 11 juror would have changed their mind. 12 THE COURT: Okay. Well -- so let's kind 13 of probe these individually. And again, I note -- I say 14 that noting certainly, as you noted, with any trial 15 strategy that, you know, hindsight is always 20/20. 16 Sometimes an attorney can, you know, roll the dice 17 thinking that outcome may have one result and have a 18 different result. And in my experience, having 19 previously dealt with dozens and dozens of 22.55s and 20 doing the issues of ineffective assistance of counsel 21 this is an area that I have some experience. So we'll just tackle these individually. 22 23 We're talking about the first issue, I think, you've raised in the guilt-innocence phase to 24 25 address, investigate or present information on alibi

Essentially, I guess, you're alleging that evidence. 2 counsel didn't do enough information to investigate the 3 case prior to it being tried? 4 MS. ECKHOFF: Correct, their investigation 5 was inadequate. 6 THE COURT: Okay. And specifically, in 7 what regards? MS. ECKHOFF: First of all, we know that 8 9 these witnesses exist. We've provided affidavits from 10 And the only point at which a trial counsel in a 11 capital case should not be investigating is if they have 12 a reasonable basis for not investigating. Right? And 13 there's no indication here that there was no -- there 14 was a reasonable basis for failing to investigate the 15 guilt phase aspects of this case. 16 Clearly the guilt phase, the State's case 17 against Mr. Balderas was anything but open-and-shut. I mean, we have a jury that had to deliberate for more 18 than two days before, you know, finding him guilty and 19 20 only after, as you've already mentioned, the extraneous influences on them did they come to a guilty verdict, 21 22 you know. And there are still serious questions about whether or not Mr. Balderas committed this crime. 23 And the guilt phase could have -- trial 24 counsel could have presented, could have discovered and 25

presented alibis. And there's no indication that they actually sought to investigate, talked to people.

I mean, if you read their affidavits they make very clear that they blame any lack of investigation on their part on Mr. Balderas himself, or on his family and friends. And Rompilla v. Beard makes very clear that that is no excuse for not investigating the case.

THE COURT: Well, let me pose this question to you: Rather than asking defense counsel to come and question them about the failure to investigate certain factual matters that you think would pertain to guilt/innocence, why not just present evidence on those particulars that you've addressed at a evidentiary hearing? In other words, if you believe that there is additional evidence that exists that was not reflected in the record that would pertain or reflect on actual innocence, why not petition the Court to bring in witnesses to develop that evidence at the habeas corpus level?

MS. ECKHOFF: That is a part of what we would present at a live evidentiary hearing because it's important to note that this Court is going to have to make credibility determinations about witnesses. We have provided affidavits from these witnesses in order

to support -- to meet our pleading burden in filing the application.

And I want to make clear that -- and even the State notes this in their brief -- that we are not required to plead evidence with our application. We are only required to allege the facts which, if proven true, might result in relief. And we have met that burden here and we do that by attaching affidavits. We have those affidavits, we want to call those witnesses, and we want you to hear them testify so you can assess credibility.

THE COURT: And that kind of relates to my original question. My main goal and my main focus that certainly gets my attention is the issue of wrongful convictions. And if there's evidence that was not presented or was even unknown at the time that could weigh on a person's conviction that would indicate that the wrong -- an innocent person has been convicted of this crime, or the wrong person has been convicted that it comes up after the fact or is newly discovered, then that a -- at any time post trial, and certainly in the habeas corpus setting, that that would be an appropriate time to do that.

So what evidence is it that you believe exists that was not properly developed that needs to be

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developed at this point? What witnesses, specifically
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    by name, do you need to call in order to develop that
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     testimony?
                  MS. ECKHOFF: The specific witnesses that
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    we've attached affidavits from are Anali Garcia --
                   THE COURT: Any witnesses that you believe
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    exists that would offer testimony that would bear on the
    innocence of your clients.
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                   MS. ECKHOFF: Right. So we have at least
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     two witnesses, Anali Garcia and -- I apologize, Octavio
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    Cortes.
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                   THE COURT: And Ms. Garcia, what is her
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     relevance or relation to this case?
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                   MS. ECKHOFF: She is an alibi witness.
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                   THE COURT: Okay. And her testimony was
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     not presented during the original trial?
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                   MS. ECKHOFF: No.
                   THE COURT: Okay. And then Ms. Cortes,
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19
     what is her relevance in this case?
                   MS. ECKHOFF: It's Octavio, it's a mister.
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                   THE COURT: Sorry, Mr. Cortes.
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                   MS. ECKHOFF: Actually, it's Ms. Garcia's
    brother. Also an alibi witness.
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                   THE COURT: Are those witnesses located
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     within the subpoena power of this court or are they
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located in Mexico or any other location that's outside 2 of the subpoena power? 3 MS. ECKHOFF: I believe at least Ms. Garcia is in Texas. And Mr. Cortes, the last that 4 5 we spoke to him, was within the United States. I'm not sure his current location. MS. HUTCHINS: May I be heard? 8 THE COURT: Ms. Hutchins, let me hear from 9 you on that aspect. Obviously, I quess the contention 10 is that the original trial counsel were aware of these 11 witnesses elected not to present their testimony at 12 trial for whatever, whether it be strategy or whether or 13 not they found that witness to be credible. 14 MS. HUTCHINS: Correct, Judge. 15 Mr. Godinich specifically identifies Ms. Garcia in his 16 affidavit and has notes from meetings with Ms. Garcia; 17 likewise, met with Iliana Cortes, who is also a sister. 18 Mr. Octavio Cortes, my understanding is, is the brother. This is a family with whom the defendant's brother has a 19 child with one of the sisters. I can't remember if it's 20 Iliana or Anali. So in essence, it would be, like, his 21 22 in-laws. The defense was aware of Ms. Garcia and 23 Ms. Cortes, met with them, specifically spoke with them 24 about the alibi defense which would be that Mr. Balderas 25

was at the house making illegal copies of CDs at the
time and wasn't allowed to leave when news broke out of
the murder. But during these meetings these witnesses
had very vague recollections, couldn't provide any
recollections, no specifics, were told that they had to
go meet with the defense attorney by Mr. Balderas'
girlfriend so they showed up not really knowing why they
were there.

And ultimately, defense counsel made the decision that they did not have any either useful or admissible evidence that they can present at trial and chose not to. And I believe there's documentation attached to Mr. Godinich's affidavit, as well as some of the exhibits the defense has attached to their own writ application that support this.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. ECKHOFF: That's not entirely correct because while Ms. Cortes, I do believe, was taken to meet with defense counsel, Ms. Garcia did not meet with defense counsel in person. In fact, she called them up on her own to reach out to them. They never reached out to her. And they didn't discuss, like trial counsel — there's no indication that they discussed any aspect of an alibi with her, they were asking her more about mitigation issues of you know, What's your relationship

like with Mr. Balderas? And is he a nice guy, type thing. They didn't broach the alibi with her. They never discussed it with her.

THE COURT: Well, outside of these particular witnesses, are there any other areas that you felt that the trial attorneys failed to adequately investigate which you believe or note that evidence exists that needs to be established on the record?

MS. ECKHOFF: And to be clear, Your Honor, there may be additional witnesses, additional alibi witnesses beyond what we have attached. Right? There were other members of the family, et cetera. However, those are the affiants that we documented to meet our burden.

Beyond that, trial counsel also didn't conduct an investigation into the actual gang.

Obviously, this was a gang shooting. And to better understand the structure of the gang and how it operated in order to confront the State's depiction of how the gang worked and, you know, the State said that

Mr. Balderas had to be the shooter for one reason or another because of, like, essentially gang politics.

And there are witnesses who can provide insight, who provided insight to support our application on how the gang actually operated.

1 And had they done that, then they could 2 have actually confronted the State's depiction of how this all went down. And if that were the case, they 3 4 could have poked holes and challenged what they were 5 telling the jury. THE COURT: And who were those particular 6 7 witnesses that would have testified on those particular matters? 9 MS. ECKHOFF: In particular, Jose Perez 10 and Walter Benitez. Now, Walter Benitez did testify as 11 a defense witness at trial; but there was more that he 12 could have provided which is detailed in the affidavit 13 attached to the application. 14 THE COURT: Okay. And Mr. Perez' 15 testimony would have been, I'm guessing, in line of what 16 Mr. Benitez would have testified to? 17 MS. ECKHOFF: Correct. THE COURT: Any other areas that you feel 18 19 were not properly investigated but factually needed to 20 be established on the record or that would establish 21 their actual innocence or wrongful conviction? 22 MS. ECKHOFF: And to an extent, the eyewitness identification, which is a different part but 23 sort of a related piece of the ineffective assistance of 24 counsel guilt claim which is that, you know, aside from 25

Mr. Diaz, the State's other key witness against 1 2 Mr. Balderas was an eyewitness who is testifying, you know, more than nine years after the fact about her 3 4 memory of that night. 5 And the line-up procedures that she was put through before making the identification were 6 7 suggestive and problematic. And her identification in the first place was a problematic because initially she 8 9 says immediately after the fact, you know, her first 10 recollection in speaking with law enforcement is, I've 11 never seen this guy before. I didn't know who he was. 12 And then it's only more than a week later, 13 after viewing a lineup with Mr. Balderas' picture in it 14 the day before, she says, Oh, yes. That's him. 15 And that's significant because she knew 16 Mr. Balderas for up to a year before this incident 17 occurred. So, that's questionable in the first place. 18 So trial counsel investigated this eyewitness 19 identification and the circumstances surrounding it, and investigated the eyewitness herself. There is evidence 20 21 out there that the eyewitness, Ms. Bardales, had had a 22 relationship with Mr. Diaz, who the State had also 23 brought to her a lineup with his picture in it before 24 this.

And she was, like, Oh, yes, I know him.

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And she had had a prior relationship with him. And I
think that that is -- if these facts had been presented,
I think that that could have been important because I
think something else that's really key to this -- it's a
complicated case -- is that Mr. Diaz' had a motive to
kill this victim.

This victim was going to be a witness against him in an aggravated robbery case. He had the motive to kill, not Mr. Balderas. And if you combine that with, you know, the eyewitness' prior relationship with Mr. Diaz that can cast further doubt on her already shaky identification.

And then, of course, that leads into the issue of the eyewitness identification expert and how that happened. And I'm happy to go into that now or we can address this first and get there.

THE COURT: I don't think we need to dive into the full fleshed-out matters of that. Again, I've read the transcripts in the prior hearing; but if I understand it correctly, the issue is that there was identification, an eyewitness expert that was detained or noticed by the defense to be used but ultimately not called?

MS. ECKHOFF: Correct. He gave testimony outside the presence of the jury because trial counsel

attempted to get the identification thrown out. 2 Judge ruled that the identification was coming in, but 3 the trial counsel could present this expert to the jury. 4 This expert who provided information about, you know, 5 why the lineup procedures were suggestive and how that may have impacted an identification. And trial counsel just never presented this information for the jury. MS. HUTCHINS: Judge, might I be heard? 8 9 THE COURT: Briefly, yes. 10 MS. HUTCHINS: Judge, in terms of that 11 there, in fact, was a hearing on the record with 12 Dr. Malpass, the ID expert. And after his testimony to 13 the Court and then after another defense witness, 14 Celeste Munoz testified again in another hearing outside 15 of the presence of the jury, the defense brought up with 16 the Court their concern about a particular case that 17 they had found. And they cite that in the record. It's 18 in Volume 29, Page 14. 19 And they specifically tell the Court that 20 in light of what they found and in this case they are 21 worried that it's -- that by presenting Dr. Malpass, 22 they are going to open the door. And the Court 23 specifically says, you know, I'm not familiar with that 24 case. I don't think it's going to open the door, but 25 again, I'm not familiar with that case.

1 And she's also said she's not familiar 2 with all of the different extraneouses that exist. And 3 so I think it's clear at that point that the defense had 4 this excerpt, they put on the testimony for the Court, 5 they've heard how the testimony of Ms. Munoz is going to go, as well as Dr. Malpass. They have this case law and 6 7 amongst themselves at that point made a reasonable 8 decision that they know the case better than the judge 9 and chose not to present this witness. 10 THE COURT: Ultimately, the testimony of 11 the witness was, at least, established on the record, 12 although it would be outside the presence of the jury, the evidence was at least recorded on the record for 13 14 review. Correct? 15 MS. ECKHOFF: It's essentially, yeah, a 16 proffer. 17 THE COURT: Okay. 18 MS. ECKHOFF: And just to be clear, the 19 Court's ruling on two different occasions in this case, 20 you know, both when Dr. Malpass was present and when 21 she's speaking about when Ms. Munoz was at issue, the 22 Court's ruling was that Dr. Malpass could testify 23 without opening the door about suggestive lineup 24 procedures. 25 THE COURT: Okay. I think that kind of

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covers the issue of evidence that was not presented unless, Ms. Eckhoff, is there anything else that we have 2 3 not addressed that we need to cover on the issue of 4 trial counsel's failure to present certain evidence that 5 you believe related to guilt or innocence? MS. ECKHOFF: No, I believe that's it. 6 7 THE COURT: Okay. I note there the next 8 point where you've got trial counsel's failure to 9 present certain testimony of witnesses from Mexico. And my recollection from the transcripts and from the record 10 11 was that there had been attempts to obtain those 12 witnesses. Again, they're outside the subpoena power of 13 the Court, but they voluntarily appeared electronically 14 through Skype or some sort of other teleconference 15 network but because of technical difficulties, some of 16 the testimony was cut short. And then another witness 17 refused to testify or was unable to because of technical difficulties? 18 19 MS. ECKHOFF: That's my understanding in 20 terms of how the actual Skype testimony went was that once -- as it was being presented, there were technical 21 22 difficulties, I believe, on this side of things that was 23 making it incredibly difficult and it was sort of abandoned. 24

And the claim is actually that trial

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1 counsel didn't preserve for the record the trial Court's 2 denial of the funds. So there are some indications in 3 emails between trial counsel and the judge that he was 4 trying to get funds in order to bring these witnesses in 5 physically from Mexico to testify. And the Court informs him that she's basically not going to do that and to come up with some other way of doing it. And, of course, eventually at the trial it doesn't work very 9 well and it all gets abandoned. 10 Because trial counsel never made that 11 request on the record and it was never denied on the 12 record, it was not an issue that could be addressed on 13 appeal. So the claim is that they were ineffective for 14 failing to preserve the denial of funds on the record. 15 THE COURT: Okay. Well -- and again, at least as to the request for denial of funds, as far as 16 questioning defense counsel, it seems like that's 17 18 something that's not so refuted. The record will speak 19 for itself whether or not they raised an objection or 20 not. But as far as the affidavit goes, you're not contending that there's any ambiguity in their responses 21 22 to that allegation? MS. ECKHOFF: They're -- if I recall 23 correctly, I don't believe their affidavit addresses 24 25 their failure to make that request on the record at all.

THE COURT: Next we've got the trial counsel's purported failure to allege the right to a speedy trial. I do note that there's, I think, eight years between that had passed between the date of the alleged offense and then the date of trial, which is a significant amount of time. Albeit, in a capital case, it's not out of the ordinary to have a considerable amount of time to pass, especially for defense counsel to be -- have time to prepare for trial.

My experience, usually time is usually an ally of the defense. So it's fairly seldom that I see defense counsel wanting to go to trial rather quickly. But on looking at the issue of prejudice, is there a particular piece of evidence or a particular way that you feel your client was prejudiced by not going to trial sooner versus the date that the trial actually commenced?

MS. ECKHOFF: Well, Your Honor, there was a key mitigation witness who died during that time, Mr. Balderas' brother. And because this case, you know -- because this case involved such weak evidence against Mr. Balderas in the first instance, it all basically comes down to one eyewitness who has a shaky identification and a codefendant who literally flips a day before Mr. Balderas' trial begins, that

recollections -- I mean, we have an entire claim that there was this alibi. Right?

If they had investigated and discovered this alibi, like, those memories of the night eight years ago would arguably be much stronger closer in time. I think that all of that -- and I take your point that I'm sure that it is the case that the defense would usually want to wait longer to go trial, but I think that that presumes that there's actually an active adequate investigation happening.

There are long, long periods in that eight years where it's wholly unclear whether any significant investigation, particularly into the guilt phase of this case, was ever occurring.

THE COURT: Okay. And then finally, alleged ineffective assistance of counsel as to the jury selection process talking about the topic of sexual abuse during voir dire. In what capacity was that particularly an issue in this case?

MS. ECKHOFF: Mr. Balderas himself. A key piece of the mitigation that trial counsel presented at trial was his own history of sexual abuse. And it was definitely a key component of the mitigation that they presented in his defense. And despite knowing that well in advance of conducting voir dire, they didn't ask any

questions of potential jurors that might kind of sauce out their own experiences with sexual abuse or their understanding of it, those sorts of things that could help them identify whether that would be a juror where evidence of this type might resonate.

THE COURT: Well, so what was -- was the issue to try and identify jurors that had been victims of sexual abuse?

MS. ECKHOFF: It's -- no, not necessarily. It's to their views, and their understanding and how they might receive that evidence.

it's kind of not an exact art on what things you may want to raise with a jury or may not want to raise with a jury. Certainly, logical things that would relate in a capital case would be issues relating to the death penalty, issues relating to prior criminal convictions, criminal history, people's belief on whether someone could be rehabilitated.

All those things certainly would be very, very relevant; although, I think that would clearly fall squarely within the issue of trial strategy of someone not wanting to raise the issue of sexual abuse with a jury in that it could also be a double-edged sword. You have people that have very strong feelings relating to

that topic. That may also result in jurors being -- I

guess, having the fans flamed on somebody they'd be more

inclined to convict versus one they'd be more inclined

to find at issue with mitigation and possibly having to

qualify the jurors before they've even decided guilt or

innocence is a bit of a challenge. But that issue, I

think, may be a little bit tougher issue.

I think generally in voir dire, appellate

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courts have given lawyers a little bit more leeway in strategy in qualifying jurors. But other than raising the issue of -- the defendant's issue of people's experience of sexual abuse or their own attitudes towards it, or any other areas within the voir dire process of the trial, you felt that the trial counsel is deficient and would warrant needing to be presented as a witness to be examined further at an evidentiary hearing?

MS. ECKHOFF: I don't believe so.

THE COURT: We've gone about an hour and my customary practice is about every hour to take about at least a 10-minute break to let everybody use the restroom and, more importantly, to let our court reporter get a brief of rest of the hands. So why don't we do that, take a 10-minute recess and then we resume at 35 minutes past the hour.

1 (Recess taken.) 2 THE COURT: All right. We're back on the 3 record. I think we're getting towards the tail end of the issues that we needed to address. 4 5 Ms. Eckhoff, next on my list was the issue 6 pertaining to the jury's exposure to certain outside influences. And I know we'll address each of those individually, but I just want to make sure that I'm 8 9 clear. Are you asking the Court to bring in individual 10 jurors from that trial and question them pertaining to 11 their deliberations and those influences? 12 MS. ECKHOFF: No, I don't think it's 13 necessary to question them about their deliberations. 14 And I understand that that's not even permissible under 15 606(b). 16 THE COURT: Correct. 17 MS. ECKHOFF: What I do think is important is to hear how they interpreted these events. It's 18 19 impossible, I think, to assess whether these were extraneous influences that could affect a juror. And I 20 think this is why, as we somewhat discussed at the prior 21 22 hearing, you know, this isn't about these specific

The standard -- the law makes clear that

jurors and their specific decision and whether they can

say that this affected their decision or not.

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the question is whether or not these events would
basically have impacted a hypothetical juror in their
position. Right? I think it's important to -- well,
because it can't be them, specifically. It's someone
sitting in a situation like them. Is it possible or
likely that someone experiencing that would be affected
and have it affect their verdict?

What is important to hear from the jurors is what they saw, how they -- what the reaction was and how that felt and how it impacted them. And then you can take that information to understand, okay, if someone -- a hypothetical juror was feeling that, could it have impacted their verdict.

And I think another key piece of this claim is the timing of when the Court addressed this on the record. That's another key piece of this claim.

And it's really unclear, even from all of the information that has been presented in the application and in the State's response to it, we still don't have a clear timeline of when the Court became aware that this had happened. And that's really important because we have indication — we provided an affidavit from a person who was sitting in the courtroom that day, a member of Mr. Balderas' family who says that the Court was informed that this had occurred before the verdict

came back at the guilt phase.

And if that's the case -- and yet it wasn't actually addressed on the record or acknowledged until after the verdict came in and after everybody took a lunch break -- that violates his rights to due process. That is something that should have been addressed on the record before the verdict came in. The impact that that had on the jury should have been assessed prior to their verdict.

I'm clear on this. You're not making any contention that there was any juror misconduct by a member of the jury, that they had engaged in any impermissible investigation or disregarded any of the Court's instructions not to investigate any factual matters on their own outside of the evidence presented in court?

MS. ECKHOFF: Well, we have the extraneous influence portion of this claim and then there are specific claims of juror misconduct. For example, there was a juror who, in violation of the court's orders, was posting about his experience sitting on the jury on Facebook and had responses from his Facebook friends, you know, saying, you know -- yes, Give him the chair.

But with regards to these extraneous influences, no. There's no allegation that the jurors

have gone beyond, these were things that happened to them.

of several of those jurors that were attached as exhibits. And I do note that those affidavits tend to be very detailed and descriptive. They generally tend to be consistent with the issues of the location of the hotel, and that several of the jurors were aware that the location of the crime scene was a relatively short distance from the location of the hotel. But I didn't see anything in the affidavits that indicated that jurors actually went to the location of the crime scene or were transported by the crime scene to and from their transportation from the hotel by the court during sequestration.

MS. ECKHOFF: I think that that's correct as far as I know, as well; but I think what's something to keep in mind and what they noted, right, is they had just sat through days of testimony about this gang and where in southwest Houston it operated. And they were hearing names of streets and all of this and then they're passing all of these streets on their way.

So they know that they're being taken closer and closer and being asked to stay very close to where this happened within the area where the gang at

1 issue in this had operated. I think that is more than, 2 you know, seeing the crime scene itself. It's how 3 that -- how that concerned them. 4 THE COURT: Well, the concerns they had, 5 though, I mean, are those concerns not reflected in the affidavits that have been tendered as exhibits? 6 MS. ECKHOFF: No, I believe that they are reflected in their affidavits. 8 9 THE COURT: Okay. So as far as presenting testimony at an evidentiary hearing, it would seem to 10 11 me, though, the concerns that were raised were pretty 12 well documented in their affidavits. As far as needing 13 to bring a juror into court and place him under oath and 14 ask him questions about that, it seems, though, their 15 concerns relating to the location of that hotel were 16 pretty well documented. 17 The other issue is the concerns about 18 Mr. Balderas' brother purportedly waving at the bus. 19 And I'll note it doesn't seem that he was ever located 20 by the bailiffs or whether it was every actually 21 confirmed if it was, in fact, Mr. Balderas' brother. 22 But there was a person waving that was believed to have 23 been a relative, which also was documented in the affidavit, as well. 24

I'll note that the concern being, as

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reflected by the jurors, was that some of them felt somewhat frightened or that their safety was not being appropriately addressed. But wouldn't you agree that if the jurors are generally feeling as though in a capital case involving a gang in the Houston area, that generally speaking the juror issues pertaining to juror intimidation have historically been towards jurors being reluctant to convict because they were intimidated or were afraid of consequences versus convicting because them felt intimidated? I mean, generally speaking, if a juror is

I mean, generally speaking, if a juror is saying that they felt threatened or intimidated, usually they were reluctant to convict because they're afraid of repercussions coming from convicting a gang member.

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MS. ECKHOFF: I would -- in all honesty,
Your Honor, this is actually the only case that I've had
where this has been an issue. And while I see your
point, I could just as easily see a juror deciding that
they want to punish him more because they're scared and
felt like -- that someone associated with them trying to
intimidate them. I can't presume to know how a juror is
going to go one way or the other.

THE COURT: I say that -- my background traditionally has been in federal courts dealing with large-scale drug trafficking cases involving the Gulf

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cartel or the zeta that cartel where obviously there 2 were multiple instances of cartel members or gang 3 members attempting to influence either witnesses, or 4 jurors, or other ways in order to affect the outcome of the case. And so that's something that obviously 6 7 exists and is recognized in jurisprudence. It may be more recognized at the federal level; but, I mean, just 8 9 as a practical matter of speaking one of the things that 10 jumped out at me was that if jurors felt, I guess, 11 intimidated, just logically thinking at it, wouldn't it seem to be more inclined to curry to the defendant's 12 13 favor versus -- versus not necessarily being more 14 inclined for conviction? 15 I didn't see anybody -- anywhere in the 16 affidavits that one of the jurors indicated that they 17 were more inclined to convict because they were either angry, or upset, or were aggravated because of that 18 19 occurrence. 20 MS. ECKHOFF: Well -- and Your Honor, I 21 would point out that that is exactly -- I believe would 22 fall under 606(b). Right? That's actually -- that would be evidence of their own deliberations. And 23

25 admissible evidence, but I think --

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that's why it isn't in their affidavit. It's not

THE COURT: Let me rephrase it. It didn't seem as though the jurors indicated that they had taken a hostile approach. It seems that generally the tone of the affidavits were that the jurors were afraid and concerned because of it, because they felt that there were lapses in security and there should have been more higher level of scrutiny or security that should have been given to their safety by the court system and by the bailiffs that were assigned to them.

MS. ECKHOFF: I think that's certainly a key, a piece of how they felt; but I mean, they are seeing this person that they understand to be a relative of Mr. Balderas and they're interpreting him as trying to intimidate them and create these feelings of fear. There isn't -- I don't know of any evidence at this point in the record one way or the other, honestly, about either being more or less likely to convict based on that experience. But that is clearly an experience that could impact their verdict.

THE COURT: Okay. And then finally I have what I've labeled as the kind of constitutional issues. I think we can move through many of these rather quickly because I don't think they're necessarily going to warrant any calling of any live testimony or develop anything from an evidentiary standpoint.

MS. ECKHOFF: Correct, they're questions 2 of law. 3 THE COURT: But I did want to cover them 4 very quickly just to make sure that I understand that we 5 are on the same page, that I'm not making any 6 assumptions on whether or not you were asking the 7 Court -- the right to present witnesses. So first is whether or not the death 8 9 sentence is allegedly unconstitutional because of a jury 10 instruction that was requested, but not given. I think 11 specifically that a single no vote would result in a 12 life sentence. And so you've raised that as a 13 constitutional issue. I'm assuming that there's no --14 there's no witnesses or any factual matters that you 15 feel you need to develop in order to make that argument? 16 MS. ECKHOFF: I would note that we have 17 provided affidavits from jurors that indicate that there 18 were holdouts at the punishment phase that may have, if 19 they had understood that being -- that they didn't need 2.0 to bring nine of their friends along with them to find 21 for LWOP, that they may have done that. And we've 22 documented that, as best we could, in the affidavits

that we attached to the exhibits and -- I'm sorry,

potentially could require some further factual

exhibits that we attached to the application and that

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development, but I'm not -- I can't specifically recall at this moment if there's anyone in particular. 2 3 THE COURT: Okay. Next, you allege that 4 the death sentence was allegedly unconstitutional 5 because it was arbitrarily and capriciously assigned based upon response to Special Issue No. 1 did not define key terms that were requested by defense and also 8 poorly failed to narrow the class of death eligibility 9 to defendants. 10 And again, that seems to be a 11 constitutional issue that just turns on the instruction 12 to the jury. So same thing, I take it there's no other 13 witnesses you're needing, requesting the Court to 14 subpoena or come forward for an evidentiary hearing? 15 MS. ECKHOFF: That's correct. 16 THE COURT: And then finally: The death 17 sentence is ultimately unconstitutional because the 18 punishment charged allegedly limited the evidence the jury could find mitigating. Again, it's same issue 19 dealing with the jury instruction. 20 21 MS. ECKHOFF: Correct. 22 THE COURT: Is there any other issue 23 that's -- that I have not addressed pertaining to, I quess, in the general constitutional law issue? 24 25 MS. ECKHOFF: No.

Finally, I think THE COURT: All right. 1 2 you had also made a request to subpoena some of the 3 prosecutors in this case or the attorneys that were actually on the prosecution team. Was that, again, in 4 5 furtherance of trying to establish the ineffective assistance of counsel claims or is that relating to 6 7 another capacity? 8 MS. ECKHOFF: Do you mean the defense team 9 or prosecutors? 10 THE COURT: Well, if I saw correctly from 11 your original petition, was there not a request for you to subpoena some of the prosecutors on this case? 12 13 MS. ECKHOFF: Yes. So the prosecutors, I 14 think, would be relevant to two issues. One is the 15 false testimony claim and the other is the Brady claim. 16 The two instances were, you know, we have alleged 17 misconduct by the State. The State has provided 18 affidavits from one of the three prosecutors who 19 provided -- who conducted this trial. We have not heard 20 from the other two, including Caroline Dozier, who was 21 present at the meetings, those earlier meetings with 22 Mr. Diaz. And the same thing with regards to the 23 24 Brady, all of the information comes from Tracy Bennett and a former prosecutor. However, clearly the State was 25

1 represented by more than just one attorney. And I can envision wanting to cross-examine the other witnesses, 2 3 as well, about their knowledge of these things. THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Eckhoff, is there 4 5 any other issue that I have not covered that you feel needs to be addressed? I know we have kind of covered 6 several other areas, some of those we covered very 8 quickly. But as far as requests to present testimony of 9

actual witnesses developed in furtherance of your clients case, is there any other witness that you're seeking the Court to be present for an evidentiary hearing that we have not discussed?

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MS. ECKHOFF: At this time, no. I believe in terms of the witnesses we have discussed, that is right. However, I would just make clear that if we were having an evidentiary hearing, it's entirely possible that additional witnesses on these same issues may arise.

THE COURT: Sure. In the realm of possibilities, I've found that just about anything is possible; but we can only work with the information that we have at hand. So I think I can work through these kind of in succinct order.

MS. ECKHOFF: Your Honor, before you do that, would it be possible for me to just make one point

that I think is relevant here and just the emphasis on 2 we need the right to cross-examine here because the 3 Supreme Court has found that the right to cross-examine 4 is a necessary component in due process in cases where 5 the stakes aren't nearly so high as they are here today 6 in cases where welfare benefits are at issue or a parole revocation. 8 And this is exactly the reason that, you 9 know, they say death is different because the Supreme 10 Court dictates that we strive for a heightened standard 11 of reliability in the outcomes of those cases. And 12 there's just some, as we've already discussed, some very 13 serious questions about whether Mr. Balderas actually 14 committed this crime. 15 THE COURT: Okay. I'll duly note that. 16 Ms. Hutchins, do you have any other final 17 thoughts that you would like to make? 18 MS. HUTCHINS: Judge, just to sort of 19 follow up on Ms. Eckhoff's final argument, while 20

MS. HUTCHINS: Judge, just to sort of follow up on Ms. Eckhoff's final argument, while jurisprudence does say that death is different, the statements that Ms. Eckhoff makes about the due process that is entitled to a defendant, there's no case law on this saying that he's entitled to that in a post conviction.

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We refer the Court back to the statute and

to the interpretation of the statute, 11.07.1 in the 2 post conviction setting and what precisely is due and 3 what is not due unto him. Also, in terms of -- I'm trying to think 4 5 of the final things just said. One moment, Judge. THE COURT: Take your time. 6 7 MS. HUTCHINS: Just trying to think of the 8 very last thing she said. 9 Oh, actual innocence. She argued that 10 there still are some very serious concerns as to his 11 actual innocence in this case. And I would just point 12 out for the court that the defendant didn't allege 13 actual innocence as a ground in his writ. He's only 14 alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. And so if 15 that is one of their concerns, then it wasn't raised as 16 a ground. 17 MS. ECKHOFF: Your Honor, he has alleged 18 serious constitutional violations that if proven to have 19 occurred would impact the verdict at the guilt phase. 20 THE COURT: Well, I think, I can probably 21 surmise by looking it all over, the established case law, any time there's going to be purported evidence of 22 23 actual innocence, that that's always going to be 24 important evidence to be considered. But let me just start by running through 25

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1 these things very quickly. If we go through the 2 constitutional art issues, it seemly to be everybody is in agreement that those are issues of law, not 3 4 necessarily of facts; that there's no contested issues 5 of fact that have to be resolved on that; and the issues that we have discussed, we can -- can be resolved 6 7 basically by reviewing the applicable law and the established record. 8 9 As to the issue of ineffective assistance 10 of counsel, the Court has reviewed the affidavits of 11 Mr. Godinich and Mr. Nunnery. The Court finds that both 12 of these affidavits are extremely detailed and have a 13 lot of specificity as to facts and many of the issues

The Court does not find that these affidavits are ambiguous and do properly go to the merits of the issues raised in the petition. And, therefore, the Court does not find that it would be necessary for those attorneys to present themselves for cross-examination and that the factual matters alleged are adequately addressed in the affidavits.

that have been raised within the petition.

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As to the Brady/Giglio disclosure issue, the Court notes specifically on the first page of Mr. Godinich's affidavit that he reviewed specifically 23 pages of notes that were from the district attorney's

office and that the information contained within those notes was used by them during the course of Mr. Diaz' -- in preparation for trial and was used by Mr. Nunnery during the course of his cross-examination.

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The Court also notes that the request as to the presentment of jurors and their exposure to outside influences, specifically as Ms. Eckhoff correctly stated, any questions that go to their specific deliberations and how they resolve the case are not admissible under the Rules of Evidence. And to ask a juror under the abstract theory of what an average juror would believe would be something that I don't think that the juror, any juror would be able to adequately weigh upon.

I feel that a juror would be able to testify as far as what their feelings and expectations were, but to look at the issue in abstract and how a theoretical juror would look at it is too speculative and would simply be unfair on a juror to have to weigh in upon that.

Again, the Court hasn't found that the affidavits submitted by the jurors are very detailed, actually go into areas that would otherwise be inadmissible; but the Court notes that there's nothing in the affidavits that necessarily warrants needing to

bring in any jurors for additional questioning or cross-examination on the factors that they were supposed 3

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However, the issues of the recanted testimony, the Court does find that there are specific issues that do warrant the development of additional testimony. Specifically, as to Mr. Israel Diaz, there is, in fact, evidence of -- that his testimony was, in fact, recanted; that Mr. Balderas be provided an opportunity to explore that testimony.

However, the Court does not find that the testimony of the investigator, Adrian De La Rosa would be probative because -- given the fact it would be a hearsay statement, the State would not be able to properly probe or cross-examine that hearsay statement based upon solely the investigator's accounts of Mr. Diaz' statement.

So the Court will provide -- will allow the applicant to subpoena Mr. Diaz. However, the Court will thus find that given there are potential issues relating to perjury, if Mr. Diaz does not, in fact, already have counsel representing him or advising him on his constitutional issues, the Court will appoint an attorney to represent him for the limited purpose of that hearing to instruct him accordingly.

Further, the Court will all allow the testimony of Anali Garcia and Octavio Cortes, who were also alibi witnesses whose testimony was never presented. The Court does give note and give consideration to the fact that trial counsel had interviewed those witnesses and did not find their testimony, their purported testimony to be credible and did not present that evidence. As officers of the Court, obviously, any attorney is precluded under the Rules of Ethics from presenting any testimony they believe to be untruthful or perjured.

However, given that there's no record of what their testimony would be, it's impossible for the Court to look in abstract to consider the testimony.

And, therefore, the Court will provide Mr. Balderas with the opportunity to present that testimony and proffer that here in court, which would also be subject to cross-examination by the State.

As to Jose Perez and Walter Benitez, the Court finds that defense counsel did present that testimony, trial counsel presented that testimony at the trial itself; and that those issues were, in fact, put before the jury and the fact finder. And based upon the juries' verdicts, the jury did not find that testimony to be credible. Therefore, the Court will not order

that those witnesses be produced. 2 So in summation, the Court will conduct an 3 evidentiary hearing involving Mr. Israel Diaz, Ms. Anali Garcia and Mr. Octavio Cortes. 4 Counsel, how much time do you require in 5 6 order to locate those witnesses and serve them with process for the hearing? MS. ECKHOFF: Your Honor, in light of my 8 9 caseload and other cases, I would anticipate -- I would 10 request six months to set the hearing. 11 MS. HUTCHINS: Judge, may I be heard? 12 THE COURT: You may. 13 MS. HUTCHINS: Judge, Article 11.07(1) 14 specifically says that if there's to be an evidentiary 15 hearing that it shall be within 30 days, or an additional 30 days for good cause. So 60 days, max. 16 17 THE COURT: I did actually print off a 18 copy of my statute and I was about to address the time 19 aspects. Counsel, I don't know that six months is 20 necessarily going to be an appropriate timeline. I 21 understand that you do have a hefty caseload and also a 22 hefty traffic schedule, given the courts that you 23 service; but at the same time, I know that this habeas 24 proceeding has carried on very much more lengthy than 25 what normally the rules are prescribed for it for

obvious procedural reasons.

And so, one of the issues I've raised is that if some of those witnesses have not been located by this time, I guess, the question I would have is are they ever going to be located? Even if you were given six months to provide them, are there particular witnesses that you do not have any means in which to contact them or to serve them with a subpoena?

MS. ECKHOFF: No, Your Honor. One of my primary concerns pertaining to the witnesses is Octavio Cortes. He's in the Marines. I am not certain at this point where he is stationed, so I cannot -- I don't know how long it might take to bring him in.

And I do recognize that this case has gone on for quite a long time, but I'd also want to make clear that, you know, we first requested this evidentiary hearing a year and a half ago and it's the State who wanted to proceed on affidavits from trial counsel that ended up taking a year. This delay to get to this point is based on what the State has requested.

I'm asking for additional time in order to be able to adequately prepare, in light of all of the other cases that I have evidentiary hearings and other cities in Texas and applications that need to be filed.

MS. HUTCHINS: Judge, if I may be heard?

1 THE COURT: You may. MS. HUTCHINS: At this point, based on 2 3 what you have stated, it seems like it's three witnesses: 4 Israel Diaz, Anali Garcia, Octavio Cortes. 5 Israel Diaz, we know where he is. THE COURT: Right. 7 MS. HUTCHINS: We can get him here within two weeks. Anali Garcia, it seems like counsel knows 8 9 where she is or at least can get hands on her. And if 10 Mr. Cortes is in the Marines and is somewhere else, that 11 may be someone that we could get a written affidavit 12 from as to what his testimony would be. 13 I know defense is very busy, they have other accounts all over the state that they go to. On 14 15 our end, we also have a caseload that we are handling. And we'd just ask if it's three witnesses, that we try 16 to work something out sooner rather than pushing it off. 17 THE COURT: Do you have specific knowledge 18 that Mr. Cortes is stationed abroad or is stationed 19 somewhere outside of the intercontinental United States? 20 21 MS. ECKHOFF: Not to my knowledge. THE COURT: Okay. Well, then this is, I 22 think, how it would be best to proceed to give everybody 23 an opportunity to do their due diligence. Until we have 24 definitive knowledge that we're not going to be able to 2.5

comport with timelines subscribed by the rules, then 1 we're going to try to adhere to the rules and conduct 2 3 the hearing within the timeframe that the rules require. If there is something that you believe 4 would warrant the Court -- I'm not even certain that the 5 6 rules would allow me to extend those deadlines for good cause; but at least I'll give you an opportunity to 7 contact those witnesses and observe in the process if 8 9 there's a particular witness that you cannot find or 10 cannot be there, we can explore the issues of whether to 11 submit their information, be it affidavit or 12 telephonically, or in what other capacity you can to try 13 accommodate those witnesses and their availability. 14 But I think, as we sit right now, the timeframe we're looking at is -- let's see. 15 16 Ms. Hutchins, you said it was 20 days? MS. HUTCHINS: Thirty days, Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: Thirty days. So if we're 18 looking for a timeframe within 30 days, we'll need to 19 20 obviously check my own calendar, as well as the calendar of the 179th to see if we can find a date within that 21 timeframe in which everyone can be available, make 22 themselves available. 23 And then, in the meantime, if you have any 24 25 issues locating those witnesses or making those

witnesses available to present their testimony, we can cross that bridge when we get there.

MS. ECKHOFF: Okay.

MS. HUTCHINS: Judge, in terms of
Mr. Diaz, is the Court going to appoint counsel,
assuming that he does not have counsel and is not
represented? Is that going to be appointed now or when
he gets back to Harris County or how is that going to
work?

attorney to represent him today since I've said that he is going to be subject to subpoena. And that's assuming that he doesn't already have counsel.

If I appoint an attorney to represent him and he contacts Mr. Diaz, and says, No, I already have an attorney, the rules don't preclude him from having multiple attorneys, but if there's another counsel that represents him we'll, at least, be able to ascertain that. But given the short time period, I would like to give the attorney enough opportunity to meet with him, discuss this issue with him, and then be able to make that particular recommendation.

Ms. Eckhoff, if the attorney that we appoint to represent Mr. Diaz indicates that he's going to recommend to his counsel to invoke his Fifth

Amendment right not to testify, are you still going to 1 2 persist in wanting to bring that witness here and have 3 him invoke his Fifth Amendment on the stand? Or are 4 you -- would that affect your decision to call him as a 5 witness? 6 And I'll allow you to make a record of 7 If you don't, you can make a record of your 8 correspondence with his attorney if that's something 9 you'd like to do. 10 MS. ECKHOFF: At this time, Your Honor, I 11 believe we would want him on record. And I will reserve 12 the right to change my mind. 13 THE COURT: Very well. 14 MS. ECKHOFF: And I would just point out, 15 to my knowledge, he's not longer incarcerated. 16 MS. HUTCHINS: I haven't checked, I don't 17 know. 18 THE COURT: Well, if he is no longer 19 incarcerated or if he's on parole, there's typically 20 other mechanisms on how to locate that witness. 21 MS. ECKHOFF: Right. 22 THE COURT: But if he is not incarcerated, 23 I'll allow your officers an opportunity to try and find 24 him and have him served. So -- and likewise, if there's 25 counsel that's been appointed, they also would probably

1 be engaged in trying to track him down. If for some 2 reason he's not incarcerated and he is located, just 3 remember that I have appointed independent counsel to 4 represent him so please refrain from directly 5 communicating with him without, at least, notifying that 6 counsel. MS. ECKHOFF: Okay. THE COURT: Is there anything else we need 8 9 to take up while we are all here on the record? 10 MS. ECKHOFF: Your Honor, I did want to raise one thing. At the last hearing the State 11 12 indicated that were going to turn over their capital 13 murder summary. They agreed that we were entitled to it 14 and they haven't turned it over and I would like a copy 15 of that, please. 16 MS. HUTCHINS: Not actually accurate, 17 Judge. 18 So the capital murder summary -- I'm not 19 sure if the Court is aware of what a capital murder 20 summary is in Harris County, Texas. It is --21 essentially, it is work product. It is quintessential 22 work product. It is what the chief prosecutor in a 23 court prepares on a capital murder cases summarizing the 24 facts of the offense, as well as any aggravating 25 circumstances and mitigating circumstances, and then

makes a recommendation up the chain of hierarchy as to what his or her recommendation is in terms of seeking death or seeking life.

So a recommendation comes from the court chief, then I believe the division chief, the bureau chief, all the way up to the assistant district attorney. And so, I mean that is essentially work product in terms of everything, their thought process and what goes into it.

In this case, it's become an issue as to whether or not it contained certain information that may be Brady. That's, I guess, what defense counsel's concern is in terms of wanting to see it. There were also -- the State is certainly aware of our obligation under Brady to turn over anything that might tend to negate his guilt or be impeachment evidence or whatnot, certainly.

The issue in this case is while capital murder summaries are work product, Spence Graham, the former prosecutor in this case provided an affidavit stating that it was in the State's file, not hidden away from defense counsel and that defense counsel had the opportunity to be able to view it.

THE COURT: And when you say "defense counsel" you mean trial counsel?

Trial counsel, correct. 1 MS. HUTCHINS: 2 Trial counsel, while the case was under Spence, had the 3 opportunity to be able to view it. Now, whether or not 4 they actually viewed it, I can't say; but it was made 5 available technically to defense counsel. Under the Rules of Discovery, as I understand them, if it's something that original trial counsel had or reviewed, 8 then trial counsel there on out would also have that 9 same ability. 10 I would like to assert the State's work 11 product privilege to it. I do believe it's work 12 product. I am prepared to turn over a copy to the Court 13 for the Court's in camera review so the court can make a 14 determination whether or not it needs to be turned over. 15 If you believe there's an impeachment or Brady evidence 16 in there, I have that copy for you, Because we would 17 like to assert our work product privilege and ensure

THE COURT: Well, I agree with you that if it's internal documents that are comprised based upon the prosecutor's assessment of the facts and their individual opinions, it sounds like it's textbook work product.

that we are not otherwise waiving our privilege to

anything else in final.

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Now, if the rules of Brady should always

apply, if there's any information in that report that is 1 2 either exculpatory or goes to the witnesses' 3 credibility, in other words, the prosecutor says, In my opinion, I don't find this witness to be truthful, or 4 5 they have the opinion of something going to credibility that potentially could be Giglio evidence, there's 6 7 always a running obligation to disclose that information. You don't have to disclose the report, but the exculpatory or impeachment evidence would need to be 10 disclosed. So I'm -- if the parties would prefer, if 11 you would like for me to view that in camera in order to 12 13 make that assessment, if it would give Ms. Eckhoff peace 14 of mind for me to do that, I'll be happy to do that. But counsel, like I said, as an officer of the court 15 16 there's always the running duty and obligation to make 17 the Brady disclosures if it's discovered. 18 MS. ECKHOFF: Right, Your Honor. 19 understand that, but the basis for our request at this 20 point is actually many slightly different than just Brady. Our original request was Brady and the original 21 response from the State was that was never turned over 22 because it was work product and we accepted that answer. 23 24 And it's only after Mr. Graham provided an affidavit 25 saying it was made available to trial counsel that we

renewed our request for that because we, as successor counsel, should have access to all of the information available to trial counsel. That's what -- we are entitled to their file and to anything that they had access to.

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And so, whether or not it contains Brady at this point is sort of immaterial because it was made available to trial counsel and we should be able to view it.

THE COURT: Well, you know, different files have different requirements on open-file policies. And I note that often district attorneys' offices or other prosecuting authorities will have discovery that exceeds the statutory and legal requirements of discovery. But if -- I don't necessarily know or, I guess it -- I would have to -- I'd probably have to go and brief the issue to see whether or not an open file policy at one time that is later amended would permanently waive work product privilege for items in that file for the duration of the case.

I don't necessarily know if that's the case or not, but if the main issue or crux of reviewing the particular documents is looking for exculpatory or impeachment information, which would be the logical purpose -- I mean, is there any other basis you would

1 have for wanting to review that, those notes or that 2 report? 3 MS. ECKHOFF: We want to have an 4 understanding of what information was available to trial 5 counsel at the time of trial. THE COURT: Well, I think you could 6 7 probably ascertain that information from the 8 discoverable items within the file, as a whole, as far 9 as what reports and documents were in the file. But if 10 this is simply the fact of whether or not to seek the 11 death penalty and then the strengths and weaknesses and 12 mitigating issues, again, this just being a summary, I 13 think probably the easiest way to address that is 14 obviously to do an in camera inspection. 15 I mean, ultimately, as I said before, the 16 goal isn't necessarily to have a fishing expedition. 17 there's particular information that you believe is going 18 to be relevant to this habeas proceeding or would weigh mitigating evidence or undisclosed bias or undisclosed 19 20 impeachment evidence, I think we could ascertain that by in camera review. 21 But is there a particular piece of 22 23 evidence that you are wanting to see if it's contained 24 within that report? MS. ECKHOFF: I have no idea what might be 25

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in the report because, as the State has indicated, that to my knowledge this is not something that is typically made available to anyone outside of their office. But for whatever reason, it was made available to trial counsel in this case.

And while I take your point that, you know, we should be able to review trial counsel's file to get a sense of what they knew and didn't know about this case, our review of trial counsel's file in this case doesn't have the notes at issue in the Brady claim.

So without them having come from the State, we would have never known that trial counsel had viewed them. It's sort of a similar situation. I can't tell you what I need to see from there because I don't have any idea what it contains, but I know trial counsel saw it or at least had it available to them. And in order to make a record of what trial counsel did or did not have going into trial and how that may have affected or contemplated -- affected their tragedy or their claims of strategy, you know, I need to be able to review what they had reviewed. That's why we go and review the Diaz file in this case.

THE COURT: Well, we're talking about a report that was based upon the prosecutor's assessment of the file. It's one thing if it was a police report

that was produced by an investigator, or a detective, or 1 2 somebody that was looking at the case. If it's just a 3 prosecutor's own assessment of the file and a recommendation based upon his opinions and viewing of 4 5 the evidence, it seems to be textbook work product. I mean, do you -- is there any case law or 6 7 do you have any authority that would go to show that if 8 something that was work product privilege that was made 9 available in an open file policy, would forever waive 10 the right to assert work product privilege? 11 MS. ECKHOFF: Not off the top of my head, 12 but I would like an opportunity to brief it. 13 Well, I will do this. THE COURT: 14 conduct an inspection review of the report. And I'm 15 specifically looking for -- we've had a lengthy 16 discussion here and it's very well briefed with the issues that you believe exist. And if there's anything 17 pertaining to relevant impeachment evidence, exculpatory 18 19 evidence or anything that would significantly weigh on the issues before us that have not already been 20 identified or discussed, then we could certainly take 21 22 that up once we get to the evidentiary hearing. If you find a case that says that the work 2.3 product has been waived because it's been voluntarily 24 disclosed and open file policy, then that's a legal 25

1 issue that would be closed in which case it would be an 2 open part of discovery. 3 MS. ECKHOFF: Okay. 4 THE COURT: So I will give you the 5 opportunity to do that and follow up with that. But 6 in the mean time, I'll accept a copy, sealed copy of the exhibit and we will review that. In which case, if there is pertinent information I'll notify the parties 8 9 accordingly. 10 MS. ECKHOFF: Thank you. 11 THE COURT: Okay. Is there anything else 12 we need to take up while we are all here on the record? 13 MS. HUTCHINS: Just to touch up on that, 14 if I may? If the Court does find pertinent 15 information, obviously it will be disclosed. If the 16 17 Court does not find pertinent information in the capital 18 murder summary, at that point I would make a motion to 19 place it under seal with the file in this case. 20 THE COURT: I will accept it right now as 21 a sealed exhibit, but if -- in that it will be maintained, confidentiality. Traditionally what I've 22 always done is if it's something that is privileged, 23 I'll return it to the submitting party because of the 24 25 fact that if it goes into the record as a privileged

1 item -- it's not something that typically would go into 2 the record because the privilege has been exerted. 3 But at this time it's been tendered as an 4 exhibit for in camera review, which we maintain sealed 5 in which case until the time the Court has had an opportunity to review it and make a determination on the 6 issues that I've already addressed. 7 Anything else that we need to take up? 8 9 MS. HUTCHINS: In terms of setting a date, 10 are we going to do that today or via email? 11 THE COURT: I will probably do it via 12 email because I'll need to bring my court coordinator 13 into the loop to make sure that I can find a date where 14 I'm not already set for trial in the 136th over in 15 Beaumont. And so I'll do my best to work with 16 everyone's schedule. 17 I understand -- I take it an afternoon 18 setting is probably preferential, but if you believe 19 that you're going to need more than just half a day to 20 present evidence, then we will set it for a morning hearing so you'll have adequate time to present your 21 22 witness and also have adequate time for 23 cross-examination. MS. HUTCHINS: And will it be here in 24 25 Houston, Judge?

1	THE COURT: That will be, I guess, by
2	default where I'll have it unless y'all would prefer to
3	come to Beaumont. If the agreement of the parties would
4	be to go there because it's more convenient, I would be
5	happy to do that; but given that this is a the
6	hearing is in Harris County and, obviously, I know
7	there's people who have been in attendance that are
8	following this case for the convenience of Mr. Balderas.
9	I was, by default, going to have it here in Harris
10	County unless the attorneys would prefer otherwise?
11	MS. ECKHOFF: No, we appreciate that, Your
12	Honor.
13	THE COURT: If there's nothing further,
14	the Court stands adjourned.
15	(Court adjourned for the day.)
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### 1 STATE OF TEXAS COUNTY OF HARRIS 2 3 I, Marcia E. Barnett, Official Court Reporter in and for the 179th District Court of Harris, State of Texas, 4 5 do hereby certify that the above and foregoing contains 6 a true and correct transcription of all portions of 7 evidence and other proceedings requested in writing by 8 counsel for the parties to be included in this volume of the Reporter's Record in the above-styled and numbered 10 cause, all of which occurred in open court or in 11 chambers and were reported by me. 12 I further certify that this Reporter's Record of the 13 proceedings truly and correctly reflects the exhibits, 14 if any, offered by the respective parties. 15 I further certify that the total cost for the 16 preparation of this Reporter's Record is \$ 421.07 and 17 was paid/will be paid by Harris County. 18 WITNESS MY OFFICIAL HAND on this, the 5th day of 19 March, 2018. 20 /s/Marcia E. Barnett Marcia E. Barnett, CSR 21 Texas CSR 5144 Deputy Court Reporter 22 179th District Court 23 201 Caroline Houston, Texas 77002 Telephone: (832) 927-3735 24 Expiration: 12/31/2019 25

3/9/2018 4:06:53 PM Chris Daniel - District Clerk Harris County Envelope No: 23082508 By: L GARCIA Filed: 3/9/2018 4:06:53 PM

# IN THE 179TH DISTRICT COURT HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS

EX PARTE Juan Balderas, APPLICANT	) Trial Cause No. ) 1412826-A ) (PROPOSED  ORDER ) )
ORDER DESIGNATING ISSUES F	OR EVIDENTIARY HEARING:
The Court designates the following is	issues in Mr. Balderas's Initial Application for
Writ of Habeas Corpus for further fac	ctual development via live evidentiary hearing:
(1) whether a key State's witness at Balderas; and	trial, Israel Diaz, testified falsely against Mr.
at his trial when they failed to inves	nsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel stigate and present evidence of Mr. Balderas's ey alibi witnesses Anali Garcia and Octavio
ORDERED AND SIGNED on this _	day of March, 2018.
	•
	The Honorable Baylor Wortham Judge Sitting by Assignment 179th Judicial District Court

### CAUSE NO. 1412826-A

EX PARTE	\$	IN THE 179" DISTRICT
JUAN BALDERAS,	\$	COURT OF
Applicant	7.	HARRIS COUNTY TEXAS

## STATE'S PROPOSED SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER DESIGNATING ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED VIA EVIDENTIARY HEARING

Based on this Court's review of the habeas record and the argument of counsel, this Court **FINDS** that the following controverted, unresolved factual issues potentially material to the legality of the applicant's confinement will be addressed by means of a narrowly tailored evidentiary hearing:

- to assist the Court in resolving the issue of whether the State either knowingly or unknowingly presented false testimony at trial through Israel Diaz, this Court will permit the applicant to attempt to present the testimony of Israel Diaz specific to whether Diaz is recanting his trial testimony, whether Diaz was pressured by the State pretrial to "change" his testimony, and whether Diaz testified falsely under oath at the applicant's trial; and
- to assist this Court in resolving the issue of whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present evidence of an alibi defense during the guilt/innocence phase of trial, this Court will permit the applicant to present the testimony of Anali Garcia and Octavio Cortes limited to what these witnesses would have stated if called to testify during the guilt-innocence phase.

Therefore, this Court **ORDERS** an evidentiary hearing to resolve these issues pursuant to **Tex. Crim. Proc. Code** art. 11.071 §§ 9, 10.

The Clerk of the Court is **ORDERED** to transmit the Court's instant supplemental order designating issues to the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Clerk of the Court is **ORDERED NOT** to transmit any additional documents in the above-styled case to the Court of Criminal Appeals until further ordered.

By the following signature, the Court adopts the State's Proposed Supplemental Order Designating Issues to be Resolved via Evidentiary Hearing in Cause Number 1412826-A.

SIGNED this 21st day of March, 2018.

The Honorable Baylor Wortham

Presiding Judge by Assignment 179<sup>th</sup> District Court

Harris County, Texas



March 26, 2018

KIM OGG DISTRICT ATTORNEY HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS

To Whom It May Concern:

Pursuant to Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, please find enclosed copies of the documents indicated below concerning the Post Conviction Writ filed in cause number 1412826-A in the 179th District Court.
State's Original Answer Filed
Affidavit,
Court Order Dated ,
Respondent's Proposed Order Designating Issues and Order For Filing Affidavit.
Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact and Order
○ Other
Sincerely,  L. Hernandez, Deputy  Criminal Post Trial

1201 Franklin • P.O. Box 4651 • Houston, Texas 77210-4651 • (888) 545-5577

Enclosure(s) – STATE'S PROPOSED SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER DESIGNATING

ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED VIA EVIDENTIARY HEARING



March 26, 2018

KELLEY REYES COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS P.O. BOX 12308 CAPITOL STATION AUSTIN, TEXAS 78711

To Whom It May Concern:

Pursuant to Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, please find enclosed copies of the documents indicated below concerning the Post Conviction Writ filed in cause number 1412826-A in the 179th District Court.

State's Original Answer Filed
Affidavit
Court Order Dated
Respondent's Proposed Order Designating Issues and Order For Filing Affidavit.
Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact and Order
Other
Sincerely,
L. Hernandez, Deputy
Criminal Post Trial

Enclosure(s) – STATE'S PROPOSED SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER DESIGNATING ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED VIA EVIDENTIARY HEARING



March 26, 2018

DEREK VERHAGEN ATTORNEY AT LAW 1700 N. CONGRESS AVE., STE. 460 AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701

To Whom It May Concern:

Pursuant to Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, please find enclosed copies of the documents indicated below concerning the Post Conviction Writ filed in cause number 1412826-A in the 179th District Court.

☐ State's Original Answer Filed ,
☐ Affidavit ,
Court Order Dated ,
Respondent's Proposed Order Designating Issues and Order For Filing Affidavit.
Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact and Order ,
Other     Other
Sincerely,  L. Hernandez, Deputy  Criminal Post Trial

Enclosure(s) – STATE'S PROPOSED SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER DESIGNATING ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED VIA EVIDENTIARY HEARING

1201 Franklin • P.O. Box 4651 • Houston, Texas 77210-4651 • (888) 545-5577

PAGE 1 OF 1

REV: 01-02-04

3/23/2018 10:27 AM Chris Daniel - District Clerk Harris County Envelope No. 23379179 By: D Day Filed: 3/23/2018 10:27 AM

## IN THE 179TH DISTRICT COURT HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS

	)	Trial Cause No.
EX PARTE	Ć	1412826-A
Juan Balderas,	)	
APPLICANT	)	[PROPOSED] ORDER
,	)	
	)	

### **ORDER**

On this date, the Court considered Applicant's Motion for Extension of Time to Prepare for Evidentiary Hearing. After due consideration, Applicant's Motion is GRANTED. The evidentiary hearing will begin on May 11, 2018.

ORDERED AND SIGNED on this 21st day of March, 2018.

The Honorable Baylor Wortham Judge Sitting by Assignment, 179th Judicial District Court



March 26, 2018

KIM OGG DISTRICT ATTORNEY HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS

To Whom It May Concern:

Pursuant to Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, please find enclosed copies of the documents indicated below concerning the Post Conviction Writ filed in cause number 1412826-A in the 179th District Court.

The try the bistrict Court.
State's Original Answer Filed
Affidavit ,
Court Order Dated ,
Respondent's Proposed Order Designating Issues and Order For Filing Affidavit.
Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact and Order ,
⊠ Other
Sincerely,  L. Hernandez, Deputy  Criminal Post Trial

Enclosure(s) -ORDER



March 26, 2018

DEREK VERHAGEN ATTORNEY AT LAW 1700 N. CONGRESS AVE., STE. 460 AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701

To Whom It May Concern:

Enclosure(s) -ORDER

4/19/2018 4:46 PM Chris Daniel - District Clerk Harris County Envelope No. 24030980 By: D Day Filed: 4/19/2018 4:46 PM

## IN THE 179th JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS

·		
	_ )	Cause No.
EX PARTE	)	1412826-A
JUAN BALDERAS,	)	
APPLICANT	)	Hearing date: May 11, 2018
	)	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	)	

## MOTION TO COMPEL DISCLOSURE OF EXCULPATO RY AND IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE

Juan Balderas, by and through his counsel the Office of Capital and Forensic Writs (OCFW), files this motion seeking production of the following materials in the possession, custody, or control of the State, relevant to the claims pending before this Court, and with respect to which this Court has set an evidentiary hearing to commence on May 11, 2018. In support of this motion, Mr. Balderas respectfully states the following:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> In this motion, Mr. Balderas uses the word "State," which should be interpreted as including, but not limited to, any member of the HCDAO, Houston Police Department, Harris County Sheriff, Harris County Probation Department, and any other governmental entity involved in the investigation of the underlying offense, the prosecution of Mr. Balderas and Mr. Diaz, the incarceration of Mr. Balderas or Mr. Diaz, or the release of Mr. Diaz.

I.

### RELEVANT BACKGROUND

On December 26, 2017, following a series of proceedings that resulted in the recusal of a prior judge, this case was reassigned to the Honorable Baylor Wortham for disposition of Mr. Balderas's Initial Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to Article 11.071 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure (Initial Application), and to dispose of any other business requested by the Court. *See* Exhibit A, Order of Assignment by the Presiding Judge. Judge Wortham contacted the undersigned counsel, Erin Eckhoff and Katherine Black of the OCFW, as well as counsel for the State, Farnaz Hutchins and Shawna Reagin of the Harris County District Attorney's Office (HCDAO), via email, requesting input regarding the scheduling of a "writ hearing" (later clarified to be a status hearing) in the case. Both parties responded, also via email, regarding the scheduling of a hearing and a status hearing was set in the matter for February 22, 2018.

At the February 22 status hearing, the Court heard argument from both parties on numerous substantive issues raised in Mr. Balderas's Initial Application. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court determined that several of the claims for relief Mr. Balderas had raised in his Initial Application warranted additional factual development via live evidentiary hearing. One of these claims was a claim that a key witness for the State, Israel Diaz, had testified falsely against Mr. Balderas at

his capital trial in 2014. The Court determined that Mr. Balderas should be provided "an opportunity to explore" the testimony of Mr. Diaz by subpoena to an evidentiary hearing; however, the Court also found that "given there are potential issues relating to perjury," that it was necessary to appoint Mr. Diaz an attorney "to represent him for the limited purpose of that hearing to instruct him accordingly." *See* Exhibit B, February 22, 2018 Writ Hearing Transcript, at 60. The Court further found that Mr. Balderas should be allowed to present the testimony of Anali Garcia and Octavio Cortes, two alibi witnesses whose testimony was not presented at Mr. Balderas's trial but who signed affidavits that Mr. Balderas filed in support of his Initial Application. *Id.* at 61.

Following the February 22, 2018 writ hearing, the Court and the parties exchanged emails regarding the scheduling of an evidentiary hearing in the case. The Court also appointed counsel for Mr. Diaz, for the limited purpose of advising him regarding constitutional (Fifth Amendment) issues.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Danny Lacayo of the Harris County Public Defender's Office. Counsel for Mr. Balderas first became aware of Mr. Lacayo's appointment via electronic communication from the HCDAO, when ADA Hutchins copied Mr. Balderas's counsel on a string of electronic messages to Mr. Lacayo. On March 19, 2018, Mr. Lacayo contacted the Court and both parties via email (attached as Exhibit C). Mr. Lacayo's email contained the following message:

My name is Danny Lacayo with the Public Defender's Office. I was assigned to represent Israel Diaz in the Writ Hearing regarding Juan Balderas. I have attached all parties involved in this email. I was reviewing the Writ and evidence attached and noticed that there was a witness named Christopher Pool who testified in the trial. The writ

For the reasons set forth below, Mr. Balderas, through counsel, respectfully requests that this Court issue an order directing the State to produce the materials listed below to counsel for Mr. Balderas.

#### II.

### ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

Mr. Balderas respectfully requests the Court order the State to disclose the following materials, all of which are relevant to specific claims pending before this Court in the Article 11.071 proceeding, including those that are the subject of the evidentiary hearing set to commence May 11, 2018, at which Israel Diaz -- a key witness for the State who testified against Mr. Balderas at trial -- is expected to

See Exh. C Page 2, email from Mr. Lacayo.

Mr. Lacayo subsequently arranged for the re-assignment of this appointment as counsel for Mr. Diaz within the Harris County Public Defender's Office. Mr. Diaz is currently represented by Genesis Draper.

alleged that he provided false testimony regarding his termination in regards to an inmate death. While at the Harris County District Attorney's Office I worked in Police Integrity for a period of time. I believe that I investigated the incident regarding Detention Officer Pool. This case was eventually presented to a grand jury which returned a no bill. I know that this is an important case to everyone and wanted full disclosure to all parties involved that I investigated one of the witnesses in this case. I am not sure if you wanted to keep me on the case and wanted your guidance. If you believe that there is some conflict I can have the case re-assigned within the Harris County Public Defender's Office.

testify.3 Mr. Balderas is entitled to these materials because he would have been entitled to them prior to trial, and because they may contain information relevant to Diaz's testimony at the upcoming post-conviction evidentiary hearing. Defense counsel are entitled to all materials "favorable" to a defendant of which the State has constructive knowledge, not just self-evidently exculpatory material. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); see also, Harm v. State, 183 S.W.3d 403, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (noting that defendants are entitled to 'favorable evidence known only to the police"). This duty to disclose includes any information that could be used to impeach witnesses against Mr. Balderas. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004); *United States v. Bagley*, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (prosecution's duty to disclose any information tending to show a witness's bias in favor of the government or against the defendant or that otherwise impeaches a witness's testimony); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (due process violated where important witness for the State in a murder prosecution falsely testified that witness

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Prior discovery provided by the State has included some exculpatory material, but counsel has a good faith belief that additional exculpatory material exists and is in the possession of the State. In light of what he has already received, and in anticipation of Mr. Diaz's testimony at the May 11, 2018 evidentiary hearing, Mr. Balderas makes the following requests for disclosure, as such information would constitute exculpatory or impeachment evidence to which Mr. Balderas is entitled under *Brady v. Maryland*.

had received no promise of consideration in return for his testimony, though in fact Assistant State's Attorney had promised witness consideration, and Assistant State's Attorney did nothing to correct false testimony); *Mooney v. Holohan*, 294 U.S. 103 (1935). Withholding of such evidence violates due process if the evidence is material to either guilt or punishment, irrespective of whether the State knowingly withheld information. *Brady*, 373 U.S. at 87. According to the Supreme Court, "[w]hen police or prosecutors conceal significant exculpatory or impeaching material in the State's possession, it is ordinarily incumbent on the State to set the record straight." *Banks*, 540 U.S. at 675-76.

The Texas discovery statute mirrors these constitutional requirements. *See* TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ART. 39.14(h) ("[T]he state shall disclose to the defendant any exculpatory, impeachment, or mitigating document, item or information in the possession, custody, or control of the state that tends to negate the guilt of the defendant or would tend to reduce the punishment for the offense charged."). This statute also explicitly extends this requirement to materials not discovered by the State until after trial. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 39.14(k) ("If at any time before, during or after trial the state discovers any additional document, item, or information required to be disclosed under Subsection (h), the state shall promptly disclose the existence of the document, item, or information to the defendant or the court."). While the underlying offense occurred before this statute was enacted, the Court of

Criminal Appeals has discussed this provision in the context of a crime that occurred before the statute's enactment, leaving open the prospect that this section applies retroactively to all offenses. *See Francis v. State*, 428 S. W. 3d 850, 856 n.12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

### III. DISCOVERY REQUESTED

In light of the State's disclosure obligations under *Brady* and its progeny, as well as the specific claims pending before this Court in the Article 11.071 proceeding, including the evidentiary hearing set to commence on May 11, 2018, counsel for Mr. Balderas respectfully request an order from this Court compelling the State to produce the following:

- 1. Copies of any and all Harris County jail records for **Israel Diaz** (DOB 04/09/1986), including, but not limited to all records and logs of visits, jail mail, complaints, grievances, write-ups, disciplinary records, classification worksheets, movement logs, and gang association information.
- 2. Copies of any and all communications and contact between **Israel Diaz** (DOB 04/09/1986), or his representatives, and the HCDAO, including, but not limited to: emails, text messages, phone messages, in-person conversations (notes and memos) and telephonic communications (and notes and memos) from 2004 to the present.

- 3. Additionally, Mr. Balderas specifically requests that any oral communications between **Israel Diaz** (DOB 04/09/1986) and the HCDAO that take place in advance of the May 11, 2018 hearing be recorded and a copy of the recording produced to counsel for Mr. Balderas in advance of the hearing.
- 4. The entire HCDAO case file for **Israel Diaz** (DOB 4/09/86) including but not limited to communications with Diaz, status notes/reports, third party communications, references to the murder of Eduardo "Powder" Hernandez, and any references to cooperation with the State in the following cases: *State v. Juan Balderas* (Cause No. 1050630); *State v. Efrain Lopez* (Cause No. 10500629 or Cause No. 1305940 or Cause No. 1428270); *State v. Jose Hernandez* (Cause No. 1050633).
- 5. Files kept and maintained by the Harris County District Attorney for any criminal case charging **Israel Diaz** (DOB 04/09/86) from 2003-2008, including all reports, notes, communications, witness lists, charging documents, promises/rewards/inducements, case resolution, and any reference to Eduardo Hernandez as a witness.
- 6. Communications, including but not limited to, emails, letters, voicemails, and any oral communications reduced to writing between employees and

- agents of the HCDAO and employees of the Harris County Department of Probation regarding Israel Diaz (DOB 04/09/86).
- 7. The entire Harris County Department of Probation case file for **Israel Diaz** (DOB 4/09/86) including but not limited to communications with Diaz, status notes/reports, third party communications, references to the murder of Eduardo "Powder" Hernandez, and any references to cooperation with the State in the following cases: *State v. Juan Balderas* (Cause No. 1050630); *State v. Efrain Lopez* (Cause Nos. 1050629, or 1305940, or 1428270); *State v. Jose Hernandez* (Cause No 1050633).
- 8. All agents' (federal, state, local and administrative agency) rough notes of interrogations or debriefings of **Israel Diaz** (DOB 04/09/86).
- 9. All prior written, recorded, or oral statements of **Israel Diaz** (DOB 04/09/86) relating to this case that were made to anyone, and all law enforcement agents' rough draft notes of interviews with Diaz.
- 10. The prior arrest and conviction records of **Israel Diaz** (DOB 04/09/86), including his complete criminal history, and the docket number and jurisdiction of all prior and pending cases.
- 11.All evidence that **Israel Diaz** (DOB 04/09/86) has ever (a) made any false statement to the authorities, whether or not under oath or under penalty of

- perjury, and/or (b) does not have a good reputation in the community for honesty. Texas Rule of Evidence 608(a).
- 12.All evidence that **Israel Diaz** (DOB 04/09/86) has ever made a false, contradictory, or inconsistent statement with regard to this case, or any statement showing bias or a motive to fabricate. *Pennsylvania v. Ritchie*, 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
- 13.All evidence that the statements of **Israel Diaz** (DOB 04/09/86) are inconsistent with or contradicted by that of any other person or prospective witness. *Kyles*, 514 U. 419.
- 14. Any express or implicit promise, understanding, offer of immunity, sentencing leniency, or of past, present, or future compensation, or any other kind of agreement or understanding between **Israel Diaz** (DOB 04/09/86) and law enforcement or prosecutorial agent or agency (federal, state, and local). This request includes any explicit or implicit understanding relating to criminal or civil income tax liability, and/or immigration proceedings. *Kyles*, 514 U.S. at 432-34.
- 15.All evidence of discussion about, or *advice* concerning, any contemplated prosecution of **Israel Diaz** (DOB 04/09/86), or any possible plea bargain, even if no bargain was made, or the advice not followed. *Brown v. Dugger*, 831 F.2d 1547, 1555-56 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1987) (Clark, J., concurring) (evidence

that witness sought plea bargain is to be disclosed, even if no deal struck) Haber v. Wainwright, 756 F.2d 1520, 1524 (11th Cir. 1985).

- 16.Copies of any and all jail records for **Alejandro Garcia** (DOB 02/02/1989), a testifying witness against Mr. Balderas at the punishment phase of Mr. Balderas's trial, including, but not limited to, all records and logs of visits, jail mail, complaints, grievances, write-ups, disciplinary records, classification worksheets, movement logs, gang association information, jobs, classes, trainings, and commissary.
- 17. Copies of any and all communications and contact between **Alejandro Garcia** (DOB 02/02/1989) and the Harris County District Attorney's Office, including, but not limited to, emails, texts, phone messages, in-person conversations and notes and memos, phone conversations and notes/memos, etc., between 2005 and present.
- 18.Copies of any and all jail records for **Edgar Rene Ferrufino** (DOB 05/10/1988), including but not limited to all records and logs of visits, jail mail, complaints, grievances, write-ups, disciplinary records, classification worksheets, movement logs, gang association information, jobs, classes, trainings, and commissary.
- 19. The Police Integrity Division file regarding Christopher Scott Pool, a former detention officer for Harris County Sheriff's Department, who was

- employed as a detention officer from May 2009 to August 2012, and who testified for the State in Mr. Balderas's trial.
- 20. The entire Internal Affairs Department investigation file regarding Christopher Scott Pool, a former detention officer for the Harris County Sheriff's Office, employed from May 2009 to August 2012, who testified for the State at Mr. Balderas's trial.
- 21.Copies of any and all records in the Permanent File of Israel Diaz Israel

  Diaz (DOB 04/09/86); TDCJ No. 1970763), including, but not limited to,
  medical and mental health screenings; IQ and educational testing; reports
  and decisions by and to the Classification Committee; visitation logs,
  disciplinary records, and all parole and probation records and documents.
- 22. All parole and probation records and documents related to **Israel Diaz** (DOB 04/09/86), including, but not limited to, medical and mental health screenings, initial interviews, reports, and decisions for incarcerations from 2003 to the present.
- 23. The entire trial file for the case of State v. Juan Balderas, as made available to Mr. Balderas's trial counsel.

#### IV.

### **PRAYER**

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Mr. Balderas respectfully requests that this Court direct the State to disclose the above-listed information to counsel for Mr. Balderas (the OCFW) within ten days of signing an order.

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Katherine Froyen Black
KATHERINE FROYEN BLACK

BENJAMIN B. WOLFF, Director (No. 24091608) (Benjamin.Wolff@ocfw.texas.gov)
ERIN M. ECKHOFF (No. 24090910)
(Erin.Eckhoff@ocfw.texas.gov)
KATHERINE FROYEN BLACK (No 24099910)
(Katherine.Black@ocfw.texas.gov)
NATALIE CORVINGTON (No. 24107401)
(Natalie.Corvington@ocfw.texas.gov)

Office of Capital and Forensic Writs 1700 N. Congress Avenue, Suite 460 Austin, Texas 78701 (512) 463-8600 (512) 463-8590 (fax)

Attorneys for Mr. Balderas

## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I, the undersigned, declare and certify that I have served the foregoing upon:

Office of the Harris County District Attorney Attn: ADA Farnaz Hutchins

This certification is executed on April 19, 2018, at Austin, Texas.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

/s/ Katherine Froyen Black
Katherine Froyen Black



# Eleventh Administrative Judicial Region of Texas

# Olen Underwood

Acting Presiding Judge

Rebecca Brite Acting Administrative Assistant

December 28, 2017

Honorable Baylor Wortham 1085 Pearl Street Beaumont, TX 77701

Dear Judge Wortham:

Enclosed please find assignment #182 for the 179th Judicial District Court of Harris County to hear Cause No. 1412826-A; Ex Parte Juan Balderas and to dispose of any other business requested by the court.

If you have any questions feel free to call.

Sincerely,

Rebecca Brite Enclosure(s)

### THE STATE OF TEXAS

### ELEVENTH ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIAL REGION

### ORDER OF ASSIGNMENT BY THE PRESIDING JUDGE

Pursuant to Section 74.056, Texas Government Code, I hereby assign the Honorable Baylor Wortham, Active District Judge, 136th Judicial District Court, to the 179th Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas.

This assignment begins the 28th day of December, 2017 and is for the primary purpose of hearing cases and disposing of any accumulated business requested by the court.

This assignment shall continue as may be necessary for the assigned Judge to dispose of any accumulated business and to complete trial of any case or cases begun during this assignment, and to pass on motions for new trial and all other matters growing out of accumulated business or cases heard before the Judge herein assigned, or until terminated by the Presiding Judge.

It is ordered that the Clerk of the Court to which this assignment is made, if it is reasonable and practicable, and if time permits, give notice of this assignment to each attorney representing a party to a case that is to be heard in whole or in part by the assigned Judge.

It is further ordered that the Clerk, upon receipt hereof, shall post a copy of this order in a prominent place in the public area of the Clerk's office. This posting shall constitute "Notice of Assignment" as required by Section 74.053, Texas Government Code.

Ordered this 28th of December, 2017.

Olen Underwood, Acting Presiding Judge Eleventh Administrative Judicial Region

Attest:

Rebecca Brite

Acting Administrative Assistant

Assignment # 182

Exh. A Page 002



# Eleventh Administrative Judicial Region of Texas

# Olen Underwood

Acting Presiding Judge

Rebecca Brite Acting Administrative Assistant

December 28, 2017

Erin Eckhoff/Katherine Froyen Black VIA email

Shawna Reagin VIA email

### NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT

The Honorable Baylor Wortham, Active District Judge, 136th Judicial District Court, has been assigned to Cause No. 1412826-A; Ex Parte Juan Balderas; 179th Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas.

Enclosure

From:

Lacayo, Danny (Public Defender"s Office)

To:

Hutchins, Farnaz (HCDA); "136clerk@co.iefferson.tx.us"; "Baylor Wortham" (136judge@co.jefferson.tx.us)

Cc:

Reagin, Shawna (HCDA); Katherine Black; Erin Eckhoff

Subject:

Date:

Tuesday, March 20, 2018 11:00:46 AM

Dear Judge Wortham.

I spoke with Natalie Corvington with the Office of Capital and Forensic Writs and Farnaz Hutchins of the DA's Office regarding the issue of my knowledge regarding Witness Christopher Pool. I have also attached all parties in this email. Natalie and the Office of Capital and Forensic Writs prefers that someone else from my office (Harris County Public Defender's Office) handle the representation of Witness Israel Diaz. Farnaz has no objection if another attorney from my office also handles the representation of Witness Israel Diaz. I wanted to make sure that it was okay for me to reassign the case to another attorney from the Harris County Public Defender's Office.

Sincerely,

## Danny Lacayo

Assistant Public Defender - Felony Division Harris County Public Defender's Office Criminal Justice Center 1201 Franklin, 13<sup>th</sup> Floor Houston, Texas 77002

Office: (713) 368-0016

Fax: (713) 368-9278

Email: Danny.Lacayo@pdo.hctx.net http://harriscountypublicdefender.org/

#### **Notice of Confidentiality**

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If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender immediately so appropriate steps may be taken to ensure the confidentiality of this transmission. The sender of this transmission does not intend to be bound by any agreement that may arise pursuant to the e-signature act or any other similar legislation. Thank you for your cooperation.

From: Hutchins, Farnaz (HCDA)

Sent: Monday, March 19, 2018 3:21 PM

To: Lacayo, Danny (Public Defender's Office); '1 36clerk@co.jefferson.tx.us'; 'Baylor Wortham'

(136judge@co.jefferson.tx.us)

Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct.

Cc: Reagin, Shawna (HCDA); 'katherine.black@ocfw.texas.gov'; 'erin.eckhoff@ocfw.texas.gov' Subject: RE:

Good afternoon,

We appreciate Mr. Lacayo bringing this to our attention and his recognition of Rule 1.10 of the Texas

We do not believe there is any conflict in Mr. Lacayo continuing to represent Israel Diaz in the upcoming evidentiary hearing, as there is no correlation between Diaz and Christopher Pool. Any involvement Mr. Lacayo had in investigating Pool during his tenure as an Assistant District Attorney is unrelated to the allegations involving Diaz. Additionally, Mr. Lacayo was not previously involved in the prosecution of Juan Balderas.

If the Court believes it is best to implement new counsel, we would respectfully ask that the reassignment be swift so as to not interfere with conducting the evidentiary hearing on May  $11^{th}$ . Per Mr. Lacayo's email, it appears reassignment within the Public Defender's Office can be efficiently undertaken.

Sincerely, Farnaz Hutchins

From: Lacayo, Danny (Public Defender's Office) [ mailto:Danny,Lacayo@pdo.hctx.net ]

Sent: Monday, March 19, 2018 2:01 PM

To: '136clerk@co.jefferson.tx.us'

Cc: Hutchins, Farnaz; Reagin, Shawna; 'katherine.black@ocfw.texas.gov'; 'erin.eckhoff@ocfw.texas.gov'

Subject:

Dear Judge Wortham,

My name is Danny Lacayo with the Public Defender's Office. I was assigned to represent Israel Diaz in the Writ Hearing regarding Juan Balderas. I have attached all parties involved in this email. I was reviewing the Writ and evidence attached and noticed that there was a witness named Christopher Pool who testified in the trial. The writ alleged that he provided false testimony regarding his termination in regards to an inmate death. While at the Harris County District Attorney's Office I worked in Police Integrity for a period of time. I believe that I investigated the incident regarding Detention Officer Pool. This case was eventually presented to a grand jury which returned a no bill. I know that this is an important case to everyone and wanted full disclosure to all parties involved that I investigated one of the witnesses in this case. I am not sure if you wanted to keep me on the case and wanted your guidance. If you believe that there is some conflict I can have the case reassigned within the Harris County Public Defender's Office.

Sincerely,

### Danny Lacayo

Exh. C Page 002

Assistant Public Defender – Felony Division Harris County Public Defender's Office Criminal Justice Center 1201 Franklin, 13<sup>th</sup> Floor Houston, Texas 77002

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                         REPORTER'S RECORD
                       VOLUME 1 OF 1 VOLUMES
2
                  TRIAL COURT CAUSE NO. 1412826-A
3
     EX PARTE, JUAN BALDERAS
                               ) IN THE DISTRICT COURT
4
    vs.
                               ) HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
5
    STATE OF TEXAS
                               ) 179TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
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                           WRIT HEARING
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          On the 22nd day of February, 2018, the following
15
     proceedings came on to be held in the above-titled and
16
     numbered cause before the Honorable Baylor Wortham,
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     Judge Presiding, held in Houston, Harris County, Texas.
18
          Proceedings reported by computerized stenotype
19
     machine.
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1	P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S
2	THE COURT: So everybody ready to proceed?
3	MS. ECKHOFF: Yes, sir.
4	MS. HUTCHINS: Yes.
5	THE COURT: The Court will call Cause
6	No. 1412826-A, ex-parte, Juan Balderas. I'll note for
7	the record that Mr. Balderas is present in the courtroom
8	this afternoon.
9	Counsel, since we are on the record, can I
10	have each of the attorneys identify themselves for the
11	court reporter and your respective clients, please.
12	MS. HUTCHINS: Farnaz Hutchins, spelled
13	F-a-r-n-a-z; last name Hutchins, H-u-t-c-h-i-n-s. For
14	the State.
15	MS. REAGIN: Shawna Reagin, S-h-a-w-n-a
16	R-e-a-g-i-n for the State of Texas.
17	MS. ECKHOFF: Erin Eckhoff with the Office
18	of Capital and Forensic Writs on behalf of Mr. Balderas.
19	MS. BLACK: Katherine Froyen Black, from
20	the Office of Capital and Forensic Writs for
21	Mr. Balderas, as well.
22	THE COURT: Well, Counselor, I know, just
23	procedurally I guess we can kind of address this.
24	We're here for, I guess, essentially a status conference
25	is how he would probably label it. I know because we've

had a substitution of judges on this case, it takes some time for -- obviously for myself to get a little bit more familiarized with the case and also to kind of come back and readdress certain issues.

So my goal here this afternoon isn't to readdress necessarily all of the issues that were covered in the prior hearing. I know that was a very lengthy hearing and I was able to review the record.

And I think most of the statements that I think you have speak for themselves.

So, my goal is to cover some of these issues in more of a cursory manner. From the onset, I'll note in the filings that each of the parties submitted that it's very apparent from the record that the respective attorneys in this case have worked very, very hard and diligently on this, both the counsel for Mr. Balderas and the counsel for the State. It's very evident from the filings and the work product of the attorneys that both counsel genuinely care about this case. It's very important to them. So I want to commend each of the attorneys for the outstanding representation you've shown your respective clients from the get-go.

And I say that, having dealt with a lot of bad lawyers. It's very refreshing to actually see some

good lawyers that do good work on a case. I do want to commend each of you for the work that you have put forth into the case and are continuing to do so, thus far.

Getting somewhat into the crux of the matter, I know, Ms. Eckhoff, you filed a request, asked for a live evidentiary hearing on a litany of issues. So, they're somewhat voluminous, but I'll consolidate those. From the get-go, we have issues relating to recanted testimony or the alleged false testimony of two witnesses, Mr. Israel Diaz and Mr. Christopher Pool. There's also an issue relating to Brady disclosure of impeachment evidence, although I think technically that would be under the category of Giglio, but I think it's still under the same parameters. Multiple issues relating to ineffective assistance of counsel, issues pertaining to jury's exposure to outside influences. And then another category, which I would, I quess, label as constitutional law issues relating to jury charge and voir dire and other aspects such as that.

So, one of the things that I noted at the get-go was the dispute about whether or not there's a, I guess, mandatory or obligatory right to have an evidentiary hearing to develop some of these matters. Having read the State's response, I think there's merit in their response in that the Supreme Court case law

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recited by counsel for Mr. Balderas was really more 1 2 limited in scope to issues relating to mental competency or really mental ability relating to somebody being 3 4 medically diagnosed with an IQ below a certain 5 threshold. Here we're looking at a little bit more 6 broader issues. So Ms. Eckhoff, having read the filings, 8 I don't believe that's one of the allegations that's been raised in your habeas corpus is that your client is 10 below the requisite IQ in order to be death penalty 11 ineligible. Is that correct? 12 MS. ECKHOFF: That's correct. But, Your 13 Honor, I would point out that US Supreme Court precedent 14 in Evitts V. Lucey makes clear that due process applies 15 in situations where, like here, the State has 16 instituted a process, right, by creating Article 11.071 of the court of the Texas Rules of Criminal Procedure. 17 18 The State has undertaken a post conviction writ process. 19 And to the extent that the State has done that, then due 20 process applies. 21 So, I don't believe that a more limited 22 reading of Panetti and Ford is actually the case. particular cases pertain to those issues, but they are 23 24 quidance on the issue of due process applying in post 25 conviction, more generally.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I mean, I'll take that argument certainly under consideration; but I do think that although the Court has discretion, in order to allow the development of evidence in certain categories, if warranted under the circumstances, I don't know that it necessarily equates to an absolute right on any potential issues. The Court's belief is that each individual issue will turn on its own circumstances. So...

And I'll rule on that, too. I think that the State was accurate in that the evidentiary hearing is really a matter to be developed. Evidence after the fact, as necessary, but not necessarily to be used as a fishing expedition or a means to -- where evidence could theoretically exist, to allow it to probe every possible nook and cranny.

My take on it has always been that if there is indication of where evidence is likely to exist or issues that are certainly undisputed that need to be developed, that may be the appropriate avenue. But with each of that being said, let's kind of dive into the weeds. Specifically, we have the first issue of the recanted testimony and false testimony that was alleged in the briefing.

We have Israel Diaz -- and having not

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1 presided over the actual trial itself, I'm playing a 2 little bit of catch-up with the facts. But was Mr. Diaz 3 presented as a cooperating witness on behalf of the 4 State's case in chief? 5 MS. HUTCHINS: By "cooperating witness," 6 Judge, you mean he was himself charged with a different capital murder that was reduced to an aggravated 8 robbery. He had pled guilty to the aggravated robbery and it was open for sentencing after he testified in 9 10 Mr. Balderas' case and I believe two other cases. 11 Ultimately, he only testified in Mr. Balderas' case. 12 did not testify in the two other cases because they 13 ended up trying different cases that didn't involve him. 14 All of this information was made known to 15 the jury, it was put out. I believe he testified in his 16 original jumpsuit from the jail and made all of that 17 information aware to the jury and was cross-examined on 18 it, as well. THE COURT: Was there, whether it be an 19 written or oral understanding, I guess, between the 20 21 counsel for Mr. Diaz and the district attorney's office 22 that if he had provided testimony in the case or 23 presumably had agreed to provide truthful testimony in 24 the proceedings, that that would have been taken into 25 consideration in his own case?

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1 MS. HUTCHINS: Judge, I don't want to 2 misspeak. There was a formal written notice given to 3 defense counsel who tried the case from State's counsel. I believe it's -- it's been filed, it's in the district 4 5 clerk's office. I just don't have a copy of that with 6 me today. So whatever the terms were or whatever it was, was disclosed to trial counsel at the time. I know that the defense has asked for 8 9 other writings, communications within the DA's office 10 relating to information about Mr. Diaz' plea deal. That 11 was all addressed prior to my coming on the case, I 12 believe it was in 2015. And having read the transcripts 13 and correspondence, whatever existed that wasn't 14 otherwise covered by work product privilege was already 15 turned over to the Office of Capital Writs. So there 16 shouldn't be anything that remains. As far as I know, 17 there were no promises, there was nothing. 18 THE COURT: Okay. Well, in any event, at 19 some point after the conclusion of Mr. Balderas' trial I 20 understand, Ms. Eckhoff, that that witness has since indicated that a portion or -- all or at least a portion 21 of his testimony was untruthful or has since been 22 23 recanted? 24 MS. ECKHOFF: That is correct. THE COURT: And certainly, to what extent 25

has that witness made that declaration? 1 MS. ECKHOFF: In speaking with our 2 3 investigator, he explained what testimony of his was 4 false and -- on two different occasions. He did-not sign an affidavit to that effect, citing concerns raised 5 by his attorney. However, he confirmed, when presented with the affidavit, that the information in that was correct. So I understand, obviously, that we do not have a sworn document on that; but that is exactly the 10 reason that an evidentiary hearing is necessary here, so 11 that the witness can be subpoenaed and questioned under 12 oath and we have an opportunity to ask him about that. 13 THE COURT: Well -- and this is a question 14 I have and maybe it's just more of a practical 15 consideration. Obviously, counsel who represented 16 Mr. Diaz was instructing him not to give a sworn 17 affidavit because if he had given sworn testimony during 18 the course of the trial that he is now admitting is 19 false, then he would be admitting committing perjury, which in and of itself is a crime and carries punitive 20 21 consequences. 22 So to the effect that even if this witness was produced and were put on the stand and placed under 23 oath, do you have confidence that questions that you 24 posed about whether or not he gave false testimony would

result in him revoking his Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify?

MS. ECKHOFF: I cannot tell you how he would testify. I don't have any insight into that, but we need the opportunity to try. We need the opportunity to try and present that evidence to this Court. We need that in order to satisfy Mr. Balderas' right to due process.

THE COURT: Well, any time I think you have a communication that somebody has changed their testimony or has recanted their testimony -- that is, of all the categories, one that certainly caught my attention the most. You've talked about either presenting the investigator to testify, although obviously, the issue you run into there is some hearsay issues.

The most reliable way to present that evidence would be through that particular witness, though that witness is not willing to testify without invoking the Fifth. Rather than going through that process of bringing him over here just to have a five-minute hearing to have him invoke the Fifth and not answer any questions, I don't know if you've had any conversations with his attorney to see whether or not he is willing to come and testify at a hearing about those

matters or if he's been advised by his attorney to 1 2 invoke the Fifth; but certainly I think that would be 3 something that would be somewhat helpful to know whether 4 or not it would be a fruitful endeavor to even produce 5 him as a witness. 6 MS. ECKHOFF: Yes, we have not had 7 contact. And I can't say what his attorney has told 8 him. To the extent he's still even represented, I don't know even know that. 10 THE COURT: Well, I think ethically, as a 11 judge presiding over a case, if there's a possibility 12 that somebody is going to testify and possibly 13 incriminate themselves in any capacity, I think, 14 ethically I'm bound to at least admonish that witness as 15 to their constitutional rights and if they're indigent 16 or incarcerated, to appoint an attorney to represent 17 their interests. 18 MS. ECKHOFF: Sure. THE COURT: I think that's another issue 19 20 that would need to be addressed to certainly protect Mr. Diaz' rights if he's going to be possibly produced 21 22 at a hearing. Okay. Well, let's discuss Mr. Pool. I looked 23 through the briefing and I've scanned through it several 24 I don't know how extensive his involvement is 25

discussed, but if you could share with me specifically the scope you believe that his was false. Has he also recanted his testimony?

MS. ECKHOFF: No, Your Honor. We -- at trial, he provided testimony. He testified in the punishment phase. He had been a corrections officer at the Harris County Jail and was called by the State to testify, I believe, about a discovery in contraband, I think. And, in the course of that it came out -- in the course of his testimony, he recognized that he had been essentially let go from the Harris County Sheriff's Office due to an incident with an inmate where the inmate actually died.

And through the -- you know, he made appeals through personnel. And it was notable because the issue was not only that this incident occurred and the inmate ended up dying, but that part of the reason that he was let go was because he was found to have been dishonest about something which is, of course, significant.

When this case came out at trial -- at the trial in cross-examination, trial counsel did not have his personnel file. And he said on the stand that he had been cleared of all of those charges. And that actually wasn't true because a review of his personnel

file, including what he was relying on to say he was 1 2 cleared of all charges, doesn't actually clear him of 3 dishonesty and doesn't clear him of this incident where 4 the inmate died; but rather, it says that he could be 5 rehired. 6 So, like, part of his punishment was that 7 he could not be rehired by Harris County Sheriff's 8 Office. And what he got, you know, cleared of was actually the punishment was reduced. He wasn't cleared 9 10 of being dishonest. 11 THE COURT: Okay. 12 MS. ECKHOFF: And it's a misdemeanor. 13 proof for that is the personnel record that contradicts 14 his testimony. 15 THE COURT: Well --16 MS. ECKHOFF: So I don't necessarily 17 actually believe testimony from him in a live hearing is 18 necessary. There are records on that. 19 THE COURT: That was going to be my next question, if that can be established through the records 20 21 developing the testimony through cross-examination probably with some very fruitful --22 23 MS. ECKHOFF: Correct. 24 THE COURT: Okay. Next on the issue we 25 have the matter relating to the disclosure of the

1 impeachment information relating to a witness, I think, 2 pertaining to one of the notes. Through the attorney 3 notes or investigator notes? MS. HUTCHINS: They're attorney notes, Judge. THE COURT: Well, my understanding is --6 7 what the rule requires is whether -- they opposing 8 counsel has provided the notes themselves is typically irrelevant. What the courts care about is whether or 10 not the information is conveyed, whether that be 11 conveyed via email, or orally, or whatever capacity, as 12 long as it was shared with the opposing counsel prior to 13 trial at a time when it could still be useful and 14 effective. 15 So I'm reading everyone's briefing 16 correctly. It seems that the information was conveyed 17 over to opposing counsel, at least, prior to trial, but it was shortly before trial. I think it was three days. 18 19 Is that the allegation? 20 MS. HUTCHINS: So, Judge, we have looked 21 at it in two different ways sort of based off the argument that defense is making now. According to the 22 affidavit, trial counsel, Mr. Godinich, he was aware of 23 it pretrial. There's no timeline from him. He said in 24 his review of all of the documentation from the DA's 25

office, which was over a series of years that we have based off of his time sheets, he reviewed the entirety of the file. These notes were amongst the things that he's reviewed, he was aware of them.

In terms of trying to pinpoint an exact timeline, I think the defense makes light of this email that existed at least we know three days before testimony started. At minimum, we know three days before they were made aware of some meetings that occurred and that's sort of, in terms of a timeline, the best we can qualify. But Mr. Godinich says he was aware of it well before. Prior prosecutors on the case say that these notes were available in the State's file for defense to review. The defense did review the State's file and that was back in 2010, 2011.

And one thing I did want to mention to the Court that we didn't include in our briefing, I came across it again in preparing for this hearing, is that Mr. Godinich actually in presenting Walter Benitez, I believe, one of his -- his star defense witness, Mr. Benitez actually testifies to some of the contents of these notes and the meetings that were held several days before the murder talking about what was discussed at the murder and the hit being put out.

So I just wanted to bring that to the

Court's attention that they were able to make use of that evidence, even if it was three days; but we certainly believe it was years before.

MS. ECKHOFF: There's a few different points I would like to address here. First of all, I think the State misunderstands the significance of the pretrial hearing, at least the significance to us. Okay.

These notes that were withheld were impeachment because on multiple occasions years before the trial, the State's star witness against Mr. Balderas gave contradictory statements. What he says in those happened is not what he testified to. They're prior inconsistent statements. Right? That was not revealed three days before at this pretrial hearing. Right? This is not what that pretrial hearing disclosed.

I raised that because in Mr. Godinich's and Mr. Nunnery's affidavits, they make the assertion that they knew about all of these things and incorporated them. And what I'm telling you is that in viewing trial counsel's own emails amongst the defense team, it makes clear that they were unaware of these meetings until three days before.

I fully acknowledge that they have notice of that three days before, or whatever, at this pretrial

However, those meetings were discussed in the hearing. notes. Diaz had provided that information to the State. So, for State -- or for the trial counsel to be like, Hey, I'm surprised to find out that this is the State's theory of what happened, you know, just a few days before trial, calls into question their assertion that they viewed these notes before and incorporated them into their preparations.

And further, I will also note that

Mr. Godinich doesn't actually say that he saw the notes.

His affidavit says the notes were viewed. It doesn't
say who viewed them or when they were viewed. And they
also, both trial counsel -- and Mr. Nunnery's statements
is even more vague. It's, I was aware that the notes
existed.

Doesn't say how or anything to give you any more information than that. So I think that that vagueness is a real issue. And there's a case here of Harris County, ex parte Prevost where the CCA has remanded on one of these writs because trial counsel's affidavits were vague.

The other issue is in their affidavits they both say that they incorporated the knowledge that they gained from reviewing these notes into their cross-examination of Mr. Diaz. Again, these notes

pertain to prior inconsistent statements that Mr. Diaz' 1 had made to the State. There are no questions on 2 cross-examination of Mr. Diaz at trial about prior 3 inconsistent statements or even prior meetings with the 4 5 State. So, that doesn't seem to match up with what trial counsel is asserting in their affidavits. 6 And I think what we need here is the 8 opportunity to cross-examine. You know, the Supreme 9 Court says that reliability in proceedings like this is 10 best determined through the crucible of 11 cross-examination. We need to be able to ask these 12 questions and get past the vague answers and know what 13 we're actually dealing with here. And that's really all we're asking for is an opportunity to confront witnesses 14 15 against Mr. Balderas and present evidence because we 16 haven't had that opportunity yet. 17 THE COURT: The issue that, as far as the 18 disclosure goes, in the defense counsel's affidavit they 19 stated, at least from the record it was clear, that in 20

the hearing it was laid out or made known, the inconsistent statements.

MS. ECKHOFF: No, they said -- my understanding is that the hearing was where the State went in and said, This is what our theory of the case is.

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They didn't say, This is our theory of the 1 2 case. We are going to rely on Mr. Diaz to do it. And 3 oh, by the way, he said contradictory things to us before. 5 The inconsistent statements were not an 6 issue at the previous trial hearing. MS. HUTCHINS: Judge, if I may respond? 8 THE COURT: You may. 9 MS. HUTCHINS: I think we have, I guess, 10 two different frame works that we're are looking at if 11 I'm understanding correctly. So at the pretrial hearing 12 that happened, the State proffered what they were going 13 to prove through various witnesses. And one of the 14 things that they proffered was that they were going to 15 provide testimony, that there was a meeting three days 16 before the murder. And at that meeting there was a hit 17 put out on the complainant, the defendant was present at 18 that meeting; and it was just made known that that's --19 that the hit was out. When Mr. Godinich returns to the office, 20 I'm assuming, is when he writes this email. And he 21 22 writes the email to the defense team that says, We 23 learned some information. We learned the State's case -- a part of their theory of their case and it's 24 the first time that we've heard about meetings three 25

days before and three days after the meeting.

I've reviewed the transcript from the hearing. There was never any mention of the meeting three days after. I believe Mr. Godinich made an error in that regard in writing that front portion of the email. And so -- and he asked the defense team for any insight into this.

Well, when you -- and so that's the extent of sort of, at least on the transcript, what was revealed from the meetings that were held three days before. There is a portion in the transcript where Mr. Nunnery specifically asked, I believe twice, "Three days before? Three days before?" Which in reviewing it -- again, we are reviewing paper documents -- it becomes of note because looking at the Diaz notes, the Diaz notes do mention meetings. And they mention meetings nine to ten months before. And they mention meanings that appear to be different with no timeline, but there's never specifically a three-day meeting that's mentioned in the notes.

So that's the point that I was trying to make in my written motion was that this element of surprise that appears in Mr. Godinich's email is not mutually exclusive from him, his having prior reviewed the contents of the notes or somebody having told him

the notes or whatnot because that three-day number never exists in the notes. In terms of the entirety of notes, the entirety of the notes deal with three different conversations that were had with Mr. Diaz and the State's attorneys back in, I believe it was, 2007 and 2008.

And these conversations deal with a host of different extraneous offenses. They jump around, the names are sort of confusing as to who's participating in what, what's happening where. And those are the notes -- the rest of the contents of the notes are what Mr. Godinich and Mr. Nunnery say they were aware of the information in that note -- in those notes before trial.

I know defense counsel is now making a distinction, Well, if they knew it, they certainly didn't use it at trial. Well, that's trial strategy. That's how they want to conduct their cross-examination. Just because they didn't specifically cross-examine on a point that Mr. Balderas now wishes they had doesn't mean that they were ineffective and doesn't mean that they didn't know about it, and I think that's the key issue here.

MS. ECKHOFF: I think there's two points to make to that. One is you're presuming a lot. The State is presuming a lot about what Mr. Godinich's email

This is something we should ask him, he should 1 meant. be providing those answers. We shouldn't be basing it 2 3 on what the State is interpreting. 4 Second of all, and to a similar point is 5 that the State -- trial counsel may or may not have a 6 strategy. Those are things that they can testify to 7 themselves that they should be cross-examined on. It's 8 very easy in a post-conviction case for trial counsel to 9 come in and say any error was due to strategy. And 10 that's clearly not always the case because if that was 11 the case, we wouldn't have post-conviction relief. And 12 they need to be tested on what that strategy was and 13 what the thinking was and we need to be able to prove 14 whether it was or was not strategy. 15 We don't -- we should not just take their 16 assertion, or in this case the State's assertion that it 17 must have been strategy. That's just not how these 18 proceedings should work. We need the right to confront 19 these witnesses. 20 MS. HUTCHINS: Just one more thing, if I 21 may? 22 THE COURT: Please. 23 MS. HUTCHINS: Separate from this, I just 24 want to move it along. One of the cases that Counsel referenced was Prevost saying that that case was out of 25

1 Harris County, which it was, and that it was sent back 2 because the affidavits were so vague. The affidavits in 3 Prevost were much different than the ones that were 4 filed here. And in that particular case, they were 5 sent back for additional affidavits to clarify some of the points that were made, which is also certainly 6 something this Court is able to do. 8 THE COURT: I understand. And that's 9 something I've noted, as well. Ultimately, as I 10 understand it, the attorney affidavit referenced that 11 they had access to the notes and the notes were viewed 12 by somebody on the defense counsel team -- it doesn't 13 necessarily state who -- that ultimately at the time the 14 affidavits were drafted, the defense counsel was aware 15 of, I guess, the contentions of these inconsistent 16 statements and had not indicated in their affidavits, at 17 least that I saw from review of the affidavits, that 18 there was information that they were not privy to or did 19 not have access to, just from our review of the 20 affidavits. That's certainly an aspect that I will take under consideration. 21 22 Next, let's address the matter of ineffective assistance of counsel. Now, I know there 23 are at least four different caveats you've raised in 24 your petition that address ineffective assistance of 25

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counsel on trial counsel and right of capacities. 1 2 And so first, I'll note that as a basic 3 premise under Strickland the Courts have always addressed this that ineffective assistance of counsel 4 5 that would amount to representation that was so deficient that essentially the defendant did not have an 6 attorney assisting in the trial. MS. ECKHOFF: No. Your Honor, it's 9 whether or not errors were made that would cause 10 prejudice. And the prejudice is whether or not even one 11 juror would have changed their mind. 12 THE COURT: Okay. Well -- so let's kind 13 of probe these individually. And again, I note -- I say 14 that noting certainly, as you noted, with any trial 15 strategy that, you know, hindsight is always 20/20. 16 Sometimes an attorney can, you know, roll the dice 17 thinking that outcome may have one result and have a 18 different result. And in my experience, having 19 previously dealt with dozens and dozens of 22.55s and doing the issues of ineffective assistance of counsel 20 this is an area that I have some experience. So we'll 21 22 just tackle these individually. 23 We're talking about the first issue, I 24 think, you've raised in the guilt-innocence phase to 25 address, investigate or present information on alibi

1 evidence. Essentially, I guess, you're alleging that counsel didn't do enough information to investigate the 2 case prior to it being tried? 3 MS. ECKHOFF: Correct, their investigation 4 5 was inadequate. 6 THE COURT: Okay. And specifically, in 7 what regards? 8 MS. ECKHOFF: First of all, we know that these witnesses exist. We've provided affidavits from 9 10 And the only point at which a trial counsel in a 11 capital case should not be investigating is if they have 12 a reasonable basis for not investigating. Right? And 13 there's no indication here that there was no -- there 14 was a reasonable basis for failing to investigate the 15 quilt phase aspects of this case. 16 Clearly the guilt phase, the State's case against Mr. Balderas was anything but open-and-shut. I 17 18 mean, we have a jury that had to deliberate for more 19 than two days before, you know, finding him guilty and only after, as you've already mentioned, the extraneous 20 21 influences on them did they come to a guilty verdict, 22 you know. And there are still serious questions about whether or not Mr. Balderas committed this crime. 23 And the guilt phase could have -- trial 24 counsel could have presented, could have discovered and 25

presented alibis. And there's no indication that they actually sought to investigate, talked to people.

I mean, if you read their affidavits they make very clear that they blame any lack of investigation on their part on Mr. Balderas himself, or on his family and friends. And Rompilla v. Beard makes very clear that that is no excuse for not investigating the case.

THE COURT: Well, let me pose this question to you: Rather than asking defense counsel to come and question them about the failure to investigate certain factual matters that you think would pertain to guilt/innocence, why not just present evidence on those particulars that you've addressed at a evidentiary hearing? In other words, if you believe that there is additional evidence that exists that was not reflected in the record that would pertain or reflect on actual innocence, why not petition the Court to bring in witnesses to develop that evidence at the habeas corpus level?

MS. ECKHOFF: That is a part of what we would present at a live evidentiary hearing because it's important to note that this Court is going to have to make credibility determinations about witnesses. We have provided affidavits from these witnesses in order

to support -- to meet our pleading burden in filing the application.

And I want to make clear that -- and even the State notes this in their brief -- that we are not required to plead evidence with our application. We are only required to allege the facts which, if proven true, might result in relief. And we have met that burden here and we do that by attaching affidavits. We have those affidavits, we want to call those witnesses, and we want you to hear them testify so you can assess credibility.

original question. My main goal and my main focus that certainly gets my attention is the issue of wrongful convictions. And if there's evidence that was not presented or was even unknown at the time that could weigh on a person's conviction that would indicate that the wrong — an innocent person has been convicted of this crime, or the wrong person has been convicted that it comes up after the fact or is newly discovered, then that a — at any time post trial, and certainly in the habeas corpus setting, that that would be an appropriate time to do that.

So what evidence is it that you believe exists that was not properly developed that needs to be

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developed at this point? What witnesses, specifically
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    by name, do you need to call in order to develop that
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     testimony?
                   MS. ECKHOFF: The specific witnesses that
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    we've attached affidavits from are Anali Garcia --
                   THE COURT: Any witnesses that you believe
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    exists that would offer testimony that would bear on the
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     innocence of your clients.
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                   MS. ECKHOFF: Right. So we have at least
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     two witnesses, Anali Garcia and -- I apologize, Octavio
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     Cortes.
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                   THE COURT: And Ms. Garcia, what is her
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     relevance or relation to this case?
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                   MS. ECKHOFF: She is an alibi witness.
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                   THE COURT: Okay. And her testimony was
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     not presented during the original trial?
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                   MS. ECKHOFF: No.
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                   THE COURT: Okay. And then Ms. Cortes,
     what is her relevance in this case?
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                   MS. ECKHOFF: It's Octavio, it's a mister.
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                   THE COURT: Sorry, Mr. Cortes.
                   MS. ECKHOFF: Actually, it's Ms. Garcia's
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     brother. Also an alibi witness.
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                   THE COURT: Are those witnesses located
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     within the subpoena power of this court or are they
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1 located in Mexico or any other location that's outside 2 of the subpoena power? 3 MS. ECKHOFF: I believe at least 4 Ms. Garcia is in Texas. And Mr. Cortes, the last that we spoke to him, was within the United States. I'm not 5 sure his current location. 6 MS. HUTCHINS: May I be heard? THE COURT: Ms. Hutchins, let me hear from 8 9 you on that aspect. Obviously, I guess the contention 10 is that the original trial counsel were aware of these 11 witnesses elected not to present their testimony at 12 trial for whatever, whether it be strategy or whether or 13 not they found that witness to be credible. 14 MS. HUTCHINS: Correct, Judge. 15 Mr. Godinich specifically identifies Ms. Garcia in his 16 affidavit and has notes from meetings with Ms. Garcia; 17 likewise, met with Iliana Cortes, who is also a sister. 18 Mr. Octavio Cortes, my understanding is, is the brother. 19 This is a family with whom the defendant's brother has a child with one of the sisters. I can't remember if it's 20 21 Iliana or Anali. So in essence, it would be, like, his 22 in-laws. The defense was aware of Ms. Garcia and 23 24 Ms. Cortes, met with them, specifically spoke with them 25 about the alibi defense which would be that Mr. Balderas

was at the house making illegal copies of CDs at the time and wasn't allowed to leave when news broke out of the murder. But during these meetings these witnesses had very vague recollections, couldn't provide any recollections, no specifics, were told that they had to go meet with the defense attorney by Mr. Balderas' girlfriend so they showed up not really knowing why they were there.

And ultimately, defense counsel made the decision that they did not have any either useful or admissible evidence that they can present at trial and chose not to. And I believe there's documentation attached to Mr. Godinich's affidavit, as well as some of the exhibits the defense has attached to their own writ application that support this.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. ECKHOFF: That's not entirely correct because while Ms. Cortes, I do believe, was taken to meet with defense counsel, Ms. Garcia did not meet with defense counsel in person. In fact, she called them up on her own to reach out to them. They never reached out to her. And they didn't discuss, like trial counsel — there's no indication that they discussed any aspect of an alibi with her, they were asking her more about mitigation issues of you know, What's your relationship

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like with Mr. Balderas? And is he a nice guy, type 1 thing. They didn't broach the alibi with her. They 2 3 never discussed it with her. THE COURT: Well, outside of these 4 particular witnesses, are there any other areas that you 5 felt that the trial attorneys failed to adequately 7 investigate which you believe or note that evidence 8 exists that needs to be established on the record? 9 MS. ECKHOFF: And to be clear, Your Honor, 10 there may be additional witnesses, additional alibi 11 witnesses beyond what we have attached. Right? There 12 were other members of the family, et cetera. However, 13 those are the affiants that we documented to meet our 14 burden. 15 Beyond that, trial counsel also didn't 16 conduct an investigation into the actual gang. 17 Obviously, this was a gang shooting. And to better 18 understand the structure of the gang and how it operated 19 in order to confront the State's depiction of how the 20 gang worked and, you know, the State said that Mr. Balderas had to be the shooter for one reason or 21 22 another because of, like, essentially gang politics. 23 And there are witnesses who can provide insight, who 24 provided insight to support our application on how the 25 gang actually operated.

1 And had they done that, then they could 2 have actually confronted the State's depiction of how 3 this all went down. And if that were the case, they 4 could have poked holes and challenged what they were 5 telling the jury. THE COURT: And who were those particular 6 7 witnesses that would have testified on those particular 8 matters? 9 MS. ECKHOFF: In particular, Jose Perez 10 and Walter Benitez. Now, Walter Benitez did testify as 11 a defense witness at trial; but there was more that he could have provided which is detailed in the affidavit 12 13 attached to the application. 14 THE COURT: Okay. And Mr. Perez' 15 testimony would have been, I'm quessing, in line of what 16 Mr. Benitez would have testified to? 17 MS. ECKHOFF: Correct. THE COURT: Any other areas that you feel 18 were not properly investigated but factually needed to 19 be established on the record or that would establish 20 21 their actual innocence or wrongful conviction? 22 MS. ECKHOFF: And to an extent, the eyewitness identification, which is a different part but 23 sort of a related piece of the ineffective assistance of 24 25 counsel guilt claim which is that, you know, aside from

Mr. Diaz, the State's other key witness against Mr. Balderas was an eyewitness who is testifying, you 2 3 know, more than nine years after the fact about her memory of that night. 4 And the line-up procedures that she was 5 put through before making the identification were suggestive and problematic. And her identification in the first place was a problematic because initially she 8 9 says immediately after the fact, you know, her first recollection in speaking with law enforcement is, I've 10 11 never seen this guy before. I didn't know who he was. And then it's only more than a week later, 12 after viewing a lineup with Mr. Balderas' picture in it 13 the day before, she says, Oh, yes. That's him. 14 15 And that's significant because she knew 16 Mr. Balderas for up to a year before this incident 17 occurred. So, that's questionable in the first place. So trial counsel investigated this eyewitness 18 identification and the circumstances surrounding it, and 19 2.0 investigated the eyewitness herself. There is evidence out there that the eyewitness, Ms. Bardales, had had a 21 relationship with Mr. Diaz, who the State had also 22 brought to her a lineup with his picture in it before 23 2.4 this.

And she was, like, Oh, yes, I know him.

And she had had a prior relationship with him. And I think that that is -- if these facts had been presented, I think that that could have been important because I think something else that's really key to this -- it's a complicated case -- is that Mr. Diaz' had a motive to kill this victim.

This victim was going to be a witness against him in an aggravated robbery case. He had the motive to kill, not Mr. Balderas. And if you combine that with, you know, the eyewitness' prior relationship with Mr. Diaz that can cast further doubt on her already shaky identification.

And then, of course, that leads into the issue of the eyewitness identification expert and how that happened. And I'm happy to go into that now or we can address this first and get there.

THE COURT: I don't think we need to dive into the full fleshed-out matters of that. Again, I've read the transcripts in the prior hearing; but if I understand it correctly, the issue is that there was identification, an eyewitness expert that was detained or noticed by the defense to be used but ultimately not called?

MS. ECKHOFF: Correct. He gave testimony outside the presence of the jury because trial counsel

1 attempted to get the identification thrown out. Judge ruled that the identification was coming in, but 2 3 the trial counsel could present this expert to the jury. 4 This expert who provided information about, you know, 5 why the lineup procedures were suggestive and how that may have impacted an identification. And trial counsel 6 just never presented this information for the jury. MS. HUTCHINS: Judge, might I be heard? 8 9 THE COURT: Briefly, yes. 10 MS. HUTCHINS: Judge, in terms of that 11 there, in fact, was a hearing on the record with 12 Dr. Malpass, the ID expert. And after his testimony to 13 the Court and then after another defense witness, 14 Celeste Munoz testified again in another hearing outside 15 of the presence of the jury, the defense brought up with 16 the Court their concern about a particular case that 17 they had found. And they cite that in the record. It's in Volume 29, Page 14. 18 19 And they specifically tell the Court that 20 in light of what they found and in this case they are worried that it's -- that by presenting Dr. Malpass, 21 22 they are going to open the door. And the Court specifically says, you know, I'm not familiar with that 23 24 case. I don't think it's going to open the door, but 25 again, I'm not familiar with that case.

And she's also said she's not familiar 1 2 with all of the different extraneouses that exist. And so I think it's clear at that point that the defense had 3 4 this excerpt, they put on the testimony for the Court, 5 they've heard how the testimony of Ms. Munoz is going to go, as well as Dr. Malpass. They have this case law and 7 amongst themselves at that point made a reasonable 8 decision that they know the case better than the judge 9 and chose not to present this witness. 10 THE COURT: Ultimately, the testimony of 11 the witness was, at least, established on the record, 12 although it would be outside the presence of the jury, 13 the evidence was at least recorded on the record for 14 review. Correct? 15 MS. ECKHOFF: It's essentially, yeah, a 16 proffer. 17 THE COURT: Okay. 18 MS. ECKHOFF: And just to be clear, the 19 Court's ruling on two different occasions in this case, 20 you know, both when Dr. Malpass was present and when 21 she's speaking about when Ms. Munoz was at issue, the 22 Court's ruling was that Dr. Malpass could testify 23 without opening the door about suggestive lineup 24 procedures. 25 THE COURT: Okay. I think that kind of

1 covers the issue of evidence that was not presented 2 unless, Ms. Eckhoff, is there anything else that we have 3 not addressed that we need to cover on the issue of 4 trial counsel's failure to present certain evidence that 5 you believe related to guilt or innocence? 6 MS. ECKHOFF: No, I believe that's it. 7 THE COURT: Okay. I note there the next 8 point where you've got trial counsel's failure to 9 present certain testimony of witnesses from Mexico. And 10 my recollection from the transcripts and from the record 11 was that there had been attempts to obtain those 12 witnesses. Again, they're outside the subpoena power of 13 the Court, but they voluntarily appeared electronically 14 through Skype or some sort of other teleconference 15 network but because of technical difficulties, some of 16 the testimony was cut short. And then another witness 17 refused to testify or was unable to because of technical difficulties? 18 19 MS. ECKHOFF: That's my understanding in 20 terms of how the actual Skype testimony went was that 21 once -- as it was being presented, there were technical difficulties, I believe, on this side of things that was 22 making it incredibly difficult and it was sort of 23 24 abandoned. 25 And the claim is actually that trial

counsel didn't preserve for the record the trial Court's 2 denial of the funds. So there are some indications in 3 emails between trial counsel and the judge that he was 4 trying to get funds in order to bring these witnesses in 5 physically from Mexico to testify. And the Court informs him that she's basically not going to do that and to come up with some other way of doing it. And, of 8 course, eventually at the trial it doesn't work very 9 well and it all gets abandoned. 10 Because trial counsel never made that 11 request on the record and it was never denied on the 12 record, it was not an issue that could be addressed on 13 appeal. So the claim is that they were ineffective for 14 failing to preserve the denial of funds on the record. 15 THE COURT: Okay. Well -- and again, at 16 least as to the request for denial of funds, as far as 17 questioning defense counsel, it seems like that's 18 something that's not so refuted. The record will speak 19 for itself whether or not they raised an objection or 20 not. But as far as the affidavit goes, you're not 21 contending that there's any ambiguity in their responses 22 to that allegation? MS. ECKHOFF: They're -- if I recall 23 correctly, I don't believe their affidavit addresses 24

their failure to make that request on the record at all.

Exh. B

THE COURT: Next we've got the trial counsel's purported failure to allege the right to a speedy trial. I do note that there's, I think, eight years between that had passed between the date of the alleged offense and then the date of trial, which is a significant amount of time. Albeit, in a capital case, it's not out of the ordinary to have a considerable amount of time to pass, especially for defense counsel to be -- have time to prepare for trial.

My experience, usually time is usually an ally of the defense. So it's fairly seldom that I see defense counsel wanting to go to trial rather quickly. But on looking at the issue of prejudice, is there a particular piece of evidence or a particular way that you feel your client was prejudiced by not going to trial sooner versus the date that the trial actually commenced?

MS. ECKHOFF: Well, Your Honor, there was a key mitigation witness who died during that time, Mr. Balderas' brother. And because this case, you know -- because this case involved such weak evidence against Mr. Balderas in the first instance, it all basically comes down to one eyewitness who has a shaky identification and a codefendant who literally flips a day before Mr. Balderas' trial begins, that

recollections -- I mean, we have an entire claim that there was this alibi. Right?

this alibi, like, those memories of the night eight years ago would arguably be much stronger closer in time. I think that all of that -- and I take your point that I'm sure that it is the case that the defense would usually want to wait longer to go trial, but I think that that presumes that there's actually an active adequate investigation happening.

There are long, long periods in that eight years where it's wholly unclear whether any significant investigation, particularly into the guilt phase of this case, was ever occurring.

THE COURT: Okay. And then finally, alleged ineffective assistance of counsel as to the jury selection process talking about the topic of sexual abuse during voir dire. In what capacity was that particularly an issue in this case?

MS. ECKHOFF: Mr. Balderas himself. A key piece of the mitigation that trial counsel presented at trial was his own history of sexual abuse. And it was definitely a key component of the mitigation that they presented in his defense. And despite knowing that well in advance of conducting voir dire, they didn't ask any

questions of potential jurors that might kind of sauce 2 out their own experiences with sexual abuse or their 3 understanding of it, those sorts of things that could help them identify whether that would be a juror where 4 5 evidence of this type might resonate. 6 THE COURT: Well, so what was -- was the 7 issue to try and identify jurors that had been victims 8 of sexual abuse? 9 MS. ECKHOFF: It's -- no, not necessarily. 10 It's to their views, and their understanding and how 11 they might receive that evidence. 12 THE COURT: I mean, I know with voir dire 13 it's kind of not an exact art on what things you may 14 want to raise with a jury or may not want to raise with 15 a jury. Certainly, logical things that would relate in 16 a capital case would be issues relating to the death 17 penalty, issues relating to prior criminal convictions, 18 criminal history, people's belief on whether someone 19 could be rehabilitated. 20 All those things certainly would be very, 21 very relevant; although, I think that would clearly fall

All those things certainly would be very, very relevant; although, I think that would clearly fall squarely within the issue of trial strategy of someone not wanting to raise the issue of sexual abuse with a jury in that it could also be a double-edged sword. You have people that have very strong feelings relating to

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that topic. That may also result in jurors being -- I guess, having the fans flamed on somebody they'd be more inclined to convict versus one they'd be more inclined to find at issue with mitigation and possibly having to qualify the jurors before they've even decided guilt or innocence is a bit of a challenge. But that issue, I think, may be a little bit tougher issue.

I think generally in voir dire, appellate courts have given lawyers a little bit more leeway in strategy in qualifying jurors. But other than raising the issue of -- the defendant's issue of people's experience of sexual abuse or their own attitudes towards it, or any other areas within the voir dire process of the trial, you felt that the trial counsel is deficient and would warrant needing to be presented as a witness to be examined further at an evidentiary hearing?

MS. ECKHOFF: I don't believe so.

THE COURT: We've gone about an hour and my customary practice is about every hour to take about at least a 10-minute break to let everybody use the restroom and, more importantly, to let our court reporter get a brief of rest of the hands. So why don't we do that, take a 10-minute recess and then we resume at 35 minutes past the hour.

(Recess taken.) THE COURT: All right. We're back on the 2 I think we're getting towards the tail end of 3 4 the issues that we needed to address. 5 Ms. Eckhoff, next on my list was the issue pertaining to the jury's exposure to certain outside 6 7 influences. And I know we'll address each of those 8 individually, but I just want to make sure that I'm 9 clear. Are you asking the Court to bring in individual 10 jurors from that trial and question them pertaining to 11 their deliberations and those influences? 12 MS. ECKHOFF: No, I don't think it's 13 necessary to question them about their deliberations. 14 And I understand that that's not even permissible under 15 606(b). 16 THE COURT: Correct. 17 MS. ECKHOFF: What I do think is important 18 is to hear how they interpreted these events. It's 19 impossible, I think, to assess whether these were 20 extraneous influences that could affect a juror. And I 21 think this is why, as we somewhat discussed at the prior 22 hearing, you know, this isn't about these specific 23 jurors and their specific decision and whether they can say that this affected their decision or not. 24 2.5 The standard -- the law makes clear that

the question is whether or not these events would basically have impacted a hypothetical juror in their position. Right? I think it's important to -- well, because it can't be them, specifically. It's someone sitting in a situation like them. Is it possible or likely that someone experiencing that would be affected and have it affect their verdict?

What is important to hear from the jurors is what they saw, how they -- what the reaction was and how that felt and how it impacted them. And then you can take that information to understand, okay, if someone -- a hypothetical juror was feeling that, could it have impacted their verdict.

And I think another key piece of this claim is the timing of when the Court addressed this on the record. That's another key piece of this claim.

And it's really unclear, even from all of the information that has been presented in the application and in the State's response to it, we still don't have a clear timeline of when the Court became aware that this had happened. And that's really important because we have indication -- we provided an affidavit from a person who was sitting in the courtroom that day, a member of Mr. Balderas' family who says that the Court was informed that this had occurred before the verdict

came back at the guilt phase.

And if that's the case -- and yet it wasn't actually addressed on the record or acknowledged until after the verdict came in and after everybody took a lunch break -- that violates his rights to due process. That is something that should have been addressed on the record before the verdict came in. The impact that that had on the jury should have been assessed prior to their verdict.

I'm clear on this. You're not making any contention that there was any juror misconduct by a member of the jury, that they had engaged in any impermissible investigation or disregarded any of the Court's instructions not to investigate any factual matters on their own outside of the evidence presented in court?

MS. ECKHOFF: Well, we have the extraneous influence portion of this claim and then there are specific claims of juror misconduct. For example, there was a juror who, in violation of the court's orders, was posting about his experience sitting on the jury on Facebook and had responses from his Facebook friends, you know, saying, you know -- yes, Give him the chair.

But with regards to these extraneous influences, no. There's no allegation that the jurors

have gone beyond, these were things that happened to them.

of several of those jurors that were attached as exhibits. And I do note that those affidavits tend to be very detailed and descriptive. They generally tend to be consistent with the issues of the location of the hotel, and that several of the jurors were aware that the location of the crime scene was a relatively short distance from the location of the hotel. But I didn't see anything in the affidavits that indicated that jurors actually went to the location of the crime scene or were transported by the crime scene to and from their transportation from the hotel by the court during sequestration.

MS. ECKHOFF: I think that that's correct as far as I know, as well; but I think what's something to keep in mind and what they noted, right, is they had just sat through days of testimony about this gang and where in southwest Houston it operated. And they were hearing names of streets and all of this and then they're passing all of these streets on their way.

So they know that they're being taken closer and closer and being asked to stay very close to where this happened within the area where the gang at

issue in this had operated. I think that is more than, 2 you know, seeing the crime scene itself. It's how that -- how that concerned them. 3 THE COURT: Well, the concerns they had, 4 5 though, I mean, are those concerns not reflected in the affidavits that have been tendered as exhibits? MS. ECKHOFF: No, I believe that they are 8 reflected in their affidavits. 9 THE COURT: Okay. So as far as presenting 10 testimony at an evidentiary hearing, it would seem to 11 me, though, the concerns that were raised were pretty 12 well documented in their affidavits. As far as needing 13 to bring a juror into court and place him under oath and 14 ask him questions about that, it seems, though, their 15 concerns relating to the location of that hotel were 16 pretty well documented. 17 The other issue is the concerns about 18 Mr. Balderas' brother purportedly waving at the bus. 19 And I'll note it doesn't seem that he was ever located 20 by the bailiffs or whether it was every actually confirmed if it was, in fact, Mr. Balderas' brother. 21 22 But there was a person waving that was believed to have 23 been a relative, which also was documented in the 24 affidavit, as well. 25 I'll note that the concern being, as

1 reflected by the jurors, was that some of them felt 2 somewhat frightened or that their safety was not being 3 appropriately addressed. But wouldn't you agree that if 4 the jurors are generally feeling as though in a capital 5 case involving a gang in the Houston area, that 6 generally speaking the juror issues pertaining to juror intimidation have historically been towards jurors being 8 reluctant to convict because they were intimidated or 9 were afraid of consequences versus convicting because 10 them felt intimidated? 11 I mean, generally speaking, if a juror is saying that they felt threatened or intimidated, usually 12 13 they were reluctant to convict because they're afraid of 14 repercussions coming from convicting a gang member. 15 MS. ECKHOFF: I would -- in all honesty, 16 Your Honor, this is actually the only case that I've had 17 where this has been an issue. And while I see your 18 point, I could just as easily see a juror deciding that 19 they want to punish him more because they're scared and 20 felt like -- that someone associated with them trying to 21 intimidate them. I can't presume to know how a juror is 22 going to go one way or the other. 23 THE COURT: I say that -- my background 24 traditionally has been in federal courts dealing with 25 large-scale drug trafficking cases involving the Gulf

cartel or the zeta that cartel where obviously there were multiple instances of cartel members or gang members attempting to influence either witnesses, or jurors, or other ways in order to affect the outcome of the case.

And so that's something that obviously exists and is recognized in jurisprudence. It may be more recognized at the federal level; but, I mean, just as a practical matter of speaking one of the things that jumped out at me was that if jurors felt, I guess, intimidated, just logically thinking at it, wouldn't it seem to be more inclined to curry to the defendant's favor versus -- versus not necessarily being more inclined for conviction?

I didn't see anybody -- anywhere in the affidavits that one of the jurors indicated that they were more inclined to convict because they were either angry, or upset, or were aggravated because of that occurrence.

MS. ECKHOFF: Well -- and Your Honor, I would point out that that is exactly -- I believe would fall under 606(b). Right? That's actually -- that would be evidence of their own deliberations. And that's why it isn't in their affidavit. It's not admissible evidence, but I think --

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THE COURT: Let me rephrase it. It didn't seem as though the jurors indicated that they had taken 2 3 a hostile approach. It seems that generally the tone of the affidavits were that the jurors were afraid and 5 concerned because of it, because they felt that there 6 were lapses in security and there should have been more 7 higher level of scrutiny or security that should have 8 been given to their safety by the court system and by 9 the bailiffs that were assigned to them. 10 MS. ECKHOFF: I think that's certainly a 11 key, a piece of how they felt; but I mean, they are 12 seeing this person that they understand to be a relative 13 of Mr. Balderas and they're interpreting him as trying 14 to intimidate them and create these feelings of fear. 15 There isn't -- I don't know of any evidence at this 16 point in the record one way or the other, honestly, 17 about either being more or less likely to convict based 18 on that experience. But that is clearly an experience 19 that could impact their verdict. THE COURT: Okay. And then finally I have 20 what I've labeled as the kind of constitutional issues. 21 22 I think we can move through many of these rather quickly 23 because I don't think they're necessarily going to warrant any calling of any live testimony or develop 24 25 anything from an evidentiary standpoint.

1 MS. ECKHOFF: Correct, they're questions 2 of law. THE COURT: But I did want to cover them 3 4 very quickly just to make sure that I understand that we 5 are on the same page, that I'm not making any assumptions on whether or not you were asking the 6 7 Court -- the right to present witnesses. So first is whether or not the death 8 9 sentence is allegedly unconstitutional because of a jury 10 instruction that was requested, but not given. 11 specifically that a single no vote would result in a 12 life sentence. And so you've raised that as a 13 constitutional issue. I'm assuming that there's no --14 there's no witnesses or any factual matters that you feel you need to develop in order to make that argument? 15 16 MS. ECKHOFF: I would note that we have 17 provided affidavits from jurors that indicate that there 18 were holdouts at the punishment phase that may have, if 19 they had understood that being -- that they didn't need 20 to bring nine of their friends along with them to find for LWOP, that they may have done that. And we've 21 22 documented that, as best we could, in the affidavits that we attached to the exhibits and -- I'm sorry, 23 exhibits that we attached to the application and that 24 25 potentially could require some further factual

1 development, but I'm not -- I can't specifically recall at this moment if there's anyone in particular. 2 THE COURT: Okay. Next, you allege that 3 4 the death sentence was allegedly unconstitutional 5 because it was arbitrarily and capriciously assigned based upon response to Special Issue No. 1 did not 6 define key terms that were requested by defense and also 8 poorly failed to narrow the class of death eligibility 9 to defendants. 10 And again, that seems to be a 11 constitutional issue that just turns on the instruction 12 to the jury. So same thing, I take it there's no other witnesses you're needing, requesting the Court to 13 14 subpoena or come forward for an evidentiary hearing? 15 MS. ECKHOFF: That's correct. 16 THE COURT: And then finally: The death 17 sentence is ultimately unconstitutional because the 18 punishment charged allegedly limited the evidence the 19 jury could find mitigating. Again, it's same issue dealing with the jury instruction. 20 21 MS. ECKHOFF: Correct. 22 THE COURT: Is there any other issue that's -- that I have not addressed pertaining to, I 23 quess, in the general constitutional law issue? 24 25 MS. ECKHOFF: No.

All right. Finally, I think 1 THE COURT: 2 you had also made a request to subpoena some of the 3 prosecutors in this case or the attorneys that were 4 actually on the prosecution team. Was that, again, in 5 furtherance of trying to establish the ineffective assistance of counsel claims or is that relating to another capacity? 8 MS. ECKHOFF: Do you mean the defense team 9 or prosecutors? 10 THE COURT: Well, if I saw correctly from 11 your original petition, was there not a request for you 12 to subpoena some of the prosecutors on this case? 13 MS. ECKHOFF: Yes. So the prosecutors, I 14 think, would be relevant to two issues. One is the 15 false testimony claim and the other is the Brady claim. 16 The two instances were, you know, we have alleged 17 misconduct by the State. The State has provided 18 affidavits from one of the three prosecutors who 19 provided -- who conducted this trial. We have not heard 20 from the other two, including Caroline Dozier, who was 21 present at the meetings, those earlier meetings with 22 Mr. Diaz. 23 And the same thing with regards to the Brady, all of the information comes from Tracy Bennett 24 and a former prosecutor. However, clearly the State was 25

represented by more than just one attorney. And I can envision wanting to cross-examine the other witnesses, 2 as well, about their knowledge of these things. 3 THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Eckhoff, is there 4 5 any other issue that I have not covered that you feel needs to be addressed? I know we have kind of covered 6 several other areas, some of those we covered very quickly. But as far as requests to present testimony of 9 actual witnesses developed in furtherance of your 10 clients case, is there any other witness that you're 11 seeking the Court to be present for an evidentiary 12 hearing that we have not discussed? 13 MS. ECKHOFF: At this time, no. I believe 14 in terms of the witnesses we have discussed, that is 15 right. However, I would just make clear that if we were 16 having an evidentiary hearing, it's entirely possible 17 that additional witnesses on these same issues may 18 arise. 19 Sure. In the realm of THE COURT: possibilities, I've found that just about anything is 20 possible; but we can only work with the information that 21 22 we have at hand. So I think I can work through these 23 kind of in succinct order. MS. ECKHOFF: Your Honor, before you do 2.4 25 that, would it be possible for me to just make one point

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1 that I think is relevant here and just the emphasis on 2 we need the right to cross-examine here because the 3 Supreme Court has found that the right to cross-examine is a necessary component in due process in cases where 4 5 the stakes aren't nearly so high as they are here today 6 in cases where welfare benefits are at issue or a parole revocation. And this is exactly the reason that, you 8 9 know, they say death is different because the Supreme 10 Court dictates that we strive for a heightened standard 11 of reliability in the outcomes of those cases. 12 there's just some, as we've already discussed, some very 13 serious questions about whether Mr. Balderas actually 14 committed this crime. 15 THE COURT: Okay. I'll duly note that. 16 Ms. Hutchins, do you have any other final 17 thoughts that you would like to make? 18 MS. HUTCHINS: Judge, just to sort of 19 follow up on Ms. Eckhoff's final argument, while 20 jurisprudence does say that death is different, the 21 statements that Ms. Eckhoff makes about the due process 22 that is entitled to a defendant, there's no case law on 23 this saying that he's entitled to that in a post 24 conviction. We refer the Court back to the statute and 25

1 to the interpretation of the statute, 11.07.1 in the 2 post conviction setting and what precisely is due and 3 what is not due unto him. Also, in terms of -- I'm trying to think 4 5 of the final things just said. One moment, Judge. 6 THE COURT: Take your time. 7 MS. HUTCHINS: Just trying to think of the 8 very last thing she said. 9 Oh, actual innocence. She argued that 10 there still are some very serious concerns as to his 11 actual innocence in this case. And I would just point 12 out for the court that the defendant didn't allege 13 actual innocence as a ground in his writ. He's only 14 alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. And so if 15 that is one of their concerns, then it wasn't raised as 16 a ground. 17 MS. ECKHOFF: Your Honor, he has alleged 18 serious constitutional violations that if proven to have 19 occurred would impact the verdict at the guilt phase. 20 THE COURT: Well, I think, I can probably 21 surmise by looking it all over, the established case 22 law, any time there's going to be purported evidence of actual innocence, that that's always going to be 23 24 important evidence to be considered. But let me just start by running through 25

these things very quickly. If we go through the
constitutional art issues, it seemly to be everybody is
in agreement that those are issues of law, not
necessarily of facts; that there's no contested issues
of fact that have to be resolved on that; and the issues
that we have discussed, we can -- can be resolved
basically by reviewing the applicable law and the
established record.

As to the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court has reviewed the affidavits of Mr. Godinich and Mr. Nunnery. The Court finds that both of these affidavits are extremely detailed and have a lot of specificity as to facts and many of the issues that have been raised within the petition.

affidavits are ambiguous and do properly go to the merits of the issues raised in the petition. And, therefore, the Court does not find that it would be necessary for those attorneys to present themselves for cross-examination and that the factual matters alleged are adequately addressed in the affidavits.

As to the Brady/Giglio disclosure issue,
the Court notes specifically on the first page of
Mr. Godinich's affidavit that he reviewed specifically
23 pages of notes that were from the district attorney's

office and that the information contained within those notes was used by them during the course of Mr. Diaz' -- in preparation for trial and was used by Mr. Nunnery during the course of his cross-examination.

The Court also notes that the request as to the presentment of jurors and their exposure to outside influences, specifically as Ms. Eckhoff correctly stated, any questions that go to their specific deliberations and how they resolve the case are not admissible under the Rules of Evidence. And to ask a juror under the abstract theory of what an average juror would believe would be something that I don't think that the juror, any juror would be able to adequately weigh upon.

I feel that a juror would be able to testify as far as what their feelings and expectations were, but to look at the issue in abstract and how a theoretical juror would look at it is too speculative and would simply be unfair on a juror to have to weigh in upon that.

Again, the Court hasn't found that the affidavits submitted by the jurors are very detailed, actually go into areas that would otherwise be inadmissible; but the Court notes that there's nothing in the affidavits that necessarily warrants needing to

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bring in any jurors for additional questioning or cross-examination on the factors that they were supposed to.

However, the issues of the recanted testimony, the Court does find that there are specific issues that do warrant the development of additional testimony. Specifically, as to Mr. Israel Diaz, there is, in fact, evidence of -- that his testimony was, in fact, recanted; that Mr. Balderas be provided an opportunity to explore that testimony.

However, the Court does not find that the testimony of the investigator, Adrian De La Rosa would be probative because -- given the fact it would be a hearsay statement, the State would not be able to properly probe or cross-examine that hearsay statement based upon solely the investigator's accounts of Mr. Diaz' statement.

So the Court will provide -- will allow the applicant to subpoena Mr. Diaz. However, the Court will thus find that given there are potential issues relating to perjury, if Mr. Diaz does not, in fact, already have counsel representing him or advising him on his constitutional issues, the Court will appoint an attorney to represent him for the limited purpose of that hearing to instruct him accordingly.

testimony of Anali Garcia and Octavio Cortes, who were also alibi witnesses whose testimony was never presented. The Court does give note and give consideration to the fact that trial counsel had interviewed those witnesses and did not find their testimony, their purported testimony to be credible and did not present that evidence. As officers of the Court, obviously, any attorney is precluded under the Rules of Ethics from presenting any testimony they believe to be untruthful or perjured.

However, given that there's no record of what their testimony would be, it's impossible for the Court to look in abstract to consider the testimony.

And, therefore, the Court will provide Mr. Balderas with the opportunity to present that testimony and proffer that here in court, which would also be subject to cross-examination by the State.

As to Jose Perez and Walter Benitez, the Court finds that defense counsel did present that testimony, trial counsel presented that testimony at the trial itself; and that those issues were, in fact, put before the jury and the fact finder. And based upon the juries' verdicts, the jury did not find that testimony to be credible. Therefore, the Court will not order

1 that those witnesses be produced. So in summation, the Court will conduct an 2 3 evidentiary hearing involving Mr. Israel Diaz, Ms. Anali 4 Garcia and Mr. Octavio Cortes. 5 Counsel, how much time do you require in order to locate those witnesses and serve them with 6 7 process for the hearing? MS. ECKHOFF: Your Honor, in light of my 8 9 caseload and other cases, I would anticipate -- I would 10 request six months to set the hearing. 11 MS. HUTCHINS: Judge, may I be heard? 12 THE COURT: You may. 13 MS. HUTCHINS: Judge, Article 11.07(1) specifically says that if there's to be an evidentiary 14 15 hearing that it shall be within 30 days, or an 16 additional 30 days for good cause. So 60 days, max. 17 THE COURT: I did actually print off a copy of my statute and I was about to address the time 18 19 aspects. Counsel, I don't know that six months is 20 necessarily going to be an appropriate timeline. I 21 understand that you do have a hefty caseload and also a 22 hefty traffic schedule, given the courts that you 23 service; but at the same time, I know that this habeas 24 proceeding has carried on very much more lengthy than 25 what normally the rules are prescribed for it for

obvious procedural reasons.

And so, one of the issues I've raised is that if some of those witnesses have not been located by this time, I guess, the question I would have is are they ever going to be located? Even if you were given six months to provide them, are there particular witnesses that you do not have any means in which to contact them or to serve them with a subpoena?

MS. ECKHOFF: No, Your Honor. One of my primary concerns pertaining to the witnesses is Octavio Cortes. He's in the Marines. I am not certain at this point where he is stationed, so I cannot -- I don't know how long it might take to bring him in.

And I do recognize that this case has gone on for quite a long time, but I'd also want to make clear that, you know, we first requested this evidentiary hearing a year and a half ago and it's the State who wanted to proceed on affidavits from trial counsel that ended up taking a year. This delay to get to this point is based on what the State has requested.

I'm asking for additional time in order to be able to adequately prepare, in light of all of the other cases that I have evidentiary hearings and other cities in Texas and applications that need to be filed.

MS. HUTCHINS: Judge, if I may be heard?

THE COURT: You may. MS. HUTCHINS: At this point, based on 2 3 what you have stated, it seems like it's three 4 witnesses: Israel Diaz, Anali Garcia, Octavio Cortes. 5 Israel Diaz, we know where he is. THE COURT: Right. 7 MS. HUTCHINS: We can get him here within 8 two weeks. Anali Garcia, it seems like counsel knows 9 where she is or at least can get hands on her. And if 10 Mr. Cortes is in the Marines and is somewhere else, that 11 may be someone that we could get a written affidavit 12 from as to what his testimony would be. 13 I know defense is very busy, they have 14 other accounts all over the state that they go to. On 15 our end, we also have a caseload that we are handling. 16 And we'd just ask if it's three witnesses, that we try 17 to work something out sooner rather than pushing it off. 18 THE COURT: Do you have specific knowledge that Mr. Cortes is stationed abroad or is stationed 19 somewhere outside of the intercontinental United States? 20 21 MS. ECKHOFF: Not to my knowledge. THE COURT: Okay. Well, then this is, I 2.2 23 think, how it would be best to proceed to give everybody 24 an opportunity to do their due diligence. Until we have 25 definitive knowledge that we're not going to be able to

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comport with timelines subscribed by the rules, then 2 we're going to try to adhere to the rules and conduct 3 the hearing within the timeframe that the rules require. 4 If there is something that you believe 5 would warrant the Court -- I'm not even certain that the rules would allow me to extend those deadlines for good 6 cause; but at least I'll give you an opportunity to 8 contact those witnesses and observe in the process if 9 there's a particular witness that you cannot find or 10 cannot be there, we can explore the issues of whether to 11 submit their information, be it affidavit or 12 telephonically, or in what other capacity you can to try 13 accommodate those witnesses and their availability. 14 But I think, as we sit right now, the 15 timeframe we're looking at is -- let's see. 16 Ms. Hutchins, you said it was 20 days? 17 MS. HUTCHINS: Thirty days, Your Honor. 18 THE COURT: Thirty days. So if we're 19 looking for a timeframe within 30 days, we'll need to 20 obviously check my own calendar, as well as the calendar 21 of the 179th to see if we can find a date within that 22 timeframe in which everyone can be available, make 23 themselves available. 24 And then, in the meantime, if you have any 25 issues locating those witnesses or making those

witnesses available to present their testimony, we can cross that bridge when we get there. 2 3 MS. ECKHOFF: Okay. 4 MS. HUTCHINS: Judge, in terms of 5 Mr. Diaz, is the Court going to appoint counsel, assuming that he does not have counsel and is not 6 represented? Is that going to be appointed now or when he gets back to Harris County or how is that going to 8 work? 10 THE COURT: I was going to appoint an 11 attorney to represent him today since I've said that he 12 is going to be subject to subpoena. And that's assuming 13 that he doesn't already have counsel. 14 If I appoint an attorney to represent him 15 and he contacts Mr. Diaz, and says, No, I already have 16 an attorney, the rules don't preclude him from having 17 multiple attorneys, but if there's another counsel that 18 represents him we'll, at least, be able to ascertain 19 that. But given the short time period, I would like to 20 give the attorney enough opportunity to meet with him, discuss this issue with him, and then be able to make 21 that particular recommendation. 22 23 Ms. Eckhoff, if the attorney that we appoint to represent Mr. Diaz indicates that he's going 24 25 to recommend to his counsel to invoke his Fifth

Amendment right not to testify, are you still going to 2 persist in wanting to bring that witness here and have 3 him invoke his Fifth Amendment on the stand? Or are you -- would that affect your decision to call him as a 4 5 witness? 6 And I'll allow you to make a record of 7 If you don't, you can make a record of your 8 correspondence with his attorney if that's something 9 you'd like to do. 10 MS. ECKHOFF: At this time, Your Honor, I 11 believe we would want him on record. And I will reserve 12 the right to change my mind. 13 THE COURT: Very well. 14 MS. ECKHOFF: And I would just point out, 15 to my knowledge, he's not longer incarcerated. 16 MS. HUTCHINS: I haven't checked, I don't 17 know. THE COURT: Well, if he is no longer 18 incarcerated or if he's on parole, there's typically 19 20 other mechanisms on how to locate that witness. 21 MS. ECKHOFF: Right. 22 THE COURT: But if he is not incarcerated, I'll allow your officers an opportunity to try and find 23 him and have him served. So -- and likewise, if there's 24 counsel that's been appointed, they also would probably 25

be engaged in trying to track him down. If for some 2 reason he's not incarcerated and he is located, just 3 remember that I have appointed independent counsel to represent him so please refrain from directly 4 5 communicating with him without, at least, notifying that 6. counsel. MS. ECKHOFF: Okay. THE COURT: Is there anything else we need 8 9 to take up while we are all here on the record? 10 MS. ECKHOFF: Your Honor, I did want to 11 raise one thing. At the last hearing the State 12 indicated that were going to turn over their capital 13 murder summary. They agreed that we were entitled to it 14 and they haven't turned it over and I would like a copy 15 of that, please. MS. HUTCHINS: Not actually accurate, 16 17 Judge. So the capital murder summary -- I'm not 18 19 sure if the Court is aware of what a capital murder 20 summary is in Harris County, Texas. It is --21 essentially, it is work product. It is quintessential 22 work product. It is what the chief prosecutor in a 23 court prepares on a capital murder cases summarizing the 24 facts of the offense, as well as any aggravating 2.5 circumstances and mitigating circumstances, and then

makes a recommendation up the chain of hierarchy as to what his or her recommendation is in terms of seeking 2 3 death or seeking life. So a recommendation comes from the court 4 5 chief, then I believe the division chief, the bureau chief, all the way up to the assistant district 6 attorney. And so, I mean that is essentially work 8 product in terms of everything, their thought process and what goes into it. In this case, it's become an issue as to 10 11 whether or not it contained certain information that may 12 be Brady. That's, I guess, what defense counsel's 13 concern is in terms of wanting to see it. There were 14 also -- the State is certainly aware of our obligation 15 under Brady to turn over anything that might tend to 16 negate his guilt or be impeachment evidence or whatnot, 17 certainly. 18 The issue in this case is while capital murder summaries are work product, Spence Graham, the 19 former prosecutor in this case provided an affidavit 20 stating that it was in the State's file, not hidden away 21 from defense counsel and that defense counsel had the

from defense counsel and that defe opportunity to be able to view it.

THE COURT: And when you say "defense counsel" you mean trial counsel?

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1 MS. HUTCHINS: Trial counsel, correct. 2 Trial counsel, while the case was under Spence, had the 3 opportunity to be able to view it. Now, whether or not 4 they actually viewed it, I can't say; but it was made 5 available technically to defense counsel. Under the Rules of Discovery, as I understand them, if it's 6 something that original trial counsel had or reviewed, then trial counsel there on out would also have that 9 same ability. 10 I would like to assert the State's work 11 product privilege to it. I do believe it's work 12 product. I am prepared to turn over a copy to the Court for the Court's in camera review so the court can make a 13 determination whether or not it needs to be turned over. 14 15 If you believe there's an impeachment or Brady evidence 16 in there, I have that copy for you, Because we would 17 like to assert our work product privilege and ensure that we are not otherwise waiving our privilege to 18 anything else in final. 19 20 THE COURT: Well, I agree with you that if 21 it's internal documents that are comprised based upon 22 the prosecutor's assessment of the facts and their individual opinions, it sounds like it's textbook work 23 24 product. 25 Now, if the rules of Brady should always

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apply, if there's any information in that report that is 1 either exculpatory or goes to the witnesses' 2 credibility, in other words, the prosecutor says, In my 3 opinion, I don't find this witness to be truthful, or 4 5 they have the opinion of something going to credibility 6 that potentially could be Giglio evidence, there's always a running obligation to disclose that information. You don't have to disclose the report, but 8 9 the exculpatory or impeachment evidence would need to be 10 disclosed. 11 So I'm -- if the parties would prefer, if 12 you would like for me to view that in camera in order to 13 make that assessment, if it would give Ms. Eckhoff peace 14 of mind for me to do that, I'll be happy to do that. 15 But counsel, like I said, as an officer of the court 16 there's always the running duty and obligation to make the Brady disclosures if it's discovered. 17 MS. ECKHOFF: Right, Your Honor. And I 18 19 understand that, but the basis for our request at this 20 point is actually many slightly different than just Brady. Our original request was Brady and the original 21 22 response from the State was that was never turned over because it was work product and we accepted that answer. 23 And it's only after Mr. Graham provided an affidavit 24 25 saying it was made available to trial counsel that we

renewed our request for that because we, as successor counsel, should have access to all of the information available to trial counsel. That's what -- we are entitled to their file and to anything that they had access to.

And so, whether or not it contains Brady at this point is sort of immaterial because it was made

at this point is sort of immaterial because it was made available to trial counsel and we should be able to view it.

THE COURT: Well, you know, different files have different requirements on open-file policies. And I note that often district attorneys' offices or other prosecuting authorities will have discovery that exceeds the statutory and legal requirements of discovery. But if -- I don't necessarily know or, I guess it -- I would have to -- I'd probably have to go and brief the issue to see whether or not an open file policy at one time that is later amended would permanently waive work product privilege for items in that file for the duration of the case.

I don't necessarily know if that's the case or not, but if the main issue or crux of reviewing the particular documents is looking for exculpatory or impeachment information, which would be the logical purpose -- I mean, is there any other basis you would

have for wanting to review that, those notes or that 2 report? 3 MS. ECKHOFF: We want to have an 4 understanding of what information was available to trial counsel at the time of trial. THE COURT: Well, I think you could 6 7 probably ascertain that information from the discoverable items within the file, as a whole, as far 9 as what reports and documents were in the file. But if 10 this is simply the fact of whether or not to seek the 11 death penalty and then the strengths and weaknesses and 12 mitigating issues, again, this just being a summary, I 13 think probably the easiest way to address that is 14 obviously to do an in camera inspection. 15 I mean, ultimately, as I said before, the 16 goal isn't necessarily to have a fishing expedition. 17 there's particular information that you believe is going to be relevant to this habeas proceeding or would weigh 18 mitigating evidence or undisclosed bias or undisclosed 19 impeachment evidence, I think we could ascertain that by 20 21 in camera review. 22 But is there a particular piece of evidence that you are wanting to see if it's contained 23 24 within that report? MS. ECKHOFF: I have no idea what might be 25

in the report because, as the State has indicated, that to my knowledge this is not something that is typically made available to anyone outside of their office. But for whatever reason, it was made available to trial counsel in this case.

And while I take your point that, you know, we should be able to review trial counsel's file to get a sense of what they knew and didn't know about this case, our review of trial counsel's file in this case doesn't have the notes at issue in the Brady claim.

So without them having come from the State, we would have never known that trial counsel had viewed them. It's sort of a similar situation. I can't tell you what I need to see from there because I don't have any idea what it contains, but I know trial counsel saw it or at least had it available to them. And in order to make a record of what trial counsel did or did not have going into trial and how that may have affected or contemplated -- affected their tragedy or their claims of strategy, you know, I need to be able to review what they had reviewed. That's why we go and review the Diaz file in this case.

THE COURT: Well, we're talking about a report that was based upon the prosecutor's assessment of the file. It's one thing if it was a police report

1 that was produced by an investigator, or a detective, or somebody that was looking at the case. If it's just a 2 prosecutor's own assessment of the file and a 3 recommendation based upon his opinions and viewing of 4 5 the evidence, it seems to be textbook work product. I mean, do you -- is there any case law or 6 7 do you have any authority that would go to show that if something that was work product privilege that was made 8 available in an open file policy, would forever waive 9 10 the right to assert work product privilege? 11 MS. ECKHOFF: Not off the top of my head, 12 but I would like an opportunity to brief it. 13 THE COURT: Well, I will do this. I will 14 conduct an inspection review of the report. And I'm 15 specifically looking for -- we've had a lengthy 16 discussion here and it's very well briefed with the 17 issues that you believe exist. And if there's anything pertaining to relevant impeachment evidence, exculpatory 18 19. evidence or anything that would significantly weigh on the issues before us that have not already been 20 identified or discussed, then we could certainly take 21 that up once we get to the evidentiary hearing. 22 If you find a case that says that the work 23 product has been waived because it's been voluntarily 24 25 disclosed and open file policy, then that's a legal

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     issue that would be closed in which case it would be an
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    open part of discovery.
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                   MS. ECKHOFF: Okay.
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                   THE COURT: So I will give you the
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    opportunity to do that and follow up with that. But
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     in the mean time, I'll accept a copy, sealed copy of the
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    exhibit and we will review that. In which case, if
     there is pertinent information I'll notify the parties
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    accordingly.
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                   MS. ECKHOFF: Thank you.
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                   THE COURT: Okay. Is there anything else
    we need to take up while we are all here on the record?
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                   MS. HUTCHINS: Just to touch up on that,
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     if I may?
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                   If the Court does find pertinent
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     information, obviously it will be disclosed. If the
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     Court does not find pertinent information in the capital
    murder summary, at that point I would make a motion to
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     place it under seal with the file in this case.
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                   THE COURT: I will accept it right now as
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     a sealed exhibit, but if -- in that it will be
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     maintained, confidentiality. Traditionally what I've
     always done is if it's something that is privileged,
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     I'll return it to the submitting party because of the
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     fact that if it goes into the record as a privileged
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item -- it's not something that typically would go into the record because the privilege has been exerted. 2 But at this time it's been tendered as an 3 4 exhibit for in camera review, which we maintain sealed 5 in which case until the time the Court has had an opportunity to review it and make a determination on the 6 issues that I've already addressed. 8 Anything else that we need to take up? 9 MS. HUTCHINS: In terms of setting a date, 10 are we going to do that today or via email? 11 THE COURT: I will probably do it via 12 email because I'll need to bring my court coordinator 13 into the loop to make sure that I can find a date where 14 I'm not already set for trial in the 136th over in 15 Beaumont. And so I'll do my best to work with 16 everyone's schedule. 17 I understand -- I take it an afternoon 18 setting is probably preferential, but if you believe 19 that you're going to need more than just half a day to 20 present evidence, then we will set it for a morning hearing so you'll have adequate time to present your 21 witness and also have adequate time for 22 23 cross-examination. MS. HUTCHINS: And will it be here in 24 25 Houston, Judge?

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                   THE COURT: That will be, I guess, by
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    default where I'll have it unless y'all would prefer to
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    come to Beaumont. If the agreement of the parties would
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    be to go there because it's more convenient, I would be
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    happy to do that; but given that this is a -- the
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    hearing is in Harris County -- and, obviously, I know
     there's people who have been in attendance that are
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     following this case for the convenience of Mr. Balderas.
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     I was, by default, going to have it here in Harris
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     County unless the attorneys would prefer otherwise?
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                   MS. ECKHOFF: No, we appreciate that, Your
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     Honor.
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                   THE COURT: If there's nothing further,
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     the Court stands adjourned.
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                   (Court adjourned for the day.)
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## STATE OF TEXAS COUNTY OF HARRIS 2 I, Marcia E. Barnett, Official Court Reporter in and 3 for the 179th District Court of Harris, State of Texas, 4 5 do hereby certify that the above and foregoing contains a true and correct transcription of all portions of 6 evidence and other proceedings requested in writing by counsel for the parties to be included in this volume of 8 9 the Reporter's Record in the above-styled and numbered 10 cause, all of which occurred in open court or in 11 chambers and were reported by me. 12 I further certify that this Reporter's Record of the 13 proceedings truly and correctly reflects the exhibits, 14 if any, offered by the respective parties. 15 I further certify that the total cost for the preparation of this Reporter's Record is \$ 421.07 and 16 17 was paid/will be paid by Harris County. WITNESS MY OFFICIAL HAND on this, the 5th day of 18 March, 2018. 19 20 /s/Marcia E. Barnett 21 Marcia E. Barnett, CSR Texas CSR 5144 22 Deputy Court Reporter 179th District Court 201 Caroline 23 Houston, Texas 77002 Telephone: (832) 927-3735 24 Expiration: 12/31/2019 25

4/19/2018 4:46:17 PM Chris Daniel - District Clerk Harris County Envelope No: 24030980 By: D DAY Filed: 4/19/2018 4:46:17 PM

## IN THE 179th JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS

EX PARTE JUAN BALDERAS, APPLICANT	) Cause No. ) 1412826-A ) ) Hearing date: May 11, 2018 )				
[PROPOSED] ORDER					
On this date, the Court	considered Mr. Balderas's Motion to Compel				
Disclosure of Exculpatory and Im	npeachment Evidence. After due consideration, Mr.				
Balderas's Motion is GRANTED	O. The State shall provide all materials identified in				
the Motion within the State's co	onstructive possession to counsel for Mr. Balderas				
within ten days of this Order.					
ORDERED AND S 2018.	SIGNED on this day of,				
	The Honorable Baylor Wortham Judge Presiding by Appointment 179 <sup>th</sup> District Court				

## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I, the undersigned, declare and certify that I have served the foregoing upon:

Office of the Harris County District Attorney Attn: ADA Farnaz Hutchins

This certification is executed on April 19, 2018, at Austin, Texas.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

/s/ Katherine Froyen Black
Katherine Froyen Black

Filed 18 April 30 A11:00 Chris Daniel - District Clerk Harris County EA001\_36718 By: L HERNANDEZ

#### **CAUSE NO. 1412826-A**

EX PARTE	Ж	IN THE DISTRICT COURT
	Ж	HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
JUAN BALDERAS, Applicant	Ж	179TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

# MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENAS AND REQUEST FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

COMES NOW THE STATE OF TEXAS, by and through the undersigned assistant district attorney, and moves the Court to quash six instanter subpoenas duces tecum in the above-referenced case, filed by the applicant and directed to the custodian of records for the Legal Department of the Harris County District Attorney's Office. The subpoenas seek the following:

- "Files kept and maintained by the Harris District Attorney [sic] for any criminal case charging Israel Diaz (DOB 4/9/86) from 2003-2008, including all reports, notes, communications, witness lists, charging documents, promises/rewards/inducements, case resolution, and any reference to Eduardo Hernandez as a witness:"
- 2. "Trial file for the case of State v. Juan Balderas, as available to defense counsel;"
- "Copies of any and all communications and contact between Alejandro Garcia (DOB 02/02/1989) and the District Attorney's Office, including, but not limited to emails, texts, phone messages, in-person conversations and notes and memos, phone conversations and notes/memos, etc., between 2005 and present."
- "Police Integrity Division file regarding Christopher Scott Poole, former detention officer for Harris County Sheriff's Dept., employed as a detention officer from May 2009 – August 2012;"
- "Copies of any and all communications and contact between Israel Diaz (DOB 04/09/1986) and the District Attorney's Office, including, but not limited to emails, texts, phone messages, in-person conversations and notes and memos, phone conversations and notes/memos, etc., between 2005 and present;" and

6. "Communications, including but not limited to emails, letters, voicemails, and any oral communications reduced to writing between employees and agents of the Harris County District Attorney and employees of the Harris County Department of Probation [sic] regarding Israel Diaz (DOB 4/9/86)."

In support of this motion to quash the subpoena, the State would respectfully show the Court the following:

#### I. DUPLICATIVE & OVERLY BROAD REQUEST

The applicant has made an identical request in a Motion to Compel Disclosure of Exculpatory and Impeachment Evidence, filed April 19, 2018. The availability of said information is scheduled to be addressed at a hearing set for Wednesday, May 2, 2018. Further, to the extent the applicant can be understood in his overly broad request, this same information was provided to the applicant's counsel in 2015.

#### II. GENERAL DISCOVERY OBJECTION

There is no general right to discovery in post-conviction habeas proceedings. Even the scope of pretrial discovery is governed by TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 39.14. Anything that is not discoverable under art. 39.14 cannot be discovered by the issuance of a court subpoena to the assistant district attorney prosecuting the case. See, e.g., State ex rel. Wade v. Stephens, 724 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tex. App. -- Dallas 1987, orig. proceeding) (holding that "[w]hile Texas courts may have once possessed inherent authority to order criminal discovery, we hold that article 39.14 now defines and limits that authority," and that the legislature "intended article 39.14 to constitute a comprehensive pretrial discovery statute and that criminal discovery orders must fall within the confines of

that article's limited jurisdiction"); accord Martin v. Darnell, 960 S.W.2d 838, 841 (Tex. App. -- Amarillo 1997, orig. proceeding).

A subpoena may not be used to circumvent the discovery procedures set forth in art. 39.14, *supra. Wade v. Stephens*, 724 S.W.2d at 144. It follows that a subpoena may not be used to obtain information that is not discoverable in post-conviction proceedings, where the State's only duty of disclosure pertains to "any exculpatory, impeachment or mitigating document, item or information in the possession, custody or control of the state that tends to negate the guilt of the defendant or would tend to reduce the punishment for the offense charged." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 39.14(h) and (k). See also, Dickens v. Court of Appeals for the Second Supreme Judicial District, 727 S.W.2d 542, 551 (Tex. Cirm. App. 1987). The State must produce this data regardless of whether or not it is requested; therefore, a subpoena is unnecessary.

#### III. GENERAL WORK PRODUCT OBJECTION

To the extent the applicant's subpoenas may implicate the privileged work product of the State of Texas, the subpoena should be quashed. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 39.14(a) and (c) (exempting privileged materials from discovery); *State ex rel. Curry v. Walker*, 875 S.W.2d 379, 381(Tex. 1994) (order requiring district attorney to release entire litigation file, except for certain direct communications, "too broad;" prosecutors have work product privilege); *United States v. Nobles*, 422 U.S. 225, 238, 95 S.Ct. 2160 (1975) (recognizing that the role of the work product doctrine "in assuring the proper functioning of the criminal justice system is even more vital" than its more common application in civil litigation). "Work product" includes prosecution files and papers, offense and investigation

reports, worksheets and factual memoranda concerning the arrest of the defendant or investigation of the case by the State. *Franklin v. State*, 702 S.W.2d 241, 245 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no pet.). The applicant cannot use a subpoena to circumvent art. 39.14's express exception against discovery of the State's work product.

## IV. GENERAL RELEVANCE/MATERIALITY OBJECTION

The applicant has failed to show the subpoenaed documents are in any way relevant to his own case, or that the items listed constitute impeachment, exculpatory evidence or mitigation, or that they tend to negate his guilt or would tend to reduce the punishment for the offense charged. Therefore, the State has no duty to comply with the subpoena or with the motion to compel disclosure.

### V. <u>CONCLUSION</u>

Therefore, the State respectfully requests that the Court quash all six subpoenas issued for the Custodian of Records of the Legal Department of the Harris County District Attorney's Office and direct the applicant not to issue further subpoenas against the Harris County District Attorney's Office without express written permission of the Court.

Respectfully submitted,

<u>Isl Shawna L. Reagin</u>

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## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify service has been accomplished by e-mailing a true and correct copies of the motion and proposed order to Erin Eckhoff, Katherine Froyen Black and Natalie Corvington of the Office of Capital and Forensic Writs, on this the 30<sup>th</sup> day of April, 2018, as follows: <a href="mailto:Erin.Eckhoff@ocfw.texas.gov">Erin.Eckhoff@ocfw.texas.gov</a>, <a href="mailto:Katherine Froyen Black and Natalie Corvington of the Office of Capital and Forensic Writs, on this the 30<sup>th</sup> day of April, 2018, as follows: <a href="mailto:Erin.Eckhoff@ocfw.texas.gov">Erin.Eckhoff@ocfw.texas.gov</a>, <a href="mailto:Katherine Black@ocfw.texas.gov">KatherineBlack@ocfw.texas.gov</a> and <a href="mailto:Natalie.Corvington@ocfw.texas.gov">Natalie.Corvington@ocfw.texas.gov</a>, as well as sending a copy to counsel for Israel Diaz, Genesis Draper, at <a href="mailto:Genesis.Draper@pdo.hctx.net">Genesis.Draper@pdo.hctx.net</a>.

<u>/s/ Shawna L. Reagin</u> SHAWNA L. REAGIN

#### CAUSE NO. 1412826-A

EX PARTE	Ж	IN THE DISTRICT COURT
	H	HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
JUAN BALDERAS, Applicant	Ж	179 <sup>TH</sup> JUDICIAL DISTRICT

## ORDER

On this the 2<sup>nd</sup> day of May, 2018, came to be heard the State's Motion to Quash Subpoenas and Request for Protective Order, and having duly considered same, this Court GRANTS the motion.

It is hereby ORDERED that no further process be exercised against the Harris County District Attorney's Office in this cause without the express written permission of this Court.

SIGNED and ENTERED this \_\_ day of May, 2018.

Hon. Baylor Wortham Judge Presiding by Assignment 179<sup>th</sup> District Court Harris County, Texas

Filed 18 April 30 A11:35 Chris Daniel - District Clerk Harris County EA001\_36755 By: L HERNANDEZ

Cause No. 1412826-A

**EX PARTE** 

§ IN THE 179th DISTRICT COURT

§ OF

JUAN BALDERAS

§ HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS

#### MOTION TO CLARIFY THE COURT'S ORDER

THE STATE OF TEXAS, by and through its undersigned assistant district attorney, files the instant instrument requesting the Court to clarify its order relating to communications with witness Israel Diaz.

١.

During the February 22, 2018 status hearing, the Court made clear it anticipated witness Israel Diaz may invoke his Fifth Amendment rights during the May 11, 2018, evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, the Court appointed independent counsel from the Harris County Public Defender's Office to represent Diaz.

Additionally, the Court ordered the parties to obtain the express permission of Diaz's counsel before they could talk to him. However, a review of the record indicates that this order occurred off-the-record. The on-the-record order is narrower: "please refrain from directly communicating with him without, at least, notifying that counsel" (I R.R. at 68)(emphasis added). In short, "notifying" is a more permissive standard than the Court's off-the-record order.

II.

THEREFORE, the State prays that the Court will clarify its order and require that the parties need the express permission of Diaz's counsel before they can communicate with him.

SIGNED this 30th of April, 2018

Respectfully Submitted,
/s/ Shawna L. Reagin
Shawna Reagin
Assistant District Attorney
Harris County District Attorney
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Reagin\_shawna@dao.hctx.net
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## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify service on opposing counsel has been effected by emailing a copy of this Motion on this the 30<sup>th</sup> day of April, 2018, as follows: <a href="mailto:Erin.Eckhoff@ocfw.texas.gov">Erin.Eckhoff@ocfw.texas.gov</a>, <a href="mailto:Katherine.Black@ocfw.texas.gov">Katherine.Black@ocfw.texas.gov</a> and <a href="mailto:Natalie.Corvington@ocfw.texas.gov">Natalie.Corvington@ocfw.texas.gov</a>, as well as sending a copy to counsel for Israel Diaz, Genesis Draper, at <a href="mailto:Genesis.Draper@pdo.hctx.net">Genesis.Draper@pdo.hctx.net</a>.

/s/ Shawna L.Reagin

Shawna L. Reagin

## Cause No. 1412826-A

§	IN THE 179th DISTRICT COURT				
§	OF				
§	HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS				
ORDER					
The Court <b>ORDERS</b> that counsel for the applicant and the State, including their representatives, may not communicate with witness Israel Diaz without the express permission of his counsel.					
SIGN	ED this of May, 2018				
	Baylor Wortham				
Presi	ding Judge				
	§  ORDER  for the ap with with  SIGN  Hon.				

5/1/2018 10:18 AM Chris Daniel - District Clerk Harris County Envelope No. 24270203 By: L Garcia Filed: 5/1/2018 10:18 AM

# IN THE 179th JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS

	)	Cause No.
EX PARTE	)	1412826-A
JUAN BALDERAS,	)	
APPLICANT	)	Hearing date: May 2, 2018
	)	-
	)	

## RENEWED MOTION TO COMPEL DISCLOSURE OF EXCULPATORY AND IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE

Juan Balderas, by and through his counsel the Office of Capital and Forensic Writs (OCFW), renews his Motion, filed April 20, 2018, seeking production of the following materials in the possession, custody, or control of the State, relevant to the claims pending before this Court and with respect to which this Court has set an evidentiary hearing to commence on May 11, 2018. In support of this motion, Mr. Balderas respectfully states the following:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> In this motion, Mr. Balderas uses the word "State," which should be interpreted as including, but not limited to, any member of the HCDAO, Houston Police Department, Harris County Sheriff, Harris County Probation Department, and any other governmental entity involved in the investigation of the underlying offense, the prosecution of Mr. Balderas and Mr. Diaz, the incarceration of Mr. Balderas or Mr. Diaz, or the release of Mr. Diaz.

#### RELEVANT BACKGROUND

On December 26, 2017, following a series of proceedings that resulted in the recusal of a prior judge, this case was reassigned to the Honorable Baylor Wortham for disposition of Mr. Balderas's Initial Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to Article 11.071 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure (Initial Application), and to dispose of any other business requested by the Court. *See* Exhibit A, Order of Assignment by the Presiding Judge. Judge Wortham contacted the undersigned counsel, Erin Eckhoff and Katherine Black of the OCFW, as well as counsel for the State, Farnaz Hutchins and Shawna Reagin of the Harris County District Attorney's Office (HCDAO), via email, requesting input regarding the scheduling of a "writ hearing" (later clarified to be a status hearing) in the case. Both parties responded, also via email, regarding the scheduling of a hearing, and a status hearing was set in the matter for February 22, 2018.

At the February 22 status hearing, the Court heard argument from both parties on numerous, substantive issues raised in Mr. Balderas's Initial Application. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court determined that several of the claims for relief Mr. Balderas had raised in his Initial Application warranted additional factual development via live evidentiary hearing. One of these claims was a claim that a key witness for the State, Israel Diaz, had testified falsely against Mr. Balderas at his capital trial in 2014. The Court determined that Mr. Balderas should be provided

"an opportunity to explore" the testimony of Mr. Diaz by subpoena to an evidentiary hearing; however, the Court also found that "given there are potential issues relating to perjury," that it was necessary to appoint Mr. Diaz an attorney "to represent him for the limited purpose of that hearing to instruct him accordingly." *See* Exhibit B, February 22, 2018 Writ Hearing Transcript, at 60. The Court further found that Mr. Balderas should be allowed to present the testimony of Anali Garcia and Octavio Cortes, two alibi witnesses whose testimony was not presented at Mr. Balderas's trial but who signed affidavits that Mr. Balderas filed in support of his Initial Application. *Id.* at 61.

Following the February 22, 2018 writ hearing, the Court and the parties exchanged emails regarding the scheduling of an evidentiary hearing in the case. The Court also appointed counsel for Mr. Diaz, for the limited purpose of advising him regarding constitutional (Fifth Amendment) issues.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Following the February 22, 2018 status hearing, the Court and the parties exchanged emails regarding the scheduling of an evidentiary hearing in the case. The Court also appointed Danny Lacayo of the Harris County Public Defender's Office as advisory counsel for Mr. Diaz. Counsel for Mr. Balderas first became aware of Mr. Lacayo's appointment via electronic communication from the HCDAO, when ADA Hutchins copied Mr. Balderas's counsel on a string of electronic messages to Mr. Lacayo. On March 19, 2018, Mr. Lacayo contacted the Court and both parties via email (attached as Exhibit C). Mr. Lacayo's email contained the following message:

My name is Danny Lacayo with the Public Defender's Office. I was assigned to represent Israel Diaz in the Writ Hearing regarding Juan Balderas. I have attached all parties involved in this email. I was reviewing the Writ and evidence attached and noticed that there was a

On Friday, April 20, 2018, Mr. Balderas, through his counsel, filed this Motion to Compel Disclosure of Exculpatory and Impeachment Evidence. That afternoon, the Court addressed the Motion in an email communication to both parties, attached hereto as Exhibit E. In the email, the Court requested the parties take a few days to confer with one another as well as with Mr. Diaz's appointed counsel, to see if any of the discovery requests contained within the Motion to Compel could be resolved by agreement.

On Tuesday, April 24, 2018, the parties conferred on the telephone for approximately one hour. At the conclusion of the conversation, the parties had not

See Exh. C Page 2, email from Mr. Lacayo.

Mr. Lacayo subsequently arranged for the re-assignment of this appointment as counsel for Mr. Diaz within the Harris County Public Defender's Office. Mr. Diaz is currently represented by Genesis Draper.

witness named Christopher Pool who testified in the trial. The writ alleged that he provided false testimony regarding his termination in regards to an inmate death. While at the Harris County District Attorney's Office I worked in Police Integrity for a period of time. I believe that I investigated the incident regarding Detention Officer Pool. This case was eventually presented to a grand jury which returned a no bill. I know that this is an important case to everyone and wanted full disclosure to all parties involved that I investigated one of the witnesses in this case. I am not sure if you wanted to keep me on the case and wanted your guidance. If you believe that there is some conflict I can have the case re-assigned within the Harris County Public Defender's Office.

reached agreement as to any of the 23 items in Mr. Balderas's motion, but the representatives of the Harris County District Attorney's Office did indicate to Mr. Balderas's counsel that there were some documents they might submit to the Court for *in camera* review, in response to Mr. Balderas's Motion.<sup>3</sup>

During the telephonic conference between counsel for Mr. Balderas and representatives of the Harris County District Attorney's Office, the HCDAO raised many objections to Mr. Balderas's requests. Some of the objections were that the requests were overbroad, others were that the materials responsive to the requests had already been produced, and still others were that items included in the request were inaccessible to counsel for the State.

For the reasons set forth below, Mr. Balderas, through counsel, respectfully renews his request that this Court issue an order directing the State to produce the materials listed below to counsel for Mr. Balderas.

#### II.

### ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

Mr. Balderas respectfully requests the Court order the State to disclose the following materials, all of which are relevant to specific claims pending before this

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Subsequently, in an email correspondence to the Court and counsel for Mr. Balderas, Assistant District Attorney Farnaz Hutchins represented to the Court that she would like to provide the Court with several documents for an *in-camera* review. *See* Exh. D, attached.

Court in the Article 11.071 proceeding, including those that are the subject of the evidentiary hearing set to commence May 11, 2018, at which Israel Diaz—a key witness for the State who testified against Mr. Balderas at trial—is expected to testify.

Prior disclosure provided by the State has included some exculpatory material, but counsel has a good faith belief that additional exculpatory material exists and is in the possession of the State. See Exh. E, Affidavit of Erin Eckhoff. In light of what he has already received, and in anticipation of Mr. Diaz's testimony at the May 11, 2018 evidentiary hearing, Mr. Balderas makes the following requests for disclosure, as such information would constitute exculpatory or impeachment evidence to which Mr. Balderas is entitled under the United States Constitution. Mr. Balderas is entitled to these materials because they should have been disclosed to him prior to his trial, and because they may contain information relevant to Mr. Balderas's claims of prosecutorial misconduct and to Israel Diaz's related testimony at the upcoming post-conviction evidentiary hearing. Defense counsel are entitled to all materials "favorable" to a defendant of which the State has constructive knowledge, not just self-evidently exculpatory material. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); see also, Harm v. State, 183 S.W.3d 403, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (noting that defendants are entitled to "favorable evidence known only to the police"). This duty to disclose includes any

information that could be used to impeach witnesses against Mr. Balderas. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (prosecution's duty to disclose any information tending to show a witness's bias in favor of the government or against the defendant or that otherwise impeaches a witness's testimony); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (due process violated where important witness for the State in a murder prosecution falsely testified that witness had received no promise of consideration in return for his testimony, though in fact Assistant State's Attorney had promised witness consideration, and Assistant State's Attorney did nothing to correct false testimony); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935). Withholding of such evidence violates due process if the evidence is material to either guilt or punishment, irrespective of whether the State knowingly withheld information. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. According to the Supreme Court, "[w]hen police or prosecutors conceal significant exculpatory or impeaching material in the State's possession, it is ordinarily incumbent on the State to set the record straight." Banks, 540 U.S. at 675-76.

The Texas discovery statute mirrors these constitutional requirements. *See* Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 39.14(h) ("[T]he state shall disclose to the defendant any exculpatory, impeachment, or mitigating document, item or information in the possession, custody, or control of the state that tends to negate the guilt of the

defendant or would tend to reduce the punishment for the offense charged."). This statute also explicitly extends this requirement to materials not discovered by the State until after trial. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 39.14(k) ("If at any time before, during or after trial the state discovers any additional document, item, or information required to be disclosed under Subsection (h), the state shall promptly disclose the existence of the document, item, or information to the defendant or the court."). While the underlying offense occurred before this statute was enacted, the Court of Criminal Appeals has discussed this provision in the context of a crime that occurred before the statute's enactment, leaving open the prospect that this section applies retroactively to all offenses. *See Francis v. State*, 428 S. W. 3d 850, 856 n.12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

## A. The Discovery Requests, as General Matter, are Not Overbroad.

Mr. Balderas was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death on March 14, 2014. The OCFW was appointed to represent Mr. Balderas in his state habeas corpus proceedings on March 24, 2014. As part of the OCFW's statutorily-mandated duty to investigate all potential legal and factual claims for relief, counsel took steps to review potentially exculpatory and impeachment evidence in possession of the State and its various agents who were involved in prosecuting and investigating the case against Mr. Balderas. *See* TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. Art. 11.071 § 3(a). These steps included having reviewed the case file made available by the

Harris County District Attorney's Office and filing Public Information Act requests with the Houston Police Department and other law enforcement agencies.

On or about August 13, 2015, when counsel for the OCFW undertook a review of the files made available by the HCDAO, it was counsel's understanding that representatives of the HCDAO set aside a portion of the contents of each box provided, explaining that certain materials were being withheld pursuant to the Texas Public Information Act. *See* Exh. D, Affidavit of Erin Eckhoff, at ¶6. Therefore, counsel for Mr. Balderas renews the discovery requests included in this Motion in good faith. Despite this fact, the State objects to almost all of Mr. Balderas's discovery requests on the grounds that they are overbroad and vague.

But, there is no way for Mr. Balderas to intuit what specific information the State or its agents possess. Rather, the requests made were as specific as possible. If Mr. Balderas already knew what material the State possessed that might tend to exculpate Mr. Balderas or impeach witnesses against him, including Mr. Diaz, to the point that he could make very specific and extremely detailed descriptions of each document he requests, presumably, he would not need to request them. This is the double-edged sword of the State's position: that Mr. Balderas cannot demand materials that he cannot describe, but he cannot describe them if he does not know what they are. Because the requests are reasonable, and based upon the good faith basis of prior representations by the State that materials were being withheld on the

basis of Public Information Act disclosure requirements (see Exh. D, Eckhoff Affidavit), the Motion should be granted in its entirety. The State cannot elide its duty under the United States Constitution to provide Mr. Balderas with relevant impeachment or exculpatory information simply by arguing that Mr. Balderas should be required first to name with specificity the documents or materials that are in the State's possession.

## B. THE SUBMISSION OF DOCUMENTS TO THE COURT FOR IN-CAMERA REVIEW IS INSUFFICIENT

During the April 24, 2018 telephone conference, counsel for the State indicated its intention to submit certain documents that might be encompassed within some of the discovery requests in Mr. Balderas's Motion to the Court for *in camera* review. For the following reasons, *in camera* review by the Court is inadequate here as a means of fulfilling Mr. Balderas's rights (and discharging the State's duties) under *Brady* and its progeny.

While in camera review might, in another case, be an appropriate means of discerning whether particular documents contain *Brady* material, this case is much more complicated than the average case: the litigation spans more than a dozen years and the files are voluminous. To expect the Court—particularly in this case, where the Court has recently been asked to take over subsequent to a recusal motion—to discern whether particular documents might contain impeachment or other exculpatory material is unrealistic and runs an unacceptable risk of depriving

Mr. Balderas of important impeachment or exculpatory evidence to use in the presentation of witnesses and the cross-examination of State's witnesses at the upcoming evidentiary hearing. Counsel for Mr. Balderas are much better-suited to this task, particularly because the OCFW has represented Mr. Balderas since 2014, filed his Initial Application, and will be responsible for conducting the examinations of witnesses at the evidentiary hearing. Finally, it is worth noting that Israel Diaz, who was a key witness for the State at Mr. Balderas's capital trial and is being subpoenaed to the evidentiary hearing, has made multiple, conflicting statements over the years, making it virtually certain that any statement he has made to law enforcement or representatives of the State over the years could be used for potential impeachment, and could tend to exculpate Mr. Balderas.

For these reasons, Mr. Balderas respectfully requests that his counsel, the OCFW be allowed to review these files rather than the Court reviewing them *in camera*, as Mr. Balderas's counsel have the extensive background knowledge of his case necessary to determine whether a seemingly innocuous document, or note contained therein, is in fact significant to Mr. Balderas's habeas claims.

#### III.

## **DISCOVERY REQUESTED**

In light of the State's disclosure obligations under *Brady* and its progeny, as well as the specific claims pending before this Court in the Article 11.071 proceeding, including the evidentiary hearing set to commence on May 11, 2018, counsel for Mr. Balderas respectfully request an order from this Court compelling the State to produce the following:

1. Copies of any and all Harris County jail records for **Israel Diaz** (DOB 04/09/1986), including, but not limited to all records and logs of visits, jail mail, complaints, grievances, write-ups, disciplinary records, classification worksheets, movement logs, and gang association information.

For example, the State has in its possession at least some jail records for State's witnesses Israel Diaz and Alejandro Garcia, including audio files of their recorded jail telephone calls. *See* Exh. D, Affidavit of Erin Eckhoff, at ¶9. Indeed, the State's prior disclosure to the OCFW included photocopies of the physical discs containing those audio files. *Id.* The State has not, however, disclosed the contents of those files to the OCFW. *Id.* In fact, the State's prior disclosure appears to contain no audio or video files, even though audio and video files exist in the case file.

- 2. Copies of any and all communications and contact between **Israel Diaz** (DOB 04/09/1986), or his representatives, and the HCDAO, including, but not limited to: emails, text messages, phone messages, in-person conversations (notes and memos) and telephonic communications (and notes and memos) from 2004 to the present.
- 3. Additionally, Mr. Balderas specifically requests that any oral communications between **Israel Diaz** (DOB 04/09/1986) and the HCDAO that take place in advance of the May 11, 2018 hearing be

recorded and a copy of the recording produced to counsel for Mr. Balderas in advance of the hearing.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> In the Court's April 20, 2018, email to the parties, the Court indicated that it was inclined to find this request overbroad, because counsel for Mr. Balderas had not made a showing that these recordings actually would contain any exculpatory or impeachment information. But because Diaz has given contradictory statements with regard to Mr. Balderas's involvement in the murder of Eduardo "Powder" Hernandez, any statement that Diaz gives to the State in the presence of his attorney will be exculpatory. Diaz told Mr. Balderas's jury that Mr. Balderas was present at the scene of the murder and confessed to committing the shooting. He told OCFW investigator Adrián de la Rosa that he lied due to pressure from the government: that he did not see Mr. Balderas at the scene in the aftermath of the shooting and that Mr. Balderas never confessed to him. Any statement Diaz makes to prosecutors now necessarily will contradict one of those prior statements, and will, by definition, be exculpatory and, therefore, discoverable. Further, if Diaz offers an explanation to attempt to reconcile his contradictory statements, that explanation is exculpatory and discoverable. Also, if the State engages Diaz in possible explanations for the contradictory statements, those conversations are discoverable.

It is immaterial that the State will inevitably characterize the statements as non-contradictory, because the State's attempted reconciliation of a cooperating

witness's contradictory statements is not the standard for determining what is or is not exculpatory under *Brady*. If that were the case, a defendant would never be entitled to receive exculpatory evidence, because the State would always make some attempt to reconcile or explain away the contradictions. The true question is whether it is reasonable to interpret Diaz's statements as contradictory, regardless of the witness's explanation now.

Brady evidence encompasses not merely anything the prosecutor believes proves the innocence of the accused: it is in fact much broader. Brady material is defined as any information that (1) is relevant to punishment or guilt; and (2) is exculpatory, broadly defined, not solely evidence of innocence. It can also be evidence that may mitigate the sentence (here, death), or anything that reasonably can be used to impeach a State's witness. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; see also Bagley, 473 U.S. at 490 ("impeachment evidence, however, as well as exculpatory evidence, falls within the Brady rule"). Therefore, if the witness's second, third, or fourth account is in any way different from any of the other accounts, even if it is more harmful to the defense, it must be turned over to the defense.

Further, permitting the prosecutor to interpret the statements of the witness is inadequate. The State is an advocate for its position, and will attempt to reconcile any statement made by the witness, even inadvertently (and good or bad faith of the

- 4. The entire HCDAO case file for **Israel Diaz** (DOB 4/09/86) including but not limited to communications with Diaz, status notes/reports, third party communications, references to the murder of Eduardo "Powder" Hernandez, and any references to cooperation with the State in the following cases: *State v. Juan Balderas* (Cause No. 1050630); *State v. Efrain Lopez* (Cause No. 1050629 or Cause No. 1305940 or Cause No. 1428270); *State v. Jose Hernandez* (Cause No. 1050633).
- 5. Files kept and maintained by the Harris County District Attorney for any criminal case charging **Israel Diaz** (DOB 04/09/86) from 2003-2008, including all reports, notes, communications, witness lists, charging documents, promises/rewards/inducements, case resolution, and any reference to Eduardo Hernandez as a witness.
- 6. Communications, including but not limited to, emails, letters, voicemails, and any oral communications reduced to writing between employees and agents of the HCDAO and employees of the Harris County Department of Probation regarding **Israel Diaz** (DOB 04/09/86).
- 7. The entire Harris County Department of Probation case file for **Israel Diaz** (DOB 4/09/86) including but not limited to communications with Diaz, status notes/reports, third party communications, references to the murder of Eduardo "Powder" Hernandez, and any

prosecution is immaterial under *Brady*, see *Brady*, at 87). The only reliable way to insure that any statement made by Diaz will be preserved, verbatim, without interpretation or omission by the prosecutor, intentional or inadvertent, is to require the statement be recorded. This procedure would also protect against any attorney or State agent becoming a witness. A recording of the statement, especially under these circumstances, is therefore the most reliable means of assuring that the statement is accurately preserved.

- references to cooperation with the State in the following cases: *State v. Juan Balderas* (Cause No. 1050630); *State v. Efrain Lopez* (Cause Nos. 1050629, or 1305940, or 1428270); *State v. Jose Hernandez* (Cause No 1050633).
- 8. All agents' (federal, state, local and administrative agency) rough notes of interrogations or debriefings of **Israel Diaz** (DOB 04/09/86).
- 9. All prior written, recorded, or oral statements of **Israel Diaz** (DOB 04/09/86) relating to this case that were made to anyone, and all law enforcement agents' rough draft notes of interviews with Diaz.
- 10. The prior arrest and conviction records of **Israel Diaz** (DOB 04/09/86), including his complete criminal history, and the docket number and jurisdiction of all prior and pending cases.
- 11. All evidence that **Israel Diaz** (DOB 04/09/86) has ever (a) made any false statement to the authorities, whether or not under oath or under penalty of perjury, and/or (b) does not have a good reputation in the community for honesty. Texas Rule of Evidence 608(a).
- 12.All evidence that **Israel Diaz** (DOB 04/09/86) has ever made a false, contradictory, or inconsistent statement with regard to this case, or any statement showing bias or a motive to fabricate. *Pennsylvania v. Ritchie*, 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
- 13.All evidence that the statements of **Israel Diaz** (DOB 04/09/86) are inconsistent with or contradicted by that of any other person or prospective witness. *Kyles*, 514 U. 419.
- 14. Any express or implicit promise, understanding, offer of immunity, sentencing leniency, or of past, present, or future compensation, or any other kind of agreement or understanding between **Israel Diaz** (DOB 04/09/86) and law enforcement or prosecutorial agent or agency (federal, state, and local). This request includes any explicit or implicit understanding relating to criminal or civil income tax liability, and/or immigration proceedings. *Kyles*, 514 U.S. at 432-34.
- 15.All evidence of discussion about, or *advice* concerning, any contemplated prosecution of **Israel Diaz** (DOB 04/09/86), or any possible plea bargain, even if no bargain was made, or the advice not followed. *Brown v. Dugger*, 831 F.2d 1547, 1555-56 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1987)

- (Clark, J., concurring) (evidence that witness sought plea bargain is to be disclosed, even if no deal struck); *Haber v. Wainwright*, 756 F.2d 1520, 1524 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1985).
- 16.Copies of any and all jail records for **Alejandro Garcia** (DOB 02/02/1989), a testifying witness against Mr. Balderas at the punishment phase of Mr. Balderas's trial, including, but not limited to, all records and logs of visits, jail mail, complaints, grievances, write-ups, disciplinary records, classification worksheets, movement logs, gang association information, jobs, classes, trainings, and commissary.
- 17. Copies of any and all communications and contact between **Alejandro Garcia** (DOB 02/02/1989) and the Harris County District Attorney's Office, including, but not limited to, emails, texts, phone messages, in-person conversations and notes and memos, phone conversations and notes/memos, etc., between 2005 and present.
- 18. Copies of any and all jail records for **Edgar Rene Ferrufino** (DOB 05/10/1988), including but not limited to all records and logs of visits, jail mail, complaints, grievances, write-ups, disciplinary records, classification worksheets, movement logs, gang association information, jobs, classes, trainings, and commissary.
- 19. The Police Integrity Division file regarding Christopher Scott Pool, a former detention officer for Harris County Sheriff's Department, who was employed as a detention officer from May 2009 to August 2012, and who testified for the State in Mr. Balderas's trial.
- 20. The entire Internal Affairs Department investigation file regarding **Christopher Scott Pool**, a former detention officer for the Harris County Sheriff's Office, employed from May 2009 to August 2012, who testified for the State at Mr. Balderas's trial.
- 21. Copies of any and all records in the Permanent File of Israel Diaz **Israel Diaz** (DOB 04/09/86); TDCJ No. 1970763), including, but not limited to, medical and mental health screenings; IQ and educational testing; reports and decisions by and to the Classification Committee; visitation logs, disciplinary records, and all parole and probation records and documents.

- 22. All parole and probation records and documents related to **Israel Diaz** (DOB 04/09/86), including, but not limited to, medical and mental health screenings, initial interviews, reports, and decisions for incarcerations from 2003 to the present.
- 23. The entire trial file for the case of *State v. Juan Balderas*, as made available to Mr. Balderas's trial counsel.

## IV.

#### **PRAYER**

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Mr. Balderas respectfully requests that this Court direct the State to disclose the above-listed information to counsel for Mr. Balderas (the OCFW).

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Katherine Froyen Black
KATHERINE FROYEN BLACK

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Attorneys for Mr. Balderas

## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I, the undersigned, declare and certify that I have served the foregoing upon:

Office of the Harris County District Attorney Attn: ADA Farnaz Hutchins

This certification is executed on May 1, 2018, at Austin, Texas.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

/s/ Katherine Froyen Black
Katherine Froyen Black

# IN THE 179th JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS

	)	Cause No.
EX PARTE	)	1412826-A
JUAN BALDERAS,	)	
APPLICANT	)	Hearing date: May 11, 2018
	)	
	)	

## MOTION TO COMPEL DISCLOSURE OF CAPITAL MURDER SUMMARY

Juan Balderas, by and through his counsel, the Office of Capital and Forensic Writs (OCFW), files this motion seeking production of the capital murder summary in the aforementioned case. This Court has set an evidentiary hearing to commence on May 11, 2018, and Mr. Balderas requests this Court order the State to disclose the capital murder summary to counsel for Mr. Balderas in advance of the May 11 evidentiary hearing. In support of this motion, Mr. Balderas respectfully states the following:

I.

## RELEVANT BACKGROUND

In October 2015, at a hearing on a prior discovery motion, counsel for Mr. Balderas requested the capital murder summary be disclosed, and the request was denied. *See* Exhibit A, Transcript of October 27, 2015 Hearing at 17. In response,

the State baldly asserted that the documents were protected under the work product doctrine. *Id.* On that basis, the Court denied Mr. Balderas's request. *Id.* 

On July 18, 2016, the State filed its Answer to Mr. Balderas's Initial Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus. In support of its Answer, the State attached a sworn statement from former Harris County Assistant District Attorney Spence Graham. *See* Exhibit B, Spence Graham's Affidavit, filed with the State's Answer on July 18, 2016. Therein, Mr. Graham stated: "Also included in the State's file was the capital murder summary that I prepared which was also *available for trial counsel to review.*" *Id.* at p. 2 (emphasis added).

In light of the State's changed position on the work product status of the capital murder summary, Mr. Balderas, through his counsel, renewed his request for disclosure of the capital murder summary at a status hearing on August 17, 2017. Exhibit C, August 17, 2017 Writ Hearing Transcript, at 18. Indeed, in response to Mr. Balderas's request, the State adhered to the position that the documents had been disclosed to trial counsel, consistent with the affidavit of Spence Graham. Specifically, when counsel for Mr. Balderas requested to be able to see the capital case summary, the State responded: "That's probably fair." *Id.* The Court then decided: "If they have it, if they can find it, that will be fine. I'm sure you should be allowed to see it." *Id.* The State did not, however, disclose the capital murder summary to Mr. Balderas's counsel.

At the writ (status) hearing before this Court on February 22, 2018, Mr. Balderas's counsel again requested on the record that a copy of the capital murder summary be disclosed. Despite its earlier representation that it was "probably fair" that the capital murder summary be disclosed to Mr. Balderas's counsel, the State reversed course and again retroactively asserted that the document did not need to be disclosed based upon the work product doctrine. *Id.* at 68-69. Counsel for Mr. Balderas objected to the State's re-assertion of work product protection on the ground that the protection had been waived due to the fact that the former prosecutor in the case, Spence Graham, had disclosed the capital murder summary to Mr. Balderas's trial counsel prior to Mr. Balderas's trial. *See* Exh. B. This Court declined to order the disclosure of the capital case summary on the basis of the State's assertion that it was work product, but agreed to perform an *in camera* review of the document.

## II.

## **ARGUMENT**

Mr. Balderas requests that this Court order the disclosure of the capital murder summary that was submitted to the Court for its review to Mr. Balderas's counsel, because the State waived the work product protection with respect to this document when it voluntarily disclosed the document to Mr. Balderas's trial counsel. *See* Tex. R. of Evid. 511(1) ("A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege

against disclosure waives the privilege if: the person or a predecessor of the person while holder of the privilege voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant part of the privileged matter unless such disclosure itself is privileged"); Wright v. State, 374 S.W.3d 564, 580 [Tex.App.—Houston [14<sup>th</sup> Dist.] 2001, pet. ref'd] (if a person holding a privilege against disclosure voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant part of the privileged matter, that person waives any privilege unless the disclosure itself is privileged); Jones v. State, 181 S.W.3d 875, 878 [(Tex. App—Dallas 2005 pet. ref'd] (finding a waiver of privileged material when a defendant voluntarily disclosed the existence of a second statement to counsel in response to a prosecutor's cross-examination of the defendant with the defendant's initial statement to police). Waiver of privileged material may be inferred from the totality of the circumstances and reasonable inferences. See Carmona v. State, 941 S.W.2d 949, 954 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992).

Here, the State has repeatedly represented, before this Court and through a sworn statement of its own witness, that the State voluntarily disclosed the capital murder summary to its adversary in advance of Mr. Balderas's 2014 trial. Specifically, by its own affirmative representation, the State placed the capital murder summary in the trial file made available to Mr. Balderas's trial counsel, who unquestionably constitute a "third party" as contemplated in Texas Rule of Evidence 511(1). Because the State knowingly and intentionally released the information to

a third party, the State waived any work product protection that may have applied to the capital murder summary and cannot now reassert that protection.

In consideration of these points and authorities, and in light of the State's voluntary waiver of work product protection here, Mr. Balderas respectfully requests that this Court order the State to disclose the capital murder summary to Mr. Balderas's counsel. If this Court denies Mr. Balderas's request and declines to order the State disclose the capital murder summary directly to Mr. Balderas's counsel, Mr. Balderas respectfully requests this Court make the capital murder summary, under seal, a part of the record in this case so that Mr. Balderas's objections to the Court's rulings with respect to the capital murder summary can be reviewed.

## III.

## **PRAYER**

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Mr. Balderas respectfully requests that this Court direct the State to disclose the capital murder summary to counsel for Mr. Balderas (the OCFW).

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Katherine Froyen Black
KATHERINE FROYEN BLACK
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Attorneys for Mr. Balderas

# IN THE 179th JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS

EX PARTE JUAN BALDERAS, APPLICANT	) Cause No. ) 1412826-A ) Hearing date: May 11, 2018 )
<u>[P]</u>	ROPOSED] ORDER
On this date, the Cour	considered Mr. Balderas's Motion to Compel
Disclosure of Capital Murder S	ummary. After due consideration, Mr. Balderas's
Motion is GRANTED. The	State shall provide a copy of the capital murder
summary to counsel for Mr. Ba	lderas in advance of the May 11, 2018 evidentiary
hearing.	
ORDERED AND 2018.	SIGNED on this day of,
	The Honorable Baylor Wortham Judge Presiding by Appointment 179 <sup>th</sup> District Court

## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I, the undersigned, declare and certify that I have served the foregoing upon:

Office of the Harris County District Attorney Attn: ADA Farnaz Hutchins

This certification is executed on May 1, 2018, at Austin, Texas.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

/s/ Katherine Froyen Black
Katherine Froyen Black

REPORTER'S RECORD VOLUME 1 OF 1 VOLUMES
TRIAL COURT CAUSE NO. 1412826
APPELLATE COURT NO. AP-77,036
EX PARTE ) IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
) HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
JUAN BALDERAS ) 179TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
On the 27th day of October, 2015, the following
proceedings came on to be held in the above-titled
and numbered cause before the Honorable Kristin M.
Guiney, Judge Presiding, held in Houston, Harris
County, Texas.
Proceedings reported by computerized stenotype
machine.
Renee Reagan, Texas CSR No. 7573
Official Court Reporter, 179th District Court 1201 Franklin Houston, Texas 77002

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THE COURT: In Ex Parte Juan Balderas, the Office of Capital and Forensic Writs has filed a motion for disclosure of exculpatory and impeachment evidence. We've had a setting here. The State had argument or wished to give the Court guidance as to what they believe the appropriate resolution of this particular motion was.

State, you may proceed. Oh, sorry. It's defense's motion. My apologies.

MR. VERHAGEN: Derek VerHagen on behalf of the Office of Capital and Forensic Writs. Yes, we're requesting any exculpatory or impeachment evidence that may be in the State's possession under Brady v. Maryland and its progeny. To this point, we've already taken steps to locate that information by filing our own P.I.A. requests at various agencies, reviewing the D.A. files: I reviewed five of the boxes in mid-August and then received the other six boxes or files on October 21st and have done our best to get through those at this point. And then obviously, we've conducted our own investigation. So based on the discovery we've been provided at this point in the investigation that we've conducted, we have a good faith belief that there's additional information that may fall under Brady v. Maryland and we're asking this Court to order that the

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State provide that to the O.C.F.W. to the extent that it exists.

I can go into detail if you'd like, Your Honor, on what exactly we're asking for; but it's listed in the motion itself. There are two things that aren't listed in the motion that I wanted to talk about very briefly. The first is, if you'll look at what's listed as No. 3 on page 5 of the motion: Any information or documentation of communications including e-mails between the State and witnesses or their representatives including but not limited to -- to that list, I'd like to add Edgar Ferrufino, the last name, F-E-R-R-U-F-I-N-O. Mr. Ferrufino was in the apartment on the night of the shooting; he was an eyewitness' boyfriend.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. Can you spell his last name again?

MR. VERHAGEN: F-E-R-R-U-F-I-N-O. And he was in the apartment on the night of the shooting. He was the eyewitness' boyfriend and he ended up testifying at trial also.

In addition to that, the O.C.F.W. is requesting a capital murder summary, to the extent that there was one, explaining the reason for charging capitally in this case. And again, I can speak in more

detail about any of the other things that are listed if Your Honor needs --

THE COURT: Capital murder summary would be, then, Request No. 10?

MR. VERHAGEN: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything else?

MR. VERHAGEN: Nothing else.

THE COURT: State.

MS. HARDAWAY: Your Honor, Mr. VerHagen, he did touch on the P.I.A. request and I would just like to elaborate on that a little more. We actually did something a little bit different in this case in that --it's 11 boxes. We have it all divided up and there's, like -- in each box there's a separate folder with office work product, prosecutor work product. But anyway, what our office did is we went ahead and scanned in the entire contents of the 11 boxes and we have made available -- at least we did all the documentary items in the boxes and we recently sent disks with the copies of all the documentary items to the Office of Capital and Forensic Writs minus the office work product. So we've already turned over a lot of information to the Office of Capital Writs.

The other thing I'd like to say is it's the State's position that this request is overly broad.

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There isn't discovery in habeas proceedings and as a matter of fact, this proceeding is not covered by the Michael Morton Act which, because this was an offense in 2005, there's specifically a savings clause in the Michael Morton Act. But, Your Honor, I would -- because there is already a P.I.A. request in place in this case, I've told Mr. VerHagen that I would be willing to do an e-mail search for specific items; some of those -- I mean, I would like to narrow the items in this discovery -- in this motion but I will go ahead and do a search and turn over external e-mails. I will not agree to turn over internal e-mails amongst the prosecutors and the prosecutors' investigators and I also object to turning over the capital murder summary.

THE COURT: Okay. And so I'm clear, you said that you've scanned -- the office, your office, has scanned all of the 11 boxes --

MS. HARDAWAY: The documentary --

THE COURT: What is a nondocumentary

20 | item?

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MS. HARDAWAY: There's various types of media; like, there are interviews and things like that, pictures. I think there are actually some pictures that have been scanned in. I'm not sure about all of them, but there are a lot of CDs.

1 THE COURT: All right. So in terms of 2 the list, if we could just go down the list of the 3 defense -- I mean, the O.C.W.'s. Would the State have any objection to the 4 granting of Request No. 1, any information tending to 5 show a witness' bias in favor of the Government or 6 against Balderas, or which otherwise impeaches a 7 witness' testimony? 8 MS. HARDAWAY: Well, I mean -- okay. 9 Your Honor, I was actually skipping over to No. 1 on 10 page 4, because generally these are just so general. 11 think that all falls under the -- on page 2, the Office 12 13 of Capital Writs refers to disclosing any potential 14 exculpatory and impeachment information. Just because 15 something might potentially be exculpatory or impeachment doesn't mean that you have to turn it over. 16 Say that again. 17 THE COURT: MS. HARDAWAY: Just because something is 18 potentially exculpatory, I don't believe that that 19 20 means --Okay. Actually I meant to 21 THE COURT: 22 start with the list as it begins on page 4. 23 MS. HARDAWAY: Okay. THE COURT: So, any information or 24 documentation in possession of the State regarding the 25

State's plea deal with Israel Diaz, including any 1 2 information about his testimony, failure to testify. 3 I'm sorry. It's very early in the 4 morning. So I guess the State's general objection 5 to all of these specific requests, the specific requests 6 7 beginning on page 4 is the P.I.A. request covers it, 8 you've scanned it --9 MS. HARDAWAY: We've scanned everything. THE COURT: Your documentary -- let me 10 read these specifics again. 11 12 MS. HARDAWAY: Your Honor, what I can do 13 is -- you know Traci Bennett's in trial right now, 14 correct? 15 THE COURT: No. MS. HARDAWAY: Or I don't know if you 16 know; she's in a capital right now. I'm aware of my 17 18 duty to turn over Brady material and I know that Traci's 19 aware of that, too. When she gets out of trial, if you 20 want me to, I can have her look through the work product and see what might be responsive to No. 1, if anything. 21 2.2 THE COURT: Okay. And for scheduling purposes, just so Mr. VerHagen knows, is it a death case 23 or nondeath case? 24 MS. HARDAWAY: It's a death case. She 2.5

should be done in about three weeks. 1 THE COURT: Okay. 2 3 MS. HARDAWAY: But actually -- and you 4 probably remember this, Your Honor -- the plea deal with 5 him was pretty well explored at trial. It's when he testified on direct; and also, Traci did a notice to the 6 7 defense --8 MR. VERHAGEN: It's one of the 9 interesting things about No. 1 and why we continue to 10 ask for it even after the P.I.A. request has been fulfilled by them is that Mr. Diaz -- if you look at the 11 12 Brady notice, it's agreed to that he'll testify in three 13 trials in exchange for his deal and he testifies in 14 Mr. Balderas' trial and then doesn't testify in any other trials. To the extent that there's any 15 explanation why Mr. Diaz didn't testify in any of the 16 17 other trials and it has anything to do with the 18 truthfulness of the testimony he gave in Mr. Balderas' 19 trial, we would be requesting any information that would 20 reflect that. 21 THE COURT: To that specific request, 22 does the State have --MS. HARDAWAY: You know what, Your Honor? 23 I don't know why he didn't testify in the other trials. 24 25 I can --

THE COURT: Because in the other trials, they didn't try that same case. That's why. That would be my guess. I'm certainly not speaking for the State. That's my recollection of the facts.

MR. VERHAGEN: Possibly, yeah.

THE COURT: Juan Balderas' guilt case was a different guilt case from the other cases that were tried. Obviously the State has a continuing duty to give you any information regarding Mr. Diaz, so I think the current case law on habeas proceedings covers that.

With regard to Request No. 3, which you've added to -- that was where you added Edgar Ferrufino.

MR. VERHAGEN: Yes.

THE COURT: And Ms. Hardaway has indicated that she will begin an e-mail search for those as long as they are not e-mails or correspondence that would normally come under the work product protection.

MS. HARDAWAY: I will do that. And, Your Honor, okay, the one problem I had with No. 3 is, again, this is pretty wide open. It says: Including but not limited to Israel Diaz and Alejondro Garcia. If we can narrow it just to those individuals, Diaz, Garcia, and Ferrufino, I will do an e-mail search and see if I come up with anything on those individuals.

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THE COURT: Okay. I think that's a fair limitation. Obviously if in the course of your proceedings, Mr. VerHagen, you come up with another specific witness to give her to search; but you can't search for an exhaustive list.

MR. VERHAGEN: Right.

THE COURT: So if you delineate; but at this point, I will order the State to conduct an e-mail search that would not otherwise be protected by office work product for Israel Diaz, Alejondro Garcia, and Edgar Ferrufino.

MR. VERHAGEN: Yes.

MS. HARDAWAY: As far as No. 2, I'll agree to do a search for Garcia and his bond reduction, although I think the record pretty well reflects that that was a matter between the Trial Court and his defense counsel, that the State didn't have anything to do with that.

THE COURT: That is certainly my recollection, because I lowered the bond.

MS. HARDAWAY: Right.

THE COURT: And I'm not sure that there would have been any records. I don't think that there are any court reporter records relative to Alejondro Garcia's case.

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                    MS. HARDAWAY: But if you want me to, I
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     will just do an e-mail search while I'm doing these
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     others.
                    THE COURT: That's fine. An e-mail
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     search relative to No. 2's request.
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                    MS. HARDAWAY: So just for Alejondro
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     Garcia and bond reduction.
                    THE COURT: Right, and bond reduction.
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                    MS. HARDAWAY: I've explained to
     Mr. VerHagen, you have to be kind of specific about
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     these e-mails or else you're just going to come up
     with --
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                    THE COURT: Right, there has to be a
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     search term.
                    MR. VERHAGEN:
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                                    Right.
                    THE COURT: With regard to No. 4, as it's
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     limited to Wendy Bardales --
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                    MS. HARDAWAY:
                                    I will agree to do that.
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                     THE COURT: As long as it would not
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     otherwise be protected by work product.
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                    MS. HARDAWAY:
                                    Right. No. 6, I have an
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     objection to.
                     THE COURT: Let's -- we haven't discussed
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     No. 5.
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                     MS. HARDAWAY: Oh, I'm sorry.
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THE COURT: Is there anything --1 2 MS. HARDAWAY: I can do a search for 3 anonymous tips. I think that's in one of the offense reports and that's the only mention I saw of that, but I 4 5 can do a search for anonymous tips. MR. VERHAGEN: And that's one of those 6 things that, you know, it's referenced in the police 7 8 report, these anonymous tips, and then we can't -- no one seems to -- we can't seem to track them down. 9 1.0 THE COURT: Because they're anonymous. 11 MS. HARDAWAY: Or that might just be all 12 there is. 13 MR. VERHAGEN: Or any kind of reference 14 other than, Hey, someone from -- another person from the 15 gang unit called me and told me that this other person 16 said this. Any kind of earlier documentation to the 17 extent any exists, even if it's in HPD's hands, would 18 still fall under Brady, right? 19 MS. HARDAWAY: Well, I can't do a search 20 of HPD's e-mails. 21 THE COURT: Right. There's an ongoing duty 22 MR. VERHAGEN: for the State to turn that over, correct? 23 MS. HARDAWAY: I don't have access to 24 their e-mails. I will do a search of our office 25

e-mails. If there is an external communication, I will turn that over.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. VERHAGEN: Or even beyond an e-mail, like an actual document that might exist that's not an e-mail that reflects what was said on the tip.

that's the crux of the current problem with Brady. How is Ms. Hardaway or anyone from the office supposed to turn over something in the custody of HPD of which they have no knowledge? And if you come up with a policy, I will certainly -- and a way for her to be held responsible for that; but what she can do is what she has suggested, which is an e-mail search for any -
MS. HARDAWAY: Because basically we've already turned over all documentary information except

THE COURT: But she certainly can do an e-mail search for that information.

what's protected by work product.

No. 6, Ms. Hardaway, you said you had an objection to?

MS. HARDAWAY: Yes, because that is asking for internal communications between the State internally discussing Wendy Bardales testifying in Spanish. And again, I think that's pretty well

developed on the record that the State had a meeting with her and it was her idea at that time to ask for an interpreter because -- I mean, that wasn't at the State's suggestion. THE COURT: I don't know how you get around the work product for those internal e-mails. MR. VERHAGEN: Right. Documentation of communications, so that would also include -- at least my interpretation of it is that it also includes notes that were taken during Ms. Bardales' interview. So to the extent that we've already received notes for -- say the State kept notes on their interviews with Mr. Diaz, with Mr. Lopez, with Garcia. They kept notes with all kinds of different witnesses they had interviews with and there's no notes regarding Ms. Bardales and maybe there aren't any. That's just -- we're requesting, to

MS. HARDAWAY: Those are protected work product.

the extent that they do exist, that the State provide

THE COURT: You already have notes from the other?

MR. VERHAGEN: We have notes from interviews with Diaz.

MS. HARDAWAY: You know, I'm happy to

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those.

look through what we held back as work product and if there's something like that, I can submit it to you in camera.

THE COURT: Okay. So at that point that would be a ruling then. The State will look; if there are witness notes for Bardales generated by the office, I will review those in camera and make a determination after that.

7, I think the: But not limited to -MS. HARDAWAY: That's pretty much along
with 6.

THE COURT: I think 7 is subsumed by 6 unless you can delineate how --

MS. HARDAWAY: I think it is, too.

Request 6, that I will review any evidence, to the extent it exists, regarding internal conversations or strategies as it relates to Ms. Bald- -- Bardales -- it was a problem in the trial and it continues to be a problem -- testifying in Spanish, I will review those in camera to the extent those exist and make a ruling.

MR. VERHAGEN: No. 8, I don't -- there were some witness -- I will say from the Court's perspective that there were some e-mails regarding accommodation or scheduling matters; but when I

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e-mailed, I e-mailed all parties, or at least a 1 representative of all parties, depending on the exigency 2 3 of needing to get a quick e-mail out. Because as we all 4 know, there were seven lawyers. MS. HARDAWAY: It was like herding cats, 5 I'm sure. 6 7 THE COURT: You are exactly right. 8 can you do an e-mail search for that, Ms. Hardaway? MS. HARDAWAY: Sure. 9 THE COURT: I guess -- and Deputy Gerac 10 and Deputy Jenkins were the Court's bailiffs at the 11 12 time, so I don't know if they sent any e-mails or not 13 but most of the e-mails probably would have come from 14 me. 15 All right. No. 9. 16 MS. HARDAWAY: That, I think, goes with 17 our ongoing --18 THE COURT: The general, right. 19 Now, the objection to the 10th and today 20 added request for the capital murder summary, if it exists, to explain the decision, I assume the State's 2.1 position is that would be covered by work product? 22 MS. HARDAWAY: Yes, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: And I would tend to agree 24 unless you have a specific reason that it is not? 25

MR. VERHAGEN: Thank you, Your Honor. 1 2 THE COURT: Okay. Anything else? 3 MS. HARDAWAY: Can we go ahead and get this transcribed and, Your Honor, if I could give Traci 4 5 just three weeks to get out of trial and then we can meet back here. 6 THE COURT: 7 Sure. Three weeks falls squarely right in the week of Thanksgiving, so maybe we 8 9 could just have the first Thursday of December, which I think is probably December -- between a death penalty 10 11 trial and Thanksgiving, she might need a moment. First 12 Thursday of December, which is Thursday, the 1st. (Court in recess.) 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

EXH A

STATE OF TEXAS
COUNTY OF HARRIS

I, Renee Reagan, Official Court Reporter in and for the 179th District Court of Harris County, State of Texas, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing contains a true and correct transcription of all portions of evidence and other proceedings requested in writing by counsel for the parties to be included in this volume of the Reporter's Record in the above-styled and numbered cause, all of which occurred in open court or in chambers and were reported by me.

I further certify that this Reporter's Record of the proceedings truly and correctly reflects the exhibits, if any, offered by the respective parties.

WITNESS MY OFFICIAL HAND, this the 4th day of November, 2015.

/s/Renee Reagan
Renee Reagan, CSR
Texas CSR 7573
Official Court Reporter
179th District Court
Harris County, Texas
1201 Franklin
Houston, Texas 77002
Telephone: 713.755.6340
Expiration: 12/31/16

EXHA

#### Cause No. 1412826-A

**EX PARTE** 

§ IN THE 179TH DISTRICT COURT

Ş OF

JUAN BALDERAS. **Applicant** 

§

HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS

# **AFFIDAVIT OF SPENCE D. GRAHAM**

STATE OF TEXAS HARRIS COUNTY

DATE: July 14, 2016

Before me, the undersigned authority, a Notary Public in and for Harris County, Texas, on this day personally appeared Spence D. Graham, who being by me duly sworn, upon his oath deposes and says:

"My name is Spence D. Graham. I am a lawyer licensed in the State of Texas and my bar card no. is 24036665. I was an assistant district attorney for the Harris County District Attorney's Office from 2003 to mid-January, 2013. Since the beginning of 2013, I have been in private practice where the majority of my practice is devoted to criminal defense.

In May, 2009, I was transferred to the 179th District Court of Harris County, Texas, where I assumed responsibility for the prosecution of Juan Balderas and worked on the case for over two years. I remained in the 179th District Court until the end of December, 2011. Prosecutor Paula Hartman then became the chief prosecutor in that court and was responsible for Balderas' case.

Pursuant to the State's request, I recently reviewed handwritten notes of interviews (Applicant's Habeas Ex. 57) that were conducted with Israel Diaz. Pages 1 through 14 of the notes comprise the notes of prosecutor Caroline Dozier. Pages 15 through 23 are notes of a former Harris County District Attorney's Office prosecutor, George Weissfish.

When I was handling the Balderas case, the prosecution file consisted of six to eight well-ordered banker boxes organized by the various criminal offenses. Included in the boxes was a manila folder with Israel Diaz's name on it. The folder contained the interview notes of

> STATE'S EXHIBIT

#### Page 2 of 2

Dozier and Weissfish as well as transcripts from the interviews that the police conducted with Diaz. I kept the prosecution files in my office and defense counsel were free to come to my office and review the contents of the boxes. While the Balderas case was assigned to me, I am sure that trial counsel (Godinich, Nunnery or both) reviewed the Balderas prosecution file although I have no memory of when that specifically happened.

Also included in the State's file was the capital murder summary that I prepared which was also available for trial counsel to review. Regarding Israel Diaz, the summary contained the following information:

- that Diaz told police and prosecutors previously handling the case that there was a hit out on the complainant and gang leaders had issued an "SOS" (or "shoot on Sight") for anyone in LTC that saw the complainant:
- that Diaz previously gave statements from jall with his lawyer to law enforcement that the applicant admitted to killing the complainant when they spoke that evening at Alejandro Garcia's house;
- that Diaz could assert that the hit out on the complainant was made by the leadership of the La Tercera Crips gang, and that it was because of not only the complainant's potential testimony, but because of his friendship with rival gang members and that the complainant would share LTC secrets with the rival gang; and
- that Diaz knew that the complainant's murder would occur."

I have read the above statement and find it to be true and correct to the best of my

knowledge."

**Affiant** 

SWORN AND SUBSCRIBED before me, under oath, on this the 🖊 TH day of

2016.

VIVIAN M. LOGAN **Notary Public** STATE OF TEXAS

OTARY PUBLIC in and for the

tate of Texas

Commission Exp. FED. 05, 2018

y commission expires: Februar 5, 2018

1 REPORTER'S RECORD VOLUME 1 OF 1 VOLUMES 2 TRIAL COURT CAUSE NO. 1412826-A 3 THE STATE OF TEXAS ) IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 4 5 V. ) HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS 6 JUAN BALDERAS ) 179TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 7 8 9 WRIT HEARING 10 11 12 13 On the 17th day of August, 2017, the following proceedings came on to be held in the above-titled 14 15 and numbered cause before the Honorable Randy Roll, Judge Presiding, held in Houston, Harris County, 1.6 17 Texas. Proceedings reported by computerized stenotype 18 machine. 19 20 21 Renee Reagan, Texas CSR No. 7573 22 Official Court Reporter, 179th District Court 23 1201 Franklin Houston, Texas 77002 24 25

EXH C

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                             APPEARANCES
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     Ms. Farnaz Hutchins
     SBOT No. 24063791
, 3
     Mr. Joshua Reiss
     SBOT No. 24053738
     Ms. Shawna Reagin
 4
     SBOT No. 16634900
     Assistant District Attorneys
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     1201 Franklin
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     Attorneys for the State of Texas
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     Ms. Erin Eckhoff
     SBOT No. 24090910
15
     Ms. Katherine Black
     SBOT No. 24099910
     Office of Capital and Forensic Writs
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     1700 N. Congress Ave. Ste. 460
     Austin, Texas 78701
17
     Telephone: 512.463.8503
     Attorneys for the Defendant
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(Open court, defendant not present.) 1 THE COURT: On the record at this time --2 MS. ECKHOFF: Your Honor, my client. 3 THE COURT: Yes. 4 5 (Defendant present.) THE COURT: Let's go on the record. 6 7 We're in Cause No. 1412826-A, and introduce yourselves 8 and tell us who you represent. MS. ECKHOFF: Your Honor, my name is Erin 9 10 Eckhoff. I'm with the Office of Capital and Forensic Writs and we represent Mr. Juan Balderas in his 11 12 post-conviction proceedings. MS. BLACK: Katherine Black, also from 13 the Office of Capital and Forensic Writs, also 14 representing Mr. Balderas, who is present. 15 THE COURT: And for the State? 16 MS. HUTCHINS: Farnaz Hutchins, that's 17 18 F-A-R-N-A-Z, representing the State along with. 19 MR. REISS: Joshua Reiss, R-E-I-S-S, Harris County District Attorney's Office. Bar Card 20 No. 24053738. Good afternoon, Your Honor. 21 THE COURT: Good morning -- good 22 23 afternoon, yes. 24 All right. You may continue. MS. ECKHOFF: Thank you, Your Honor. 25

We've filed an initial application for writ of habeas corpus on Mr. Balderas' behalf that raised a number of claims that if established, would entitle him to habeas relief. These claims include that State's witnesses provided false testimony at trial. The impeachment --

THE COURT: Mr. Diaz, Mr. -- okay.

MS. ECKHOFF: Excuse me, sir?

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MS. ECKHOFF: That the State withheld impeachment evidence and as we have discussed a bit off the record, that the jurors were exposed to a -- an extraneous influence and that the Court, when that influence was brought to their attention, waited until after they reached a verdict to actually address it on the record. Again, if these claims are proven as true, then Mr. Balderas is entitled to habeas relief and I think what's important to note at this point is that, you know, we have the burden of proof. Mr. Balderas has the burden of proof at this stage. Our application are allegations that we are making. The State obviously has responded and denied those allegations and we are requesting an opportunity to put on the evidence necessary to prove our claims. For that, we argue, an evidentiary hearing is necessary. We need the opportunity to put on our own evidence but also

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challenge the State's evidence to the contrary. And we urge that that's what due process requires in a death penalty case like this.

As we also discussed a bit off the record, trial counsel have submitted affidavits responding to some of Mr. Balderas' claims, specifically the ineffective assistance of counsel claims. We don't --

THE COURT: And let me just say this.

I'll make some notes while you're talking. I just want
to interlineate, I know he had Mr. Jerome Godinich and
Alvin Nunnery.

MS. ECKHOFF: Yes.

THE COURT: And these are two lawyers that have taken capital murder cases probably more than any other pair of lawyers in the county. I don't know of anybody that's had more than they. So I'm just -- you may continue but I want you to know I know who the parties are.

MS. ECKHOFF: Sure. I appreciate that.

THE COURT: You may continue.

MS. ECKHOFF: We're simply stating that the affidavits alone are not a sufficient form of fact finding here. They certainly add to the facts at issue but there are a number of problems with relying on

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affidavits and not doing an evidentiary hearing, the most common sense of which is that it's really difficult to cross-examine a written statement. You know, for better for worse, when these types of claims are raised, trial counsel often become adverse to their former clients. They have an interest in defending themselves from these claims and --

THE COURT: Because right now you're claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, aren't you?

MS. ECKHOFF: Correct, yes.

THE COURT: I just want you to realize that I know both parties well. I know they've had probably dozens and dozens of cases --

MS. ECKHOFF: Sure.

THE COURT: -- like this. Those two pioneered capital murder in this county, at this level, at a very high level of sophistication. You may continue.

would just add that given the adverse dynamic that may arise in these types of cases, it's fair for Mr. Balderas to examine them and challenge them to the extent necessary and if possible. But -- and as we discussed off the record, we have had some opportunity to do a cursory review of what we believe are the

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accurate affidavits that were submitted and we've done our best to identify problems with them and objections we have to them at this point. We will be requesting additional time to review them more thoroughly and respond to the extent we have additional objections to make but I'm happy to go through some of the initial problems that I've noticed. First of all --

THE COURT: Why don't you do this for the Court of Appeals, very quickly go through -- is it 10 or 11 errors that you're alleging?

MS. ECKHOFF: There were 14 claims.

THE COURT: Would you go through them real quickly and summarize it?

MS. ECKHOFF: Sure. Okay. So, Claims 1 and 2 pertain to the testimony of Israel Diaz who testified on behalf of the State after making a deal with the State on the eve of Mr. Balderas' trial. And in that deal, in exchange for his testimony, his own capital murder charge was reduced to aggravated assault. At the trial he gave an account of the night in question, the night of the shooting, that he actually had seen Mr. Balderas immediately after the shooting take place and that Mr. Balderas confessed to him his involvement. Now, in our post-conviction investigation, of course we go back and talk to Mr. Diaz about his

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involvement in Mr. Balderas' trial and at that time he 1 2 recanted his testimony. He said that he actually did not even see Mr. Balderas the night of the shooting and 3 that Mr. Balderas has never confessed to him. 4 THE COURT: Did he also say that he -that the prosecutors at the time told him that his 6 statement that he didn't see that, the murder, that 7 8 wasn't acceptable and they told him he had to say that he did see it? Is that right? Are you alleging that? 9 MS. ECKHOFF: That is what he reported to 10 11 our investigator. 12 THE COURT: Also Mr. Isbell has given a statement, an affidavit, saying he was there every 13 moment that they were together with the prosecutors and 14 he never heard that. 1.5 MS. ECKHOFF: I understand. 16 THE COURT: I want you to realize 17 18 Mr. Isbell is the highest caliber attorney that we have I hold him in incredibly high esteem and I 19 2.0 believe him. I'm telling you that. MS. ECKHOFF: Okay. 21 THE COURT: So I'm just trying to say --22 go ahead. You may continue summarizing. 23 MS. ECKHOFF: And I appreciate that and I 2.4 would just point out, though, for the first -- for Claim 25

1, that was brought under Brady and Giglio, that would require the prosecutor knowing that it's false. The second claim is under Ex Parte Chabot and Chavez and that doesn't require that the State actually know that it was false testimony. So to the extent that you've -- it is, you know, possible that in fact the State did not do that as Mr. Diaz said but he still provided false testimony, that still entitles Mr. Balderas to relief.

Claim 3 is a Brady claim where in post conviction, the State turned over documents and within those documents we found 23 pages of handwritten notes of State meetings with Israel Diaz in the many years leading up to this testimony that he gave where he gave differing accounts of what happened the night of the shooting and surrounding the shooting. Those were notes that we did not find in our review of trial counsel's file and to the best of our ability, comparing it against what we understood trial counsel to have in their possession, raised a Brady claim that those had not actually been turned over as impeachment evidence. They were prior inconsistent statements that they could have used to cross-examine Diaz.

THE COURT: Would it help if after she gives one, you could give your rebuttal to each one of these?

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MS. HUTCHINS: If you'd like, Your Honor.

I was going to ask you at the end how you wanted me to
do it, if you wanted me to just do it very succinctly or
do them one by one.

THE COURT: As she's doing it succinctly, you can. We'll go back. I apologize. I've not had a death case before and I know this is different, but I want to have all the information. Only you were giving your side of it. I would like to have a rebuttal. So, let's back up to the first one. And so, do you remember?

MS. HUTCHINS: Yes, Judge. So, our response to that, Judge, is that the Court can resolve Grounds 1 and 2 based on --

MS. HUTCHINS: The false testimony, whether it was knowingly presented by the State or unknowingly presented by the State, that that can be resolved by this Court based off of the prevailing case law that's noted in the State's answer as well as the exhibits that were attached to the State's answer, namely, the credible affidavit of Mr. Isbell who stated that he was at each of the meetings, that the State did not pressure Mr. Diaz to change his statement and that Mr. Diaz testified as Mr. Isbell expected him to, as

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well as the affidavit of Traci Bennett, the State's --
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     one of the State's prosecutors, that refutes Mr. Diaz's,
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     I guess -- if we're even going to attribute the
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     statement to Mr. Diaz's statements post-conviction.
                                                           The
     reason I say if we're even going to attribute those to
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     Mr. Diaz are that the applicant now is relying on a
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     post-conviction affidavit from their habeas
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     investigator. It's not actually an affidavit from
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     Mr. Diaz himself.
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                    THE COURT: I know. It's a hearsay
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     document.
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                    MS. HUTCHINS: It's a hearsay document.
     So there's plenty of case law along with those that say
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     hearsay documents are not dispositive and not worthy of
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     an evidentiary hearing especially in this situation
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     where Mr. Diaz himself refused to sign an affidavit.
                    THE COURT: Okay.
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                    MS. HUTCHINS: Those would be our
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     responses succinctly, Judge, to the first two.
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                    THE COURT: That's the first two.
                    MS. HUTCHINS: First two.
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                    THE COURT: Have you gone into the --
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                    MS. ECKHOFF: I was only starting on the
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     third but just to --
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                    THE COURT: Take your time.
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MS. ECKHOFF: -- address that, we admit that the affidavit that we submitted is a hearsay affidavit and I understand that and that's why our position is that it's very important to get Mr. Diaz in here where everybody can hear him account for -- address his recantation and the circumstances surrounding that when he's here in person and under oath.

With Claim 3 we were discussing was the Brady claim regarding the prior inconsistent statements of Mr. Diaz that to our best information had not been provided to trial counsel because they were not present in trial counsel's file as they turned it over to us. And at this point, it apparently -- the State has actually taken contradictory positions on these notes at various times. Of course the State in their answer state that these notes were made available to defense counsel because they were in the trial file and available to review at any time. However, in the fall of 2015 when we were actually in court on a motion that we had made for disclosure of this type of evidence and specifically these types of notes of witnesses, the attorney representing the State at that time represented at two different hearings before the Court that those notes constituted work product and were privileged as work product and had not been provided to trial counsel

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and would not be provided to trial counsel and that their disclosure to us in post-conviction had been inadvertent and therefore did not constitute a waiver of access to other similarly situated notes.

So while the State's position now is that they were always available to trial counsel, we have had differing representations in the course of these proceedings.

THE COURT: And presumably you have a trial transcript or post-trial transcript saying just what you said?

MS. ECKHOFF: I do.

THE COURT: They were not provided and that they were work product?

MS. ECKHOFF: That's correct.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. ECKHOFF: I have copies of that if you would like to see it.

THE COURT: You want to respond?

MS. HUTCHINS: First off, Judge, the -in terms of it being Brady information that was withheld
and not disclosed, in the State's answer there are
affidavits, credible affidavits, from Spence Graham who
handled the case early on in its stages and said that
the trial file was open. Defense counsel could have

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access to it and these notes were available and that the content of the notes in Israel Diaz's statements were included in the State's capital murder summary, which is a document that is prepared by the District Attorney's Office, a copy of which was given to defense counsel.

Also, we have the affidavit of Traci
Bennett, who was one of the trial prosecutors, who says
that these notes were in the file and available for
review. We also have the affidavits now of Jerome
Godinich and Alvin Nunnery, both of whom say that they
reviewed these notes in -- I think Jerome Godinich said
he personally reviewed these notes pretrial during his
review of the State's file at the DA's Office and he
took notes from any inconsistencies into account during
his trial prep. His log hours reflect the time that he
spent reviewing the State's files here at the DA's
Office. Mr. Nunnery says he was also aware of these
notes pretrial and used what he believed was beneficial
to the defense in his cross-examination.

As pointed out in the State's answer, these notes also have inculpatory information that's consistent with Mr. Diaz's trial testimony. The notes are attached, I believe, as one of the exhibits to the applicant's file. I have reviewed the notes. The Court -- I'm not sure if the Court has or not but if the

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Court wants to look at the notes, the Court will see or may have already seen that these notes are basically a long stream of consciousness. There's no real division of this event, this event, this event. And so, I think it's important to point out that it's their handwritten notes taken by whoever was listening to the conversation and we can't hold them as this giant gold standard. We can just say the defense was aware of them pretrial.

The trial record also does not reflect that the defense attorneys were hindered or surprised in any way during Israel Diaz's testimony, that they were able do an effective and thorough examination. Applicant's Exhibit No. 56 that they have attached is actually an e-mail from Mr. Godinich to the defense team that tells of some -- of a pretrial hearing that they had with the State and that they actually learned some of the State's case in that pretrial hearing and learned some information that they did not know pretrial. at that point, even before they started trial, he's now memorialized that still before trial they've learned even more of the State's case, some of the State's theory of the case. And so our argument would be that's another example of how they did notice some of the inconsistencies.

I think it's also important to point out

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that there's a difference between the openness of a file during the pendency of a case, as the case is pending in the court, as trial is coming, and then the availability of the file post-conviction. And the attorneys that handle the cases and are responsible for the cases during trial and pretrial are different than the attorneys from the office that handle the case post-conviction. And so, I haven't seen the transcript that the defense is talking about, about our office saying that these notes were not available, have never been available during trial; but I can tell you this, that the prosecutors who handle PIA discovery, public information discovery post-conviction, are with our general counsel department and they have rules and quidelines that they use generally as to what they think has been disclosed during the pendency of a case, what they think should not be disclosed, or that is privileged, which may be entirely different -- and in this case appears to be entirely different -- than what the State's attorneys actually allowed the defense attorneys to see.

MS. ECKHOFF: Just on that point --

THE COURT: You may respond.

MS. ECKHOFF: The attorney for the State that made those representations in court had nothing to

EXH C

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do with the PIA office or whoever would do that. 1 the attorney who was previously handling this case prior 2 to Ms. Hutchins. It was the person working in the 3 post-conviction unit. And just also to touch base on --4 5 THE COURT: What do you say about what Ms. Farnaz has said about Mr. Godinich and Mr. Nunnery 6 say they had access to those notes that you say were not 7 provided? 8 9 MS. ECKHOFF: Well, Your Honor --10 THE COURT: Both of them say they had 11 access to it pretrial. MS. ECKHOFF: I appreciate that and you 12 also have to realize, Your Honor, that we didn't know 13 that at the point at which we made these claims. We 14 only found that out yesterday upon receipt of the 15 affidavits. 16 THE COURT: So are you rescinding your 17 claim then? 1.8 I believe we should 19 MS. ECKHOFF: No. 20 have the opportunity to examine them further regarding their access. 21 THE COURT: I'm just trying to tell you 2.2 that it's greatly weakened by -- what these affidavits 23 that have been provided by the two attorneys. 2.4 You were onto which one now? 2.5

1 MR. REISS: Judge, I'm sorry. Can we go off the record for one moment? 2 (Mr. Reiss not present.) 3 THE COURT: Please continue. 4 MS. ECKHOFF: Are we back on the record? 5 THE COURT: Yes, we're back on the 6 7 record. You're addressing which point of error? MS. ECKHOFF: I just want to make one 8 more point just about what Ms. Hutchins said --9 THE COURT: Sure. 10 11 MS. ECKHOFF: -- regarding what she 12 called the capital murder summary and actually what she just indicated here, that some of this information had 1.3 been put together in a capital murder summary which was 14 15 provided to trial counsel, again, that is not a document that we have been able to find in trial counsels' files 16 17 and post-conviction we haven't had that provided to us either. So I would at least make a request to be able 18 to see that document. 19 20 MS. HUTCHINS: That's probably fair. 21 THE COURT: If they have it, if they can find it, that will be fine. I'm sure you should be 22 23 allowed to see it. MS. ECKHOFF: Thank you. 24 THE COURT: Tell us the next point of 25

error.

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MS. ECKHOFF: The -- I'll keep all of the -- if it's all right with Your Honor, go out of order and --

THE COURT: Go however you want to do it.

MS. ECKHOFF: And discuss the ineffective assistance of counsel claims together. Then I'll jump to Claim 5 which was the claim regarding the extraneous influence on the jury.

THE COURT: From the passenger on the bus from the motel in the seedy part of town?

MS. ECKHOFF: Correct. And, Your Honor, that wasn't my description of it; that was the juror's description of it. And I would just point out that whatever the circumstances of the waving incident or as the jurors interpreted it, the intimidation incident, we provided affidavits explaining that that was not how it actually happened. Regardless, the primary issue there is not so much that but what effect it had on the jurors. And affidavits from the jurors make clear that this was a very stressing event for them and that they felt threatened not for only their own safety but for the safety of their family and then after having two days, almost two days full of deliberation and an Allen charge, come back the next day and within hours come to

a guilty verdict. So, again, the important aspect there is the effect that it would have had on the jurors or not even these specific jurors but hypothetical jurors perceiving that the way that they did.

The other aspect of that is the fact that as we understand it from our investigation, although the record is not clear on this, is that the Court actually was informed of this incident prior to the verdict coming in.

THE COURT: The waving?

 $$\operatorname{MS}$.$  ECKHOFF: The waving, yes. That she had been made aware that this had happened and -- I  $$\operatorname{mean}$$  --

THE COURT: When did the judge have a hearing asking those -- I believe he [sic] had a hearing asking all 12 jurors if that would have an influence on them?

MS. ECKHOFF: That is not entirely correct. So what she did is there was the verdict, they deliberated for a couple more hours, they came up with their verdict, they announced the verdict. They took a lunch break and upon the return of the lunch break, Judge Guiney has an informal hearing where she sends the bailiff, who was present and described these incidents on the record, back to the jury room to pick out which

jurors he thought may have been the most affected by it. 1 So, they -- she did speak to 2 of the 14 jurors. 2 provided affidavits from five additional jurors 3 recounting their reactions to those events that were 4 never put on the record in this case because they were 5 not questioned as well. And again, yes, they were 6 asked, hey, did this affect your verdict but this was 7 after the verdict was already reached. And, you know, 8 what is a juror going to say at that point? No, Your 9 10 Honor, I shouldn't have voted this way? THE COURT: I disagree with you. I think .11 that's what a juror would say if that's -- was it. I 12 mean, you can think what you want --13 14 MS. ECKHOFF: Fair enough. THE COURT: -- but I'm thinking that if 15 16 you ask a juror did it affect you, I --MS. ECKHOFF: And the standard -- another 17 point, which I've already mentioned but I'll make at 18 this point again, is just that the standard isn't these 19 specific jurors and if their specific verdict, rather 20 21 did the event -- would the event have affected the decision-making of a hypothetical juror in those 22 23 circumstances and with those same perceptions.

THE COURT: I don't have any idea what

that means then. How would that apply to this case?

EXHC

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hypothetical jury? We're only talking about did it influence any juror to vote a special way. You may continue.

MS. ECKHOFF: I think that's the summary of the claim.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. HUTCHINS: Judge, during the pendency of, I guess, the time period when the application was filed, when the State filed their answer, the Appellate Court rendered its opinion overruling the direct appeal. And one of the issues that the applicant actually raised on direct appeal was whether the applicant argued his due process rights and his right to an impartial jury was affected and tainted because of this alleged juror misconduct. And the Court of Criminal Appeals decided that these rights were not affected, the jury was not affected.

THE COURT: The Court of Criminal

MS. HUTCHINS: Correct, Judge. Has decided already on his direct appeal that his right to an impartial jury and right to due process were not affected. The juror misconduct as reflected by the examination of the jurors and the bailiff in the courtroom did not have an effect on the jurors and their

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Appeals?

verdict. And the Court of Criminal Appeals has stated that the Court did not err by overruling the defense's motion for mistrial because they did, in fact, move for a mistrial even after the jurors were questioned and even after the jurors said it did not affect their verdict. And so, to that end, because the Court of Criminal Appeals has already made a determination on this issue, we would argue that the applicant is now procedurally barred from this issue. The issue's already been resolved.

However, even still, we have the affidavit of Vickie Long, who is one of the managers for the court system, who stated that the reasons why the motel on the first night was picked, because there was limitations with Rodeo Houston. The Court was even unaware that it happened until the next morning. It was out of their hands.

THE COURT: You're from Austin, huh?

MS. ECKHOFF: Not even originally.

THE COURT: Forgive me, but when the rodeo's in town, there are no good viable options for places to stay because they are booked and they are booked months in advance, especially anywhere on this side of town.

MS. HUTCHINS: So it's actually on the

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record that the Court was made aware the next morning 1 and the Court did not know and for the second night 2 3 found somewhere far away but was trying to accommodate the situation. 4 THE COURT: Where was it the first time? 5 MS. HUTCHINS: I'd have to look it up, 6 7 Judge. MS. ECKHOFF: It was --8 9 THE COURT: What's the name of the place? MS. ECKHOFF: I believe it was called the 10 Motel 6 Westfield. 11 12 MS. HUTCHINS: Westchase, I believe. MS. ECKHOFF: Westchase. 13 THE COURT: Motel 6? 14 1.5 THE REPORTER: They went all the way past 16 Clear Lake. They looked everywhere. MS. HUTCHINS: They looked everywhere. I 17 18 think they ended up having the hotel the second night --19 and I may be mistaken -- but I think the second night it 20 was in Willowbrook. THE COURT: And you were the court 21 22 reporter at that time? THE REPORTER: Yes, sir. 23 MS. HUTCHINS: Also, Judge, based off 2.4 25 of --

THE COURT: This occurred in 2005, the 1 2 death occurred in 2005? MS. HUTCHINS: Yes, Judge. The trial 3 happened in 2014. 4 5 THE COURT: See, I was the judge until 2012 and now -- so. 6 MS. HUTCHINS: Also, Judge, pursuant to 7 8 Texas Rule of Evidence 606(b) and prevailing case law on the issue, juror affidavits are not admissible to 9 address the mental processes and deliberations of jurors 10 unless they are outside influences. And the case law 11 shows that these types of actions which occurred in this 12 case do not qualify as outside influences. And so, the 13 juror affidavits that they're relying upon, what our 14 argument would be, would be inadmissible. 15 16 Also, I'm a little bit confused by 17 opposing counsel's argument that we're talking about a 18 hypothetical jury because we need to address the jury in 19 this case for this applicant in this trial. 20 So, other than that, I don't know if you didn't mention it or if you're abandoning it, there was 21 an issue with a Facebook post. 22 MS. ECKHOFF: Yes, there was the issue 23 24 with the Facebook post. MS. HUTCHINS: I can or you want to? 25

THE COURT: You go first.

MS. ECKHOFF: Real quick, to respond to what she just said, I think actually what she mentioned with the issues of 606(b) and how the jurors' particular mental impressions and decision-making is outside of the scope based on 606(b), I think that's where this idea of it's more of a hypothetical --

THE COURT: And summarize 606(b) for the record.

MS. ECKHOFF: Sure. Under 606(b) the statements going to or evidence going to the jurors' decision-making process in coming to their verdict are not admissible except for, as Ms. Hutchins noted, if there's an issue of an extraneous influence, which is of course the basis of our --

THE COURT: And I don't think the location of a hotel would be an extraneous that would qualify here -- I just want to tell you what I'm thinking now -- and someone waving at them on a bus. All right.

MS. ECKHOFF: Regarding the Facebook messages, in our investigation we discovered the Facebook posts of one of the jurors sitting on the jury. And despite admonitions from the Court that they are not to discuss the case, including on social media, repeated

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admonitions from the Court to that effect, he made multiple posts on Facebook regarding his jury service in the midst of his jury service.

THE COURT: Did he say anything about deliberations or guilt or innocence or anything like that?

MS. ECKHOFF: Forgive me for not remembering the exact details --

THE COURT: That's okay.

MS. ECKHOFF: -- of his posts from -- but he did discuss the difficulty that he was feeling and being bored by expert testimony and more importantly, our understanding is that one of the reasons the jurors are admonished not to discuss this is because you want to make sure that people don't feel free to offer their opinions on how things should go while you're sitting on there. And not only did he post, but his posts encouraged one of his friends to respond by saying something along the lines of "Give him the chair or fry him," you know, basically making clear what his position would be on what the verdict should be. And all I'm saying, Your Honor, is that's exactly why we -- you -- inform jurors that they should not be doing these things.

THE COURT: And that, I agree with you.

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1 MS. ECKHOFF: So it's juror misconduct.

THE COURT: I guess the question would be

how serious is this. So, go ahead.

MS. HUTCHINS: Judge, we'd argue that the applicant fails to show any sort of prejudice or harm from these Facebook posts. There were 17 posts. of them discuss the facts of the case or the content of the deliberations or make any sort of comment about his bias or partiality, which side he was leaning towards. The comment about the experts, I believe, was something along the lines of "just endless testimony from experts." There were experts on both sides of this So there's no way that we can tell one way or another what he's even talking about. There's no indication that he was affected by any of the comments that came back to him. He didn't respond to any of the comments that other people posted. There's no evidence that any of the other jurors were influenced by this or knew about these Facebook posts. It is the applicant's burden in this case and even in their writ application they say that it is speculative and it can't be ascertained if this conduct led to votes being changed.

THE COURT: Yes, ma'am.

MS. ECKHOFF: Your Honor, the entire reason that we're asking for further fact development is

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because, as Ms. Hutchins noted, we don't know what, if any, effect these things had because we haven't had fact development on what that might have been.

MS. HUTCHINS: Which would break the curtain, Judge, the juror curtain under 606.

THE COURT: So, go to the next one.

MS. ECKHOFF: Your Honor, at this point
I'll mention that we've raised five claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel at various points of
the trial: Guilt, punishment phase, but also pretrial
and jury selection. These are very -- I'm not even sure
I can succinctly go through all of these aspects --

THE COURT: Try.

MS. ECKHOFF: But so, our review of trial counsels' file indicated very little guilt phase investigation. We have a case where the client, as trial counsel make clear in their affidavits, maintained his innocence in this case. And there seems to be very little evidence of investigation from the trial file, which is what we have, you know, to rely on in assessing their investigation. In the course of our investigation, we were able to locate and obtain affidavits from witnesses who provide Mr. Balderas with an alibi for the night of this event and those -- some of those witnesses were available to trial counsel

because trial counsel spoke to them as potential character witnesses for the punishment phase and others we got to through following the investigation further.

And what is important to remember is, you know, the standard is whether or not the investigation was reasonable or failure to continue or further their investigation was reasonable in light of what they knew at the time. And it doesn't -- our position is that their failure to further investigate his guilt claims were unreasonable.

Another point within that claim is their use of an eyewitness identification expert. So you may recall that one of the -- from what I -- your review of the case that one of the witnesses against Mr. Balderas was an eyewitness who was present at the time of the shooting and she testified, you know, eight years after the fact about her identification. And what was interesting and really problematic about her identification of Mr. Balderas was that in the immediate aftermath of the shooting, the same night when she's giving her statement to the police, she says that she had never seen the shooter before and she did not know who he was. She knew Mr. Balderas, had spent time with him, had been around him in, you know, roughly the year leading up to when the shooting occurred. She knew who

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he was and she said that she didn't know who the shooter was. She didn't make an identification of Mr. Balderas until a week after the crime occurred and even then, the CCA has agreed, in considering this on direct appeal, that the identification procedures used by the police in this case were suggestive. They disagreed as to whether or not that entitled him to relief at direct appeal but they agree that the procedures were suggestive, the majority of the CCA did.

At trial they did, at the last minute, decide to challenge this eyewitness identification. They retained an expert, Dr. Roy Malpass, to come and testify. They made an effort to get the eyewitness struck and not to present it. And in so doing, they had a hearing outside the presence of the jury where Mr. Malpass explained his expertise and why there are problems with this identification and the lineup procedures. The Court declined to, you know, strike the identification and allowed the witness to testify but she also specifically made a ruling that the defense could call Dr. Malpass to testify before the jury to explain to them what the problems could be with this identification and with these procedures, and without opening the door to extraneous conduct. That happened twice on the record.

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1 Trial counsel, in their affidavits, site 2 as their reason for not calling Dr. Malpass to come testify before the jury is that it was a decision in 3 order to avoid extraneous influences coming in -- or I'm 4 sorry -- extraneous conduct coming in. They believed it 5 would open the door. It's unclear to us, based on the 6 7 affidavits alone, why they believed that the Court, after saying that they could put this evidence on 8 9 without opening the door, would in fact open the door. And then, within that, it's an 10 interesting thing. One of the counsel actually 11 representing Mr. Balderas at trial who took witnesses 12 13 and examined witnesses and made argument was Scott 14 Shearer who is actually direct appeal counsel in this 15 case as well. And Scott Shearer was responsible for the motion for new trial --16 That's in this county? 17 THE COURT: MS. HUTCHINS: Yes, Judge. 18 THE COURT: I don't know him. 19 2.0 only party I don't know yet. 21 MS. ECKHOFF: So included in our quilt 22 phase, IAC claim is a motion -- or I'm sorry -- a claim 23 that --THE COURT: Take your time. I'm not 2.4 hurrying you. I'm giving you as much time as you need. 25

MS. ECKHOFF: I appreciate that. 1 trial counsel or Mr. Shearer was ineffective for failing 2 to conduct any sort of extra record investigation of 3 some of these juror issues that could have been used in 4 the motion for new trial. We made an IAC claim to that 5 6 effect, not only in his role as appellate counsel for 7 that claim but the fact that he was involved in this entire trial proceeding. One of the points that we 8 would raise is that we have affidavits from Mr. Godinich 9 and Mr. Nunnery but the Court and the State have never, 10 as far as I know, asked Mr. Shearer to provide any 11 12 response to Mr. Balderas' allegation. THE COURT: And have you? Have you asked 13 for --14 15 MS. ECKHOFF: Actually, we did. THE COURT: I mean, you have the same 16 right to ask those things. 17 MS. ECKHOFF: Your Honor, when we were 18 19 here on -- in front of Judge Guiney -- I would have to 20 go back and remember what the date of that was. 21 apologize. But we were here on the record arguing much of these same things and us arguing that an evidentiary 22 hearing was necessary, it was when we were arguing the 23 motion for -- or for an ODI, an order designating 2.4

issues. At that time when it became clear to us that

Judge Guiney was going to enter into an order for trial counsel to submit affidavits and the State had only requested for Mr. Nunnery and Mr. Godinich to submit affidavits, we made an oral motion at that time that Mr. Shearer also be included in that. She had indicated on the record that she was going to do that and -- but only signed the State's order verbatim that didn't include him.

THE COURT: You didn't do any follow-up to ask her to do that?

THE COURT: I'm just saying, you have the same subpoena power that the State does and if you don't do that, who's going to do it? So, okay. I'm just trying to tell you where I'm coming from, and what I'm hearing is you have the same ability to call that person

MS. ECKHOFF: Your Honor, I don't recall.

MS. ECKHOFF: I think that's -- I think that that is the guilt phase IAC claims. I don't know if you want to address those and then move on to others?

THE COURT: Yes, you want to address -- there was guite a bit that she had.

and you didn't. Okay. Let's proceed.

MS. HUTCHINS: Yes, if I may, Judge, and I may take them out of order.

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I would have to --

1 THE COURT: Whatever order you take them in, that will be fine. If you want to, you can bring 2 chairs up there and sit down. You've been standing for 3 4 45 minutes. You're welcome to sit down if you like. 5 MS. BLACK: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: And you --6 7 MS. HUTCHINS: I may take you up on that, 8 Judge. Thank you, Judge. 9 THE COURT: Just pull one up and sit down. 10 MS. HUTCHINS: Judge, as you are more 11 12 than aware, there was extensive evidence against the 13 applicant in this case. Not only was he charged with 14 this capital murder, he was charged with another capital 15 murder, as well as an assault; and in addition to that, there were three other murders that were put on in 16 17 punishment and an aggravated --18 THE COURT: As extraneous? 19 MS. HUTCHINS: As extraneouses. 20 THE COURT: I don't know -- I assume that's his family here. But I don't know if they 21 22 understand that, that he's charged with one murder 23 and --MS. HUTCHINS: There are at least four 24 2.5 other murders, whether you characterize them as capital

murder or murder, that were charged against him and two assaults.

THE COURT: There were four other murders, or four murders total; is that right?

MS. HUTCHINS: Yes, Judge. No, five.

THE COURT: Five. So maybe you didn't know that, that they wanted to charge him with that but they proceeded with one case.

Is that correct?

MS. HUTCHINS: Correct, Judge.

THE COURT: I wasn't the judge.

MS. HUTCHINS: There was also a larger investigation going on to the La Tercera Crips gang that the applicant was tied to and so there was this big investigation trying to sort of parse out all of these different crimes. All of this, I believe, ended up being in total, I think, 88 different offenses that the State gave the defense notice of. So there was a whole host of information that trial counsel over the years were sifting through.

THE COURT: Let me just say that to the audience because I think y'all would like to know what's happening. They're saying there were 88 -- 8-8 -- 88 different extraneous offenses that they could have used in trial against --

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MS. HUTCHINS: And bad acts, Judge, if I 1 2 may correct. 3 THE COURT: And bad acts against Mr. Balderas. I just want you to know, 88. So, okay. 4 5 MS. HUTCHINS: And to assist trial counsel, the record will reflect that they hired a host 6 7 of different investigators, fact investigators, mitigation investigators, experts, specialists. I 8 believe they had experts on mental health, gangs, the 9 10 prison system, child abuse, brain development, and 11 eyewitness identification. So there was an extensive 12 defense team going on in this case. The vouchers that were turned in to the Court show that there were 13 multiple meetings with the defendant's family, including 14 1.5 the defendant's mother, his brother, his girlfriend. Just from 2013 to 2014, there were 26 meetings with the 16 17 defendant's girlfriend. 18 THE COURT: Is she here? 19 MS. HUTCHINS: I believe she's the wife, 20 Your Honor. Yes. 21 THE COURT: Okay. MS. HUTCHINS: Also, the applicant has 22 attached a number of different e-mails as exhibits. 23 I've been able to count at least ten e-mails that they 2.4 25 have attached to their writ from different members of

the defense team which reflect unfavorable and uncooperative witnesses which reflect -- which dispute the alibi defense and which show that the defendant's mom actually attempted to thwart the defense investigation.

THE COURT: Who did?

MS. HUTCHINS: The defendant's mother.

THE COURT: Is she here?

MS. ECKHOFF: Yes, Your Honor.

MS. HUTCHINS: That the defense had trouble with the defendant's mother and these are all documented in the e-mails between the different defense mitigation experts and trial counsel that the applicant has attached as exhibits to his writ. For example, the defendant's mother did not want the defense to contact the family in Mexico and did not want the family from Mexico coming to visit the defendant. That the various family members including the girlfriend, Yancy Escobar, came to the office, was told that defense is continuing to pursue leads but urging the family to give them any information, names, phone numbers, contact information that they had and stressing how important it was because the defendant himself did not have those names and information and he kept telling the defense, My brother and my girlfriend have them.

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And the struggle that the defense had to 1 2 get this information, the e-mails also showed that it was not until early 2014 that the defendant's family 3 finally gave them information about an alibi and when 4 5 they pursued this potential alibi, they were told by the 6 defendant's brother, This woman wants nothing to do with 7 this case, she does not want to testify. They were not 8 given contact information. The other witnesses they've now 9 identified as alibi witnesses, the majority of them were 10 interviewed by the defense at the time and did not have 11 12 credible information, any information with facts, 13 anything that was usable or not based off of hearsay. And all of that is supported by the affidavits of 14 15 Mr. Godinich and Mr. Nunnery as well as these e-mails from back then. 16 17 Just to briefly summarize some of the 18 points that are made in Mr. Godinich and Mr. Nunnery's 19 affidavits --20 THE COURT: He likes you to say "God-nich." 21 MS. HUTCHINS: Godinich. 22 THE COURT: Not T; "God." 23

MS. HUTCHINS: Godinich.

THE COURT: Kind of a joke.

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MS. HUTCHINS: Which basically the affidavit reinforces the information that the family — the information contained in those contemporaneous e-mails, the family and the defendant did not provide the alibi information; that they interviewed various witnesses the defense now identifies as having not been interviewed or not been given a chance; that the defendant's girlfriend actually did not want to testify at trial because she wanted to watch the trial; that it was strategy for them not to call the defendant's brother because they did not feel he would be credible due to his criminal history, his relationship with the gang, his relationship with the defendant, the various photographs that were found of him during the discovery period —

THE COURT: Is his brother here?

MS. HUTCHINS: And ultimately, he was ordered to leave the courtroom during trial because he couldn't control himself.

Some of the information they say that defense counsel would have learned through an investigation, they say in the affidavits they already knew that. It was nothing that they found to be useful or that they could use in a admissible way, it was through hearsay or innuendo; and that the defendant

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himself did not want to testify, so some of the information could not come out.

Mr. Nunnery also purports that they spoke to whoever would speak to them, either themselves, through their investigators, their defense team. At trial, trial counsel put on a witness, Walter Benitez; and he provided evidence of -- as evidence of the defendant's innocence of the quilt -- of the capital that was charged. Mr. Benitez provided testimony of an alternate shooter; he provided testimony of Israel Diaz's motives against the complainant, talking about the meeting that was called, that Mr. Diaz wanted the complainant's death, and as well as the motives for Mr. Diaz testifying. Mr. -- interestingly, Mr. Godinich states in his affidavit as well that when Mr. Benitez -since I was not there, I could not see it; I don't think counsel was there either. Mr. Benitez, when he testified, flashed a gang sign for the LTC gang during guilt/innocence and that the defendant in trial responded and that they were told this by the jurors when they spoke to the jurors after trial and that that was probably what did it in for Mr. Benitez and his credibility when he testified.

The record shows that much of the proposed testimony, the applicant now says defense would

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have learned through what they characterize as a reasonable investigation was known, was presented, was just presented through other witnesses, for example, Karen Bardales, Israel Diaz, and Wendy Bardales. They wanted to call a witness, Celeste Munoz, at guilt/innocence to testify to some of this information. They were told if they did, it would open the door to an extraneous.

Speaking of extraneouses, I don't have the record in front of me but I would like to respectfully disagree with defense counsel's characterization of the Court's ruling regarding Mr. Malpass. I believe the Court ruled that he could testify; he could not give an ultimate opinion about Wendy's accuracy but that he would be allowed to testify. There was no ruling as to whether or not it would open the door to other extraneouses. The trial attorneys give an affidavit saying that when they spoke amongst themselves as well as their appellate counsel, they believed that it would open the door to an extraneous offense, which was not in the defendant's best interest.

THE COURT: Trial strategy.

MS. HUTCHINS: Trial strategy, yes,

25 Judge.

And as to the issue of Mr. Shearer, 1 defense is saying that -- I guess now saying that 2 Mr. Shearer should have investigated juror misconduct as 3 a ground for a motion for new trial. However --4 THE COURT: When did he come onto the 5 case? 6 MS. HUTCHINS: I'm not sure when he came 7 He was there during trial sort of as an appellate 8 9 resource. THE COURT: I see. 10 11 MS. HUTCHINS: However, they have not filed the claim as an ineffective assistance of 12 appellate counsel; they've done it as an ineffective 13 assistance of counsel. Even still, their argument that 14 15 he should have investigated juror misconduct as a motion for new trial, now that we have the direct appeal and 16 the CCA's ruling, we know that the CCA found there was 17 no juror misconduct that denied him a right. So that 18 issue, at the end of the day, they don't establish harm 19 on it. So, our argument is that issue goes away right 20 21 there. 22 And I think -- sorry. I know it's long. 23 There's just a lot to cover. THE COURT: I'm not limiting you. 24 MS. HUTCHINS: That's it, Judge. 25

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THE COURT: You want to continue? 1 MS. ECKHOFF: I will just point to the 2 issue of whether -- what the Court's ruling was on 3 Dr. Malpass. If you look at Volume 25 of the reporter's 4 record at 179 and again in the Volume 29 of the record, 5 at 14, she discusses both of those -- those -- in both 6 of those cases. One is her actual ruling on 7 Dr. Malpass, that's the 25th Volume. The 29th Volume, 8 if I remember correctly, was actually when she was doing 9 the hearing on Celeste Munoz, the witness that 1.0 Ms. Hutchins mentioned, and where she clarified at that 11 12 point that Dr. Malpass could -- where Celeste Munoz would open the door, that Dr. Malpass would not. 13 MS. HUTCHINS: Judge, I just want to 14 clarify one thing. The direct appeal -- on direct 15 appeal, the majority opinion from the Court actually 16 17 found that the pretrial lineup and the in-court identification were not impermissibly suggestive. Ιt 18 19 was dissenting opinions. 20 THE COURT: Was that from the CCA? MS. HUTCHINS: Yes, Judge. They found 21 that the witness identifications were not impermissibly 22 suggestive. Defense counsel was talking about the 23 opinion from the dissent that did think it was 2.4 impermissibly suggestive. Also --25

THE COURT: Let me -- I remember Joe 1 2 Kegans saying she didn't care one bit about the Court of Appeals. She only cared about the Court of Criminal 3 Appeals. She was a judge down here. And it's the same 4 thing. I don't care about the dissenting opinion. 5 care only about the majority opinion. So I think it's 6 disingenuous to cite the minority opinion. Let's -- you 7 know, I'm just trying to tell you what I'm thinking. 8 MS. ECKHOFF: If I may clarify, please? 9 I said a majority said that the lineup was suggestive. 10 I didn't say that the majority said it was impermissibly 11 suggestive. I apologize if I didn't make that clear. 12 13 THE COURT: I appreciate it. Any further rebuttal? 14 MS. HUTCHINS: I did, but I can't think 15 of it, so it's okay. 16 MS. ECKHOFF: Regarding all of the things 17 that Ms. Hutchin's just reviewed, I would just like to 18 reiterate the point that these are factual disputes that 19 20 require fact finding. That is exactly why we're requesting an evidentiary hearing where we have subpoena 21 powers to further explore these representations that are 22 being made by trial counsel as to what happened, or what 23 they say happened, and that all -- many of the things 24 that she cited and attributed to obviously Mr. Godinich 25

and Mr. Nunnery's responses to these claims are information that we got last night and that's why we're asking for additional time to more thoroughly review them and address and respond to them.

wanted to point out is that problems that we do and have spotted with those affidavits that kind of come up nicely here is that one issue is that trial counsel in their affidavits purport to speak on behalf of other members of the trial team. And that wouldn't be proper. For example, on, I believe, it was page 2 of at least the copy that I have reviewed, Mr. Godinich says that neither he nor 12 other members of the trial team that he lists by name had whatever information he was discussing at that point. And so, he's purporting to answer not only on his behalf but on behalf of all those other people.

And then, additionally, Ms. Hutchins mentioned, for example, the -- their claim that the jurors said that they saw Mr. Benitez throw a gang sign in the course of his testimony, that's hearsay in this affidavit.

THE COURT: You have plenty of hearsay affidavits as well.

MS. ECKHOFF: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Don't you? 1 MS. ECKHOFF: We have one hearsay 2 affidavit, which we acknowledge is hearsay. 3 THE COURT: Okay. 4 MS. ECKHOFF: But again, we're saying 5 that that just makes the case that further fact finding 6 7 is necessary. We're not asking Your Honor to make a 8 decision based solely on our affidavit. We want to get that witness in here to talk and speak for himself. 9 Ιn this case, you know, Mr. Godinich is saying that 10 11 Mr. Shearer told him that something the jurors told 12 Mr. Shearer. I mean, at that point you're talking 1.3 hearsay upon hearsay. It wouldn't presumably be 14 admissible at trial and it shouldn't be admissible as evidence in an affidavit. 15 16 THE COURT: I think it's just anecdotal. 17 So, all right. Do you want to go into the 18 post-conviction errors that you're alleging? 19 MS. ECKHOFF: The punishment phase? 20 THE COURT: Yes. MS. ECKHOFF: Yes. Sure. 21 22 THE COURT: I think we should put them all out here on the record and let Ms. Farnaz respond. 23 MS. ECKHOFF: I will try to at least 24 discuss the ones that we would like further factual 2.5

development.

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THE COURT: Well, I think you should hit your strongest ones right now. This might be your only hearing that you will have. So I think you should hit the very strongest points you have right now.

MS. ECKHOFF: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And I'll give you as much time as you need. We can be here until 5:00; it's only 2:00 o'clock. You'll miss rush-hour traffic on 360 going back.

MS. ECKHOFF: I would appreciate that.

Your Honor, the claim in the punishment phase is that, again, the trial counsel did not conduct a reasonable investigation to develop facts, additional facts, that they could have put on the record regarding Mr. Balderas' social history, which is an important piece of miti — of punishment phase case and the — including additional testimony from witnesses that they did present but also testimony from those that he did not, regarding aspects of, you know, him growing up and the effects that that would have had on him.

One important claim that we made, too -- and it's fashioned a little funny because of the nature of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim -- a

failure of the trial counsel to object when -- so in the course of the punishment phase proceedings, they presented evidence from experts regarding Mr. Balderas' sexual abuse as a young child to -- and the experts were there to explain the effects that growing up subjected to such sexual abuse could have, the effects that that could have on a young boy. And in the course of the cross-examination of those experts, the State made some statements -- and, you know, I don't remember exactly how they were worded at this point; they're described in the application -- that insinuated that the jury should doubt the experts' opinions and reports because the jury wasn't hearing about these abuse allegations from Mr. Balderas himself but rather from experts. And we make a claim that that is a violation of Mr. Balderas' Fifth Amendment right not to testify and kind of highlighting for the jury that they're not hearing this from the defendant himself but rather from experts on his behalf. And the State then reiterated during their closing argument at punishment, came back to that issue and highlighted it again for the jury.

THE COURT: And if he were to testify, those 88 extraneouses might have come in.

MS. ECKHOFF: Your Honor, this was at the punishment phase where a number of those extraneouses

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did come in because --

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THE COURT: This is trial strategy on the attorneys' part. So you may continue.

MS. ECKHOFF: In terms of the punishment phase, I believe that that is it. Yeah.

THE COURT: You would like her to respond now?

MS. ECKHOFF: Yes, Judge.

MS. HUTCHINS: Judge, the record shows that the defense in this case, they put on just as much punishment evidence as the State did. They put on 18 witnesses, put on extensive mitigation evidence, and actually presented much of the exact same evidence that the defendant now claims was lacking. They just put it on through different witnesses that he now says he would have preferred other witnesses. They were able to put on testimony of -- and this is according to the record as well as to the trial counsels' affidavits. They presented all the available mitigation. Other than what they presented at trial, they were unaware of any other evidence that was going to rebut the extraneouses.

To rebut the extraneouses, they cross-examined those witnesses but they used seven mitigation experts, four experts and a reverend. The mitigation experts traveled to New York and Mexico to do

their investigation. They made strategic decisions to present the evidence and the experts as they did, feeling it was done in the best light possible. They investigated and presented evidence of the defendant's childhood, his family history of mental illness. I believe that in the State's answer there are at least 10, 15 pages which go through all the evidence that was presented by the defense on these points during punishment phase.

They investigated and presented witnesses that testified to his positive character, his role as a protector. They attempted to investigate his attempted disassociation from the gang; but other than the applicant, there was no evidence of that. They presented his juvenile caseworker, family, friends, a Harris County Jail guard, they presented evidence of his childhood abuse, his unstable mother.

As to the issue of the alleged comment on the defendant's failure to testify, as explained in the State's answer, the State cross-examined these expert witnesses on the points that these expert witnesses testified that they spoke to the applicant, they interviewed him multiple times; yet they didn't have any notes of any of their interviews with the applicants. They didn't make any recordings, any videos, and so

these experts came to court basically testifying off the top of their heads about each and every meeting they had and their beliefs and their reactions to the physical reactions that the defendant was having.

And so, the State was cross-examining these experts on their ability to come in here and give this testimony without having any sort of documentation to that effect and were asking the experts, well, don't you think it would have been useful or helpful to make these notes or to have these videos or to have these recordings and you certainly know that if you had made them, they would be discoverable to us and the defense experts were agreeing.

And so, when looked at the entirety of the context of the cross-examination as well as the argument, the State's argument is not that it's the applicant's failure to testify. It's the fact that the information that these experts were testifying to was coming from a single source, the applicant, who had all of the motive and bias to say these things, and that the jury should rely on the credibility of these witnesses without the witnesses having anything to justify or back up what they were purporting to the jury. And so, in the defense attorneys' affidavits, they actually address these issues and say we thought these were valid points

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for the prosecutor to make, thought they were fair. We didn't think they were worthy of objection and to that end, these are record claims and they weren't objected to at trial and so, now they're procedurally barred as well. But there were strategic reasons for not objecting to them.

And I don't know if there were issues -there were issues raised in the applicant's writ that
were not raised right now. I don't know if you were
just trying to summarize them succinctly? If you want
me to address them, there were a couple of other issues
they raised in the punishment phase --

THE COURT: You may.

MS. HUTCHINS: -- that I have responses to and I could just save my responses and you could make the argument after, if you'd like.

MS. ECKHOFF: That sounds fine.

MS. HUTCHINS: There was some trouble -there was some witnesses that testified via Skype in
this case from Mexico, defense witnesses, from the
defendant.

THE COURT: During trial?

MS. HUTCHINS: During trial.

THE COURT: The punishment phase?

MS. HUTCHINS: In the punishment phase

**EXH**C

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the defendant's family members testified from Mexico. In some e-mails that are attached to Mr. Godinich's affidavit and I believe to the defense exhibits as well, it talks about the fact that the defense wanted to actually bring these people over and the defense was going to foot the bill to bring them over but the witnesses couldn't decide amongst themselves who to come. Meanwhile, the defendant's mother was also telling them not to come. And so, ultimately they managed to work out a way for the witnesses to testify via Skype. The defense is able to do cross -- direct examination. The State starts cross-examination and there's technical issues. They switch witnesses, they take some live witnesses in court, they go back to the witnesses in Mexico. There's still technical issues. Ultimately they can't use Skype; they use speakerphone. And so, the defense and the State are questioning here in English, there's a translator who is translating in Mexico as well as the defense mitigation expert.

THE COURT: And you have a translator on this end as well.

MS. HUTCHINS: Yes. And so, there's a defense mitigation expert actually in Mexico sort of relaying everything also back to the trial team. And from the record, it appears as though the defense and

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the State were all able to ultimately battle through the technical issues and ask all the questions they wanted, get the answers they wanted. And these witnesses, two of them are able to testify; one of them was not there when he was called to testify.

Mr. Godinich's affidavit as well as an attached exhibit actually says that the defense cut their questioning short of these witnesses in Mexico because they found out that the defendant's girlfriend was calling the witnesses in Mexico, telling them to change their answers. And so, the testimony that they were getting from the witnesses in Mexico was not what trial counsel expected to be getting, so he immediately tried to get them off the stand before he was presenting perjured testimony, or what he believed was going to be perjured testimony.

THE COURT: Don't react in the audience, ma'am. She's talking about you.

MS. HUTCHINS: There was also some issues about Mr. Nunnery's behavior and some comments that he made and whether or not they affected the jury in their deliberations. Some of these alleged comments are -- I guess the comments, these side comments are not on the record. Mr. Nunnery addresses them in his affidavit to the fact that he has no personal recollection, sometimes

1 words are exchanged. 2 THE COURT: I read that. MS. HUTCHINS: I'm not sure if he knows 3 if jurors heard him or not. 4 THE COURT: When someone alleged that he 5 called one of the prosecutors the "b" word? 6 7 MS. HUTCHINS: Correct. And so, the applicant fails to establish that those comments 8 9 affected the jury deliberation or that they heard it. 1.0 know they provided some affidavits from the jurors. Interestingly, I think the juror affidavit --11 THE COURT: I don't think you have to go 12 13 there. MS. HUTCHINS: 14 Okay. 15 THE COURT: I'm not considering that. 16 just want you to realize that happens in every trial. And unless someone came in here and said, I heard him 17 call her the "b" word and it changed my idea of what I 18 wanted to give him for punishment, short of that, let's 19 20 move on to something germane. You may continue, or do you have more? 21 MS. HUTCHINS: Just briefly, Judge. They 22 criticize his closing argument about that he sort of 23 insulted the jurors and they didn't like the tactic that 2.4 he took. He addresses that, that he made points that he 25

thought were valid and he wanted to remind jurors of the oath that they took, to hold to their verdict. And he felt as though it was important and necessary for him to urge that to the jurors. And when looked at in the entirety of his argument, the entirety of his argument supports that he did a very thorough closing argument and summation of the evidence.

THE COURT: Yes, ma'am.

MS. ECKHOFF: Your Honor, I would just point out again that these are factual disputes that we would like to delve into at a hearing.

THE COURT: I'm not going to let you go into that one, I'm telling you there. That's just malarkey, if you ask me. Let's go to something germane.

MS. ECKHOFF: Your Honor, I'm not -- I appreciate that you're giving us the opportunity to go into -- the remaining ineffective assistance counsel claims, I will admit at this moment, are not nearly as fresh in my memory as these.

THE COURT: That's okay. You have as much time here as you need.

MS. ECKHOFF: Okay.

THE COURT: And take your time. I'm not hurrying you.

MS. ECKHOFF: Thank you. We raise in

claim -- a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel pretrial for failing to assert speedy trial at a time where it would actually be considered. In this case the defendant himself made a pro se motion for a speedy trial.

THE COURT: Do we have speedy trial in Texas anymore? I don't think we do. So do you have a statute that you can cite that shows that we had a speedy trial provision here?

MS. ECKHOFF: If you would allow us to -THE COURT: Well, I mean, you're bringing
up speedy trial as in your appointed error in
punishment, do we have it? I mean, I don't believe -as a sitting district judge, I don't believe we have
speedy trial.

MS. HUTCHINS: Judge, after -- I believe what the standard is that after about a year, the defense can raise speedy trial and then there are four factors that the Court uses to weigh whether or not there's been a violation. And I believe the remedy is if there has been a violation, then you get your trial. But if not, then I believe the case is permitted to proceed as sort of -- as it's going forward.

THE COURT: I just mean -- you may continue.

MS. ECKHOFF: And, Your Honor, there was a claim that was raised on our end as a constitutional claim, it's the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial that applies to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. And in considering the pro se motion for speedy trial that was raised, the Trial Court did consider the factors as laid out in Barker v. Wingo; it's a Supreme Court case regarding a speedy trial. The reason that the speedy trial motion was denied was because voir dire had already begun and that was the basis of the denial.

Our allegation is that that's a claim

Our allegation is that that's a claim that should have been raised before even getting to jury selection.

MS. HUTCHINS: Briefly, Judge.

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. HUTCHINS: Judge, during the speedy trial motion, the -- Spence Graham testified in the hearing as to the voluminous nature of the case, all the extraneouses, the fact that the defense was putting together mitigation packets to try to persuade the applicant to take a life offer, that the applicant keeps picking up offenses in jail. It took six years for the State to make a decision whether or not to pursue it as a death case. So these were all the factors that were going on during the pendency of the case, as well as

just the changeover in not only the judges but also the prosecutors handling the case and whatnot.

The issue was raised on direct appeal and on direct appeal, the applicant argued the Trial Court erred in overruling the motion for speedy trial. The Court of Criminal Appeals said, no, there was no error, the Trial Court was within its right and was correct in denying it.

When we look at the affidavits of
Mr. Godinich and Mr. Nunnery, we get some insight into
the defense and that they had strategic reasons for the
delay. The applicant actually never expressed a desire
for a speedy trial until the eve of trial when he filed
his pro se one. The affidavits address the abundance of
the evidence, the time needed to investigate his new law
violation, the applicant -- the defendant never objected
to a reset or a continuance. And I believe it's
Mr. Nunnery who says that they filed the speedy trial
motion to preserve his appellate rights on the issue but
there were no unavailable witnesses or missing witnesses
that they would have called or that would have hindered
their defense because of this delay. But they filed the
motion anyway, to preserve his rights.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. ECKHOFF: Just a point on that, Your

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Honor. I'm going back to something she said before.
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     would just want to point out in raising these claims, we
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     filed this initial application before any decision on
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     direct appeal is made by the CCA. It's just how it
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     works. Like, we have to raise all of these claims and
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     we will continue to raise them, even though they're also
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     raised on direct appeal because it's our responsibility
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     to preserve --
                    THE COURT: And you may drop some of
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     them.
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                    MS. ECKHOFF: Your Honor, we don't
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     drop -- I respectfully disagree. We need to preserve
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     the record for further review up the chain, too --
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                    THE COURT: Okay.
                    MS. ECKHOFF: -- and in federal court, if
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     we get there.
                    THE COURT: Okay. I gotcha.
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                    MS. ECKHOFF: So, no, we are not going to
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     drop any of these claims. We are preserving them for
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     the future.
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                    THE COURT: Okav.
                    MS. ECKHOFF: And we also, again, assert
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     that further factual development is needed on these
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     factual disputes.
                    If I could have a moment?
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THE COURT: You may. 1 2 MS. ECKHOFF: Thank you. Your Honor, would it be all right if we speak with our client? 3 THE COURT: Sure. Let's take a break for 4 a moment. 5 (Recess taken.) 6 THE COURT: Are we ready to start? 7 MS. ECKHOFF: Yes, Your Honor. I believe 8 the final IAC claim that we had raised pertained to the 9 10 jury selection phase of trial where we raised a claim that trial counsel did not adequately account for their 11 mitigation case in their jury selection and therefore, 12 because they did not explore these issues that they knew 1.3 14 would be developed and presented in the punishment 15 phase, didn't explore how potential jurors would actually react and consider those claims, specifically 16 in this case, the sexual abuse of small children. 17 18 And --19 THE COURT: Are you talking about the 20 episode when he's 8 years old and Mr. Hernandez touches him? 21 MS. ECKHOFF: I believe it was more than 22 just touching, Your Honor; but, yes, and it was over the 23 course of, I believe, five years that he was pretty 24 repeatedly and regularly sexually assaulted by his 25

stepfather.

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THE COURT: Is that Mr. Hernandez?

MS. ECKHOFF: I believe.

THE COURT: Eleazar Hernandez?

MS. ECKHOFF: Yes, that is correct, Your Honor. And so, that's the claim that we've made in jury selection. You know, the ABA guidelines that dictate what is reasonable performance in capital cases make clear that you need to approach the entire trial including jury selection with your punishment phase in mind and in selecting your jury. And we just made a claim that they didn't do that as they're required to under the ABA guidelines.

MS. HUTCHINS: Judge, under prevailing case law, trial counsel was not ineffective for not attempting during voir dire to improperly bind the prospective jurors as to whether they would specifically consider sexual abuse as mitigating evidence. Case law says that trying to lock the jurors in on a specific "this set of circumstances is mitigating" is improper jury selection.

THE COURT: Yes, I would agree.

MS. HUTCHINS: So Mr. Nunnery's affidavit addresses that and addresses that because of their understanding of the case law, they voir dired on

mitigation globally but not specific types of mitigation and appropriately considered jurors who could give weight to mitigation in general.

Mr. Godinich's affidavit also supports that their method of jury selection, the Colorado

Method -- I did a little bit of research into it because I wasn't familiar off the top of my head with it -- focuses on the issue of whether jurors would give life or death and if they can appropriately consider mitigation. And so, when you look at their affidavits in conjunction with their approach to voir dire, you see that the defense addressed the issues that the State raises, they addressed issues on the questionnaires, they address both special issues and mitigation, which is absolutely reasonable strategy on their end.

And in addition -- so all of that goes to show there was not a lack of deficient conduct but also that there was no harm because the trial court gave the jury specific instructions throughout trial and also with the punishment charge to consider the totality of the evidence in their deliberations and on the special issues and that they need not agree on what evidence constitutes mitigation. And so, when you look at it even under the realm of *Strickland*, they don't meet either prong of *Strickland*.

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MS. ECKHOFF: Just as a point of clarification, I agree that it is improper in jury selection to pin a potential juror down on what they would or would not consider mitigation. However, trial counsel is entitled to explore potential mitigation with them to gauge their reaction and respond to their views of those issues without asking them would you find this mitigating or not.

THE COURT: I'm giving you the right to first present, then she rebuts, then I'm letting you rebut even again. So I'm giving you more than I'm giving the State at this time.

MS. ECKHOFF: I appreciate that. Thank you. And I'm happy, if she would also like to respond, I'm more than --

THE COURT: No, I'm going to limit them. But I'm trying to give you as much time as you need.

MS. ECKHOFF: Thank you. A claim that I think I inadvertently skipped over at one point is Claim 7 and that was a claim that the State relied on false testimony at the punishment phase when a State's witness, who was a corrections officer here, Harris County, testified that he had essentially been exonerated from some of the charges that had been brought against him, like internal personnel charges.

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He had been terminated as a corrections officer as a result of an incident that occurred and in his testimony, he indicated that he had been cleared of those charges. That's not exactly -- a review of his personnel file shows that that's not actually the case. The charges stood. They modified his punishment. So there's a claim that that testimony that he was cleared of the charges was false. And --

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. HUTCHINS: Judge, the standard there is whether the testimony in its entirety left a false impression with the jury. This particular witness, I believe, testified about a weapon that he found in the applicant's cell, if I'm not mistaken.

MS. ECKHOFF: I don't believe it was a weapon. I can double-check. I believe it may have been some other contraband.

MS. HUTCHINS: It was contraband. I'm sorry. In my head contraband equals weapon. There was contraband in his cell and he testified about the contraband. However, on cross-examination the defense elicited that he was terminated from the sheriff's office for a violation of policies that involved the death of an inmate. He testified it was about a round sheet, which is a sheet that they use to document things

in the sheriff's office; for a failure to render aid and deception. And on redirect he testified that he was cleared of wrongdoing and he is eligible for rehire after 75 days.

When looking at the entirety of his testimony and then you compare it to the applicant's own exhibits, which they've attached as 70, 71, and 72, his termination letter, his separation from the sheriff's office, and then his reinstatement with the sheriff's office, there's no false impression, our argument, that was left with the jury.

Also, when -- you have to assess the materiality of this witness' testimony when examining false testimony. It's not only was the testimony false, which we argue that it wasn't, but was it material. And when you look at this one witness' testimony about contraband found in his cell, in the greater context of all of the punishment evidence against him, the additional murders, the additional aggravated assaults, in and out of custody, his juvenile history, we argue that it was not material. And so, based off of all of that and the prevailing law, we believe that their issue is resolvable.

THE COURT: You may continue.

MS. ECKHOFF: Your Honor, I believe that

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the remaining claims are legal in nature and they're not 1 2 claims that we would be seeking additional fact finding 3 on. There are claims that are made to preserve the record going forward and I would just refer to our 4 5 arguments in the --THE COURT: Would you just state them and 6 7 put them in the record? MS. ECKHOFF: The names of the claims? 8 THE COURT: Yes. 9 10 MS. ECKHOFF: Okay. It's Claim 10, is the agreement between the State and the defense to 11 exclude African-Americans from Mr. Balderas' jury 12 violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 13 14 Amendment. Claim 11: Mr. Balderas' death sentence 15 16 violates the equal protection due process in cruel and 17 unusual punishment clauses of the United States 18 constitution. Mr. Balderas -- Claim 12: Mr. Balderas' 19 constitutional rights were violated when the Trial Court 20 21 was prohibited from instructing the jury that a vote by one juror could result in a life sentence. 22 Claim 13 --2.3 THE COURT: And who made that statement, 24

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you're saying?

MS. ECKHOFF: On -- that the Trial Court 1 2 was prohibited -- are you talking about instructing the 3 jury that a vote --THE COURT: No -- yes. Go ahead with 4 that one. 5 MS. ECKHOFF: 6 With that one --7 THE COURT: Who was reported to have said that? 8 9 MS. HUTCHINS: It's just a standard jury 10 instruction. THE COURT: Oh, I thought that you were 11 12 saying that somebody made that statement in open court. MS. HUTCHINS: Oh. They did. Actually 13 Mr. Nunnery, even though he was prohibited from doing 14 so, actually told the jury in closing argument that one 15 16 vote equals a life sentence. THE COURT: That's what I wanted to hear. 17 18 MS. ECKHOFF: Okay. THE COURT: Did you know that? 19 20 MS. ECKHOFF: That that occurred? 21 THE COURT: Yes. 22 MS. ECKHOFF: Yes, but the jury -- you know, presumably jurors follow the instructions that 23 they're given by the Court. And it's a pretty standard 2.4 25 challenge to the statutory prescribed instruction.

Claim 13: Mr. Balderas' death sentence was arbitrarily and capriciously assigned based on the jury's answer to the unconstitutionally vague first and special issue.

claim 14: Mr. Balderas' death sentence should be vacated because the punishment phase jury instruction restricted the evidence that the jury could determine was mitigating. Again, those are all legal claims that are -- a case for those is made in the application and we agree that no further fact finding on those is necessary.

THE COURT: Anything?

MS. HUTCHINS: I mean, our response on No. 10, the affidavits, not only the ones attached to the State's answers, show that no juror was excluded or potential juror was excluded based off of race.

Everything was done, on the defense end, pursuant to strategy. And that, I guess, at some point the applicant actually raises that they object because -- or they're upset --

THE COURT: There was no Batson challenge anywhere here, right?

MS. HUTCHINS: No. There were prospective jurors who were released based off of their answers to the questionnaire. Now he's upset because he

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argues the majority of them were minorities, and so there's affidavits from the State saying anybody who was excused was not excused based off of race. That's consistent with the State's affidavit as well as the defense affidavit.

The defense affidavit actually -- I believe it's Mr. Nunnery's -- goes into detail and says that with these types of cases, you have one eye down the line. You're looking at what juror's coming up and so you have to make a strategic decision as to is this juror better or worse than the one that's coming down the line. So in those situations, they would agree to dismiss jurors based off of potentially somebody more favorable coming down the line, and that anybody that was dismissed -- agreed to be dismissed by the defense was discussed with Mr. Balderas. Mr. Balderas had no issue with it. Trial counsel explained all their reasons. And for every single juror that was dismissed by agreement, the judge actually asked the defendant whether it was his agreement and the defendant agreed that it was his agreement. And so, the defense --Mr. Nunnery explains in his affidavit that he didn't believe it was necessary to then further on the record explain the inner workings of his conversation and his advice to the defendant on the record. It was

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sufficient for them to say that, yes, the defendant knew and the defendant agreed. That's Ground No. 10.

Grounds No. 11 through 14, all of these were raised by the defense pretrial in a pretrial motion. They were all overruled by the Trial Court. Because they were previously raised and overruled by the Court, under the prevailing case law, the defendant is now procedurally barred from raising them in a post-conviction writ application. Despite the bar, in our answer we go through and we give additional reasons as to why those claims don't have any merit. And so, I can just rely on what we have in the State's answer.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. ECKHOFF: Your Honor, if you don't mind, at this point I would like to hand it off to Ms. Black to preserve my voice.

THE COURT: Pull up a chair.

MS. BLACK: Your Honor, just to return to our prior primary concern today. When we came here, the previous -- the Court previously had made a decision that there was a need for further factual development in this case on issues of ineffective assistance of counsel that we've gone into some depth about today. We came here today to argue that there were actually other issues raised in the petition that require further

factual development.

And to go back to a point that the district attorney made earlier, this is really -- the Article 11.071 contemplates different ways of assisting this Court in making factual findings. The pleadings -- we're at the pleading stage; we feel we've alleged facts which if we were given the opportunity to come into court and prove, we could prove would entitle Mr. Balderas to relief. We came here to ask the Court to take a closer look at some of these claims that require further factual development.

THE COURT: Well, then, please --

MS. BLACK: The ineffective assistance of counsel claims were the claims that the Court previously had deemed where further factual development was necessary but in fact, had deemed that that could be accomplished by the use of affidavits. Now, our position then and it's our position now that affidavits are not a reliable substitute for a -- live testimony in court, at which this Court can assess the credibility and the demeanor of witnesses as opposed to on paper.

But an additional point I'd like to make is that there was an order for these affidavits and then there was a long, long delay and the information, a lot of the facts, which the State is relying on to rebut our

claims in this hearing today, came to light, basically, within the last 24 hours. And it would be -- the Court previously, the prior Court had deemed that there was a need to go into further detail on these claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and in fact, to hear from the witnesses and if provided, for affidavits to be an initial way of doing that. We would ask for an opportunity to respond with more than 24 hours' notice to the factual allegations that were submitted in these affidavits that hadn't even been served on us -
THE COURT: Can we enumerate those for

THE COURT: Can we enumerate those for the record, those that you're talking about again, or are they just the same ones she's already stated?

MS. BLACK: We did the best we could in standing here today, basically, doing it in the form of an ad hoc argument. But what we'd like the opportunity to do is take those affidavits --

THE COURT: I understand.

MS. BLACK: -- back to our office to look at them carefully and to raise -- to file -- a motion has been filed. If this is, in fact, a hearing on that motion, we would like for the opportunity to oppose the motion in writing because a written motion was filed with numerous allegations made in the form of these lengthy affidavits and we feel we deserve, and due

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process requires, that we be entitled to take those affidavits, to study them, and to respond in the same form, in writing, in a written opposition to that motion before this Court takes that motion under advisement.

attempted to do today is, through a quick reading of affidavits, to point out that there are still -- that, in fact, they raise what -- what the Court is charged with doing in designating issues for factual development is deciding whether there's controverted issues of fact. Are there things where we've raised a claim and the State has disputed the claim and it can't -- there's a factual issue that needs to be resolved. So those facts were -- those disputed issues were found by the prior Court to exist with respect to our ineffective assistance of counsel claim and we would argue that due process requires that --

THE COURT: Do you have her ruling in writing somewhere?

MS. HUTCHINS: Judge, the -- I don't have a copy with me. There should be a copy in the file.

THE COURT: So what does it say? If you look at it, what does Judge Guiney say?

MS. HUTCHINS: It's an order designating issue and what it does is, basically, it's the Court

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saying that the Court finds the applicant filed a writ application with these 14 claims and it lists what the 14 claims are and then it said in there that the Court has determined that these claims, that it will resolve these claims and it actually says, "some by application of the applicable law, some" -- back up a second.

It says that, "The Court would resolve these issues in the manner the Court deemed appropriate, namely, some by the application of applicable law, some by the review of the pleadings, some by the review of the appellate record, some by the review of the affidavits submitted by trial counsel, some by recollection of the Court, and some by a review of the submitted habeas evidence."

And so, what it basically says is that the Court is acknowledging that the applicant filed a writ application, these are the 14 grounds, and the Court is going to decide the manner in which it thinks it's appropriate to resolve them. And then the Court issued another order that ordered Mr. Godinich and Mr. Nunnery to do affidavits on these six or seven issues. And that's all that that order said.

And what the effect of that order is is it basically stops the clock at the CCA. Otherwise, if we didn't have that order, we would have to do things on

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a much speedier timetable. That's all it does.

MS. BLACK: It does a little more than that. It's designating that there is an issue that -- and it is providing for factual development of that issue. And these affidavits were contemplated.

Now, what we had hoped to convince the Court was that there were — that in taking a fresh look at this case, there may be other issues that raise controverted issues of fact. Our position is that there are factual issues in several of the claims and most importantly, in the prosecutorial misconduct relating to false testimony, the ineffective assistance of counsel, and the juror misconduct claims. And we urge this Court not to decide them based on the pleadings alone because the burden at the pleading stage is to raise facts which, if proven, would entitle Mr. Balderas to relief.

But in the event that we are speaking solely about these ineffective assistance of counsel affidavits, the mode of factual development is inadequate here for several reasons but one of which is that the affidavits are not a good substitute for live testimony and an evidentiary hearing for many of the reasons that we've talked about, which is that many of the statements in the affidavits raise allegations or questions that we would dispute but often in a manner

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that would be inadmissible in the context of an evidentiary hearing.

And that's also why we, for example, provided a hearsay affidavit in support of our claim, our false testimony claim regarding Israel Diaz; we're asking for further factual development because we don't want to solely rely on the hearsay affidavit. We would like to have access to this Court's subpoena power to prove that claim by bringing the witness into the court where the Court can evaluate the witness' credibility, the demeanor, and both sides have the opportunity to examine and cross-examine the witness and we feel the same thing is appropriate in the context of the ineffective assistance of counsel claims where this process of having an affidavit that's filed five days before we're here in argument and submitted through a motion that was filed only hours ago just really doesn't allow for the full exploration of those issues and doesn't give us adequate time to respond to the -- to the -- to the factual questions that are either answered or raised in that affidavit -- in those affidavits. THE COURT: I think y'all did a fine job

THE COURT: I think y'all did a fine job presenting and rebutting.

MS. BLACK: But we're stuck with what's in the pleadings and what we're asking this Court for is

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to allow us to present you with more.

THE COURT: Yes. I understand. I understand. You may not get that but what you can do is supplement your responses here today with affidavits or motions or memorandum. I don't know what you're going to use and I will read them as well. And then -- so, you have something today for the first time, these affidavits.

MS. BLACK: Well, the motion, could we respond to the motion in writing, I guess. Before the Court rules on the motion, could we file a written opposition? That's --

opposition, that's fine. I'll read it. Let's keep it not so verbose. Let's keep it at a minimum of what you're going to say and address the most serious issues. I know what you say and you're keeping every one of your options and errors open for federal review as well. But I've already told you what I think about several of your errors that you've raised. So, if you want me to respond to it, I would address those of your strongest errors.

MS. BLACK: And we intend to do that and -- and again, this is the difference between where we are now versus where we were at the pleading stage.

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We did come here --

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THE COURT: I understand. You want a live hearing.

MS. BLACK: But it would be relevant to some of the claims and not all of the claims in the petition. There are discrete issues that do require a hearing and where due process does require a hearing but not all of the issues in the petition -- we weren't here to argue all of them, that we would present a hearing on every issue that we made.

THE COURT: Well, if that's what you wanted, then you should really pare it down and just use your strongest errors.

You didn't talk about the translators and the people on the jury panel that spoke Spanish and contradicted what the translation said it was, or the translator said it was. We've had that happen in court here all the time. I'm not — they are not trained, no one on the jury is trained to be a translator. The person here is trained and uses that every day. And every day I will go with what the translator says. I don't care what the juror said she thought she understood from the people speaking Spanish. They're not working as a translator down here. We have a translator here. I know all four or five of the

translators. I speak Spanish and I've corrected the translator myself. But she used a word that was proper enough. So, I'm telling you, I will go with the translator every time.

MS. BLACK: We appreciate the Court's advice about paring things down and putting things into a context. And again, this hearing has gone back and forth on almost every issue but I guess if I could tag onto our request for an opportunity to respond in writing in opposition to the motion the State filed today, we would also like to, because this Court is hearing these issues for the first time, file a written motion for a evidentiary hearing on certain issues in the petition but not all of them and perhaps accompany them with affidavits and things to further convince the Court that there is -- there are controverted issues of fact related to --

strongest ones. I've given you my opinion already just on what I've heard today. Please don't spend your wheels -- spin your wheels on the motel, the person waving, the translator. I know these attorneys, they've practiced before me, I've practiced alongside them for 25 years here. And I've appointed Mr. Godinich before, in the past. So, I know that he's a good lawyer.

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There are only -- we have 179 people on the first degree list, 79 people on the second degree list here, and 69 people on the third degree list here. But there are only, what, 40 or 50 people on the capital list. And that's 40 or 50 people out of the thousands that practice at this courthouse a day. They have to take a special CLE course and maintain their CLE on capital writs and capital cases. These attorneys pioneered the way.

This county was one of the first and the best counties on requiring proper accreditation for capital crime. This -- I would say I don't know of a county that does a better job than Harris. Do you know of one? And we have the best attorneys that are appointed to capital crime. I only appoint people that have the highest accreditations. So, do you know of a county that does it better than this one? I mean, you practice all over the state, don't you?

MS. BLACK: Yes, and as a defense attorney, we deal with issues of ineffective assistance of counsel all the time and in fact, due to recent -- well, not that recent but fairly recent supreme court opinions, doing the work that we're doing at the state court level, we'll have other attorneys reviewing our work and raising allegations of ineffective

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1 assistance --THE COURT: Indeed. Indeed. 2 3 MS. BLACK: -- and really what we're --4 you know, our position is that even the best attorneys 5 can make mistakes and this is a capital case, so what we're looking at is raising claims of error and having 6 7 Courts review the claims of error because of the 8 heightened need to get it right and to not make mistakes 9 in a capital case. So even though it's awkward, raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel is really a 1.0 11 way of saying that even the best counsel can make mistakes and --12 THE COURT: Indeed. 13 14 MS. BLACK: -- if those mistakes go to the reliability of the quilt verdict and death sentence, 1.5 we have an obligation to rectify those errors because of 16 17 the severity of the punishment. THE COURT: Not every error warrants a 18 19 reversal. 20 MS. BLACK: That's certainly true. 21 THE COURT: That happens every day. I tell that to appellate attorneys every day that come in 22 here. So is there anything else you would like to put 23 on the record before we adjourn? 24 MS. HUTCHINS: Just on our end, Judge, 25

that the clerk's office, based off of, I think, the file stamp on them, I just wanted to clarify for the record that Mr. Godinich and Mr. Nunnery filed their affidavits last week and their certificates of service, I believe, saying that they were mailed out by the clerk's office. So I just didn't want the Court to think --

THE COURT: Nobody thinks that.

MS. HUTCHINS: -- that we were sitting on their affidavits.

THE COURT: And they don't think that either. I'm sure it's --

MS. BLACK: It's only been a couple of days and we are in Austin, so they are probably in the mail.

THE COURT: So, if you want me to grant a hearing on further stuff, then you need to pare it down to just your best arguments and tell me what you want to present, who your witnesses are going to be, and what you think that they might testify to. I mean, so, if you put a little summation on the paragraph and then tell me what you hope to produce by that. And you'll give it to them before they give it to me and I'll have both of your responses.

So you get to respond to theirs and they're going to respond to yours right now. So e-mail

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them and then once you both have it and you can both send me your -- I don't know how you'll present it to the Court. Probably it should be in written form for the clerks, not by e-mail.

MS. BLACK: Yeah.

THE COURT: Again, I'm not guaranteeing anything but don't -- don't throw everything in the kitchen sink at me and expect me to grant you a hearing on that. Pare it down to the best ones that you have and I will look at it.

MS. HUTCHINS: Judge, am I correct in my understanding then that you will, once you have their — the defense's objection to our motion and potentially our response from us on their objection, that at that point, once you review it, you will make a decision and you will issue your written order and we will both just get notification of your written order?

THE COURT: I think that's so, yes.

MS. BLACK: And just to clarify, it would be more of a -- we're kind of talking about two different things but there's an opposition to your motion but we're actually affirmatively moving for something as well.

MS. HUTCHINS: No, I understand.

THE COURT: Explain that to me so that I

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know what you mean. 1 MS. BLACK: We were hoping to -- when you 2 discussed paring down the issues and attaching the 3 relevant affidavits, that would be more of a motion for 4 5 an evidentiary hearing than our response to their motion. 6 THE COURT: Yes. 7 MS. BLACK: But it --8 9 THE COURT: I don't want to receive a 35-page document. Tell me what you want to investigate, 10 11 tell me who your witnesses are going to be, what you think they're going to proffer, and we'll go from there. 12 Again, I haven't made any promises of what I'm going to 13 do. I don't know. 14 MS. BLACK: Should we set a time frame 15 16 for the response, for the motion and the response? 17 MS. HUTCHINS: We should. THE COURT: Because the Court of Criminal 18 19 Appeals date is what? September the 25th. MS. HUTCHINS: 20 21 MS. BLACK: We can move to push that out. THE COURT: You will make those motions 22 23 or do we have to make it? MS. HUTCHINS: It has to come from the 24 25 Court.

THE COURT: Does the Court have to make 1 it? 2 MS. HUTCHINS: It has to come from you. 3 THE COURT: You provide it to us. If you 4 5 send it to our court, we'll sign it and ask for more time. 6 MS. HUTCHINS: That's fine. 7 THE COURT: Y'all did a fine job, both of 8 you. I'm really surprised of how verbal and good 9 10 you-all are. MS. HUTCHINS: What type of timetable 11 would you like for the defense to make their motion and 12 objections? 13 THE COURT: What do you think is a 14 reasonable amount of time? 15 MS. ECKHOFF: Your Honor, we would 16 request at least 30 days, if possible, only because we 17 actually have evidentiary --18 THE COURT: She's going to be in labor. 19 MS. HUTCHINS: I don't know. I feel like 2.0 21 30 days is appropriate for findings. 10 days maybe for 22 an objection. 23 MS. BLACK: We both have evidentiary hearings next week in other parts of the state that will 2.4 require being out of the office, but the two of us won't 25

be back in the office for many days for the next two 1 2 weeks. So it might be -- the request is just to put us outside that window so we have some time to put our 3 heads together. 4 THE COURT: How many cases do y'all have, 5 that you two are handling? 6 MS. BLACK: Our office has 40 cases. 7 8 MS. ECKHOFF: Our office as a whole has about 40 cases. I believe I currently have -- I'm 9 10 assigned on nine. THE COURT: Okay. 11 12 MS. BLACK: I'm new to the office, so my caseload hasn't ratcheted up. The reason for the 13 request is just that there are some cases that are 14 outside of where we live so we go on the road and it 15 just is hard to put a motion together when we're --16 17 THE COURT: Okay. Y'all did a fine job. Anything else before we're adjourned? 18 MS. HUTCHINS: Just your timetable, 19 20 Judge. THE COURT: Oh. For you to respond in 21 2.2 writing to me, asking for an evidentiary hearing, how 23 about in 25 days or so? 24 Is that okay with you? MS. HUTCHINS: Yes, Judge. I'm good with 25

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whatever the Court decides. 1 THE COURT: What day is that? 9/12. And 2 3 forgive me. Tell me the name of the organization with the State? 4 MS. ECKHOFF: We're with the Office of 5 Capital and Forensic Writs. 6 7 Is there also a timetable for the State's response to our filing? 8 9 MS. HUTCHINS: I'm okay with ten days, 10 Judge. 11 THE COURT: Okay. Ten days beyond that. MS. HUTCHINS: From 9/12, which would get 12 us to Friday, 9/22. 13 14 THE COURT: Okay. 9/22, and that's the 15 State's response to -- what's the acronym to your office? 16 17 MS. HUTCHINS: The OCFW. THE COURT: OCFW. Okay. Thank you very 1.8 19 much for your time. 20 MS. BLACK: Thank you, Your Honor. MS. ECKHOFF: Thank you. 21 22 (Hearing adjourned.) 23 2.4 25

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STATE OF TEXAS
COUNTY OF HARRIS

I, Renee Reagan, Official Court Reporter in and for the 179th District Court of Harris County, State of Texas, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing contains a true and correct transcription of all portions of evidence and other proceedings requested in writing by counsel for the parties to be included in this volume of the Reporter's Record in the above-styled and numbered cause, all of which occurred in open court or in chambers and were reported by me.

I further certify that this Reporter's Record of the proceedings truly and correctly reflects the exhibits, if any, offered by the respective parties.

WITNESS MY OFFICIAL HAND, this the 22nd day of August, 2017.

/s/Renee Reagan
Renee Reagan, CSR
Texas CSR 7573
Official Court Reporter
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Harris County, Texas
1201 Franklin
Houston, Texas 77002
Telephone: 832.927.4105
Expiration: 12/31/18

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